Commentary

Volume Fifty-seven, Number Two, February 1974

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Sonya Rudikoff

Berrigan's Diatribe
Robert Alter

The Presidency & Professor Schlesinger
Michael Novak

Books in Review:
Johanna Kaplan
Edward Grossman
Jane Larkin Crain
Paul Warshow
Joseph W. Bishop, Jr.

The Road to Geneva
Theodore Draper

America, Europe & the Middle East
Eugene V. Rostow

Do the Arabs Want Peace?
Gil Carl AlRoy

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

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Commentary

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Life mask taken 60 days before Lincoln's death. The hand was cast in 1860. From the collection of Clarence Hay


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

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Letters from Readers

Male and Female

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

I am so pleased by the accuracy, perception, and integrity of David Gutmann's treatment of my book, *The Inevitability of Patriarchy* ["Men, Women, and the Parental Imperative," December 1973], that it is a bit embarrassing to raise even the most minor of points. However, I think it necessary to make the following point in order to preclude the possibility of misconception on the part of those who have read the essay but not the book. (That Mr. Gutmann has not himself misunderstood my purpose is clear from the rest of his essay.)

I am quoted as having written: "The evidence indicates that women [should] follow their own physiological imperatives and not choose to compete for the goals that men devote their lives to attaining. . . ." Perhaps it would have been better to replace the deleted words with "would" rather than "should." The purpose of my book was not to suggest how women or men or societies *should* behave, but why they *do* behave as they *do,* in reality, behave. My point in the quoted sentence was that the female's greater nurturant and supportive behavior is probably rooted in female physiology and that—even if males did not have a physiologically-engendered greater need to attain dominance—this fact would preclude most women's choosing to sacrifice the joys and satisfactions that males sacrifice in order to attain dominance in hierarchies and in the male-female relationships.

It is the reality of the male's greater need to attain dominance, a need that is engendered by male physiology and cued by the environmental presence of a hierarchy or a member of the other sex, that my book attempts to demonstrate. It is the process by which social values, socialization, and institutions conform to and exaggerate the physiological reality that I attempt to explain. At its most basic, the theory I present concludes that there is certain behavior that is a precondition for attainment of dominance in hierarchies and male-female relationships, that male physiology is such that males are motivated more strongly and more readily to manifest the behavior that is necessary if one is to attain dominance in a hierarchy or male-female relationship, and that socialization conforms to and exaggerates this reality. Socialization exaggerates by making qualitative and discrete the sexual differentiation that, on a physiological-behavioral level, is quantitative and continuous; thus, social values exaggerate the physiologically-generated reality—that males more often and more strongly manifest the behavior that is necessary for the attainment of dominance in hierarchies and male-female relationships—into social values stating that "men are aggressive" and "women are passive," and this exaggeration results in a greater differentiation of male and female behavior than physiology alone would engender.

STEVEN GOLDBERG
Department of Sociology
CUNY
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

David Gutmann attributes the sharp differentiation of sexual roles formed during young adulthood to the need to facilitate parenting behavior. According to Mr. Gutmann, men reach a peak of aggressiveness and ambition in their first decades of adulthood in order to achieve the power required for them to provide amply for their children, and women suppress their ambition and assertiveness in order to serve as patient and devoted caretakers. Impressed with the survival value of this pattern of sexual differentiation, Mr. Gutmann does not dwell upon the motivation for its development. Are these sex-role distinctions deliberately adopted for the sake of child rearing or do they develop in response to various forms of social pressure? Let us briefly speculate on how they come about. Having been goaded during childhood by strategically dispensed doses of approval and disapproval, we enter the promised land of adulthood trained to respond to social pressure, and prepared, finally, after a long apprenticeship, to prove our worth. This sense of worth has been defined in part in terms of the fulfillment of traditional sex roles. We have come to believe that

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a man is as good as what he achieves, and that his achievement is measured by units of power, earnings, and related indices of conquest. The evaluation of a woman is mainly based on whom she marries and the degree to which she can gracefully support the achievement drive of her husband. It is within this framework that we, in our thirties and the years before and after, devote ourselves to passing the test of worth with outstanding grades, to earning high regard and approval.

By middle age, however, one's status is more or less established, and having actually experienced and accommodated to moral judgment, the long-treasured goal of acceptance loses much of its glitter. As a result, we may begin to withdraw from the contest and to function within a more personally meaningful framework of values. As Mr. Gutmann has observed, a reversal of sex roles is likely to occur at middle age; men feel less impelled to dominate and conquer and women are less ready to remain passive and unassertive. It is as though we are only permitted to feel our own impulses, to know ourselves, in the twilight of life.

When viewed from this perspective, the sex-role differentiation valued by Mr. Gutmann is seen as the culmination of a massive socialization process, one which ruthlessly coerces people to follow certain roles and functions irrespective of their individual needs or desires. In the case of sex-role differentiation, it leads to oppression and inequity. Mr. Gutmann seems unduly impressed with the effectiveness of this social pattern as a mode of adaptation, failing to assess its enormous toll in wasted energy, misplaced effort, and mangled spirit.

HERBERT ZIMILES
Bank Street College of
Education
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . Like David Gutmann, I view the assertion of femaleness and maleness as natural to us, and the expression of one's own sexual gender as intrinsically good. Furthermore, I support his life-cycle perspective on sex roles. But I should like to add my evolutionary perspective to his concept of the parental imperative. It is, of course, perfectly possible for men and women to grow up without becoming parents, and in today's world it is increasingly desirable for some—but not all—to do so. It is even conceivable to me that an entire society might renounce reproduction and its members live fulfilling lives. But such a society would perish in one generation. We, therefore, are each of us products of an unbroken line of individuals who were committed—whether by nature, sex-role training, or accident—to the care of the next generation; and so we, however flawed as individuals, are at an absolute advantage over any individuals in the past who were committed to remaining childless. Natural and cultural selection have continuously favored the individual and social patterns which implement reproduction; Mr. Gutmann's prototypical family, the woman nurturing the young and the man out stalking in the jungles (of the Equator or of Wall Street) . . . is the most widespread, successful model.

So much for my endorsement. Now for some reservations. I have been intrigued by the waves of feminism (in Europe in the preceding century; in Israel at the turn of this century; in the U.S. early in this century as well as recently), high tides which subsequently ebb. I have interpreted this ongoing conflict between some sort of sex-typing and some form of egalitarianism as evidence of the attraction of the traditional role for *women*—an interpretation to which Mr. Gutmann would probably subscribe, although women do not receive much attention in his discussion, which deals chiefly with their petulant sons. But feminism as I understand it—and I do not understand it too well, having been a resident of Israel in the decade during which its momentum was greatest—does not seem to me to be attacking sex roles out of an antagonism to sexuality, but because sex roles, over the centuries, have been intrinsically bound to status differences. (I am still surprised, coming from the academic setting of Israel, where the determination of one's salary was a sexless process, . . . to discover that women in the United States do not receive equal pay for equal work.) Not only have I alluded in print to the attractiveness of the traditional role for women, but I myself have . . . three

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

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1 Avoid paying extra installation charges when you order new phone service. Have all the work done at one time. Changing your mind later will mean extra visits and extra charges. So consider carefully all the different colors and styles, how many phones you want and exactly where you want them installed.

2 Ask one of our business office Service Representatives to explain the different types of service offered by your local Bell Company. Choose the one which best fits your pattern of calling. If you don't do a lot of calling each month, ask if "budget" or "limited" service is available in your area at a lower rate.

3 Ask the Service Representative for a rundown on the specific rates and charges you can expect. Find out exactly what the regular monthly charges will be, and what the one-time-only payments are. Find out whether there are options in your area of paying on a monthly basis, or making a single one-time only payment, on certain items.

4 Are you going to be away from home for any extended period of time? A business office Service Representative can tell you, based on how long you plan to be away, whether you could save money by temporarily suspending your telephone service.

5 Moving to a new residence? Ask a Service Representative whether you are eligible for a credit on your bill if you take your present phones along with you to your new location.

6 If you've never had a phone in your name before, or have never established credit, you may be asked to pay a deposit when you order telephone service. But we don't like to keep deposits for long periods of time. In fact, if you establish good credit with us by paying on time, we'll return your deposit to you PLUS interest. Ask a Service Representative to explain the details which apply in your area.

7 If a coin phone swallows your money but doesn't give you your call, you're entitled to a refund. Find a phone that works, dial "Operator" and explain what happened. You'll get a refund in the mail. P.S. We'd appreciate it if you'd also tell the operator the telephone number and location of the phone that's out of order so we can get it fixed as soon as possible.

8 Reach a wrong number on a Long Distance call you just dialed? Don't just hang up. Ask for the area code and the number you reached in error. Then dial "Operator" and report what happened. The operator will have the charge removed.

9 Get a poor connection on a Long Distance call, or get cut off in the middle of your conversation? Don't just hang up and call back. The person who placed the call should report what happened to an operator. The operator will issue a credit for the time your call was interrupted.

10 Error on your bill, with a charge for a Long Distance call you didn't make? Call the business office. A Service Representative will arrange to get the charge removed.

11 Save on Long Distance charges by cutting down on person-to-person calls. It's true you may not be able to reach the person you want on your first try with a station-to-station call. But in many instances you can make two (or even three) out-of-state station-to-station calls for what it would cost you to make that one person-to-person call. This is particularly true if you dial your own calls instead of going through an operator.

12 Dialing your own out-of-state Long Distance calls is the least expensive way of all. If you don't know the number for a call you want to make to a distant city, you can obtain it at no charge to you by dialing the area code (when required) for that city, plus 555-1212, for Directory Assistance. Then dial direct and save. Save time

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;ave money
)hone bill.

in the future by recording the number in your personal number book. A listing of all area codes can be found in the information pages at the front of your local telephone directory.

13 Make sure you know when dial-direct rates apply before you make your call. They apply on all out-of-state calls to anywhere in the United States (excluding Alaska) if they are completed from a residence or business phone without an operator's assistance. They also apply on calls placed with an operator from a residence or business phone when direct dialing facilities are not yet available.

14 But it's even more important to know the circumstances when direct-dial rates do NOT apply. They do not apply on person-to-person, hotel-guest, credit card or collect calls, or on calls charged to another number, because an operator must assist on such calls. Direct-dial rates do not apply on calls made from coin phones, even those from which you dial the complete number yourself before the operator comes on.

15 While operator-handled calls cost you more than those you dial yourself, there is one exception. If you run into equipment trouble completing a Long Distance call you're dialing yourself from a home or business phone, you're still eligible for the dial-direct rate even if you require an operator's assistance. Explain your problem to an operator. If you need help in getting the call through, or in making a satisfactory connection, confirm with the operator that it will be charged at the dial-direct rate.

16 Dial direct, but save even more by making your out-of-state Long Distance calls within the time periods when rates are lowest. The lower rates for out-of-state calls made in the evening, on the weekends or late at night are described for you in the call guide in the front of your local directory.

17 Don't get caught by surprise, or miss out on the money you can save on Long Distance calls you make within your state. The times when lower rates apply may be different than for your out-of-state calls. Check carefully in the call guide in the front of your local directory for a description of when to save on calls you make within your state.

18 If you're concerned about avoiding added charges on your Long Distance calls in general, don't guess how long you've been talking. Time yourself, so you can finish your call before overtime rates apply. To save even more time and money, jot down what you want to say before you dial.

19 Before you go ahead and place a Long Distance call to a business, check first to see if they have a toll-free number. You can recognize it because it has an 800 prefix instead of a regular area code. If they have one, it's usually displayed in their advertising, or you may find it listed in your own local telephone directory. If so, the call's on them, and you save.

20 The information pages at the front of your local telephone book are a good source for tips on how to place your calls and how to save time and money in using your telephone. Look in the book, and save.

We hear you.

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children—a reactionary number in these times—so I can speak with some personal certainty on the point.

But "tradition" changes. Mr. Gutmann concedes that the sense of a parental imperative was more urgent when the average life condition was one of hardship. I have seen this for myself, in a cross-cultural study of women in five Israeli subcultures ranging from traditionalism to modernity, carried out by Aaron Antonovsky, Benjamin Maoz, and myself. Among our traditional women it was typical to see the entire reproductive period, from menarche to menopause, given over to childbearing and childrearing; in this group we also found the traditional sex roles (although women in a traditional setting play a much more active economic role than do women who are transitional, a fact often overlooked by social scientists). And, most intriguingly: of our five subcultures, morale was highest among the most modern women; but they were closely followed by the most traditional women—suggestive evidence for the viability of tradition, and the pain of transition.

We cannot, however, restore the sense of urgency to the parental imperative, save by some rather drastic measures: the elimination of mass inoculation against childhood disease, for example, would recreate an awareness of the fragility of human childhood. Less sweeping measures, such as an assertion of emergency, will not do. The jungle of male achievement has altered too; I am not persuaded that the verbal aggression and symbolic hostility of competition is "merely" a sublimated version of the caveman. This transformation has meant a more stable social structure, longer and healthier lives, purchased at the price of a sense of genuine urgency, of "clear and present danger." It is now possible to compare the activities of young fathers, who energetically manage their paperwork, to those of young mothers, who energetically manage their children—for mothering is not only a matter of cuddling, it requires as much active management and planning as an executive position in administration. We can rejoice that our men have gone beyond tribal battles, rejoice that our children do not perish in infancy and early childhood, and we must, as in everything else, pay a price. To return to Mr. Gutmann's evolutionary perspective and my own, we cannot in our own lifetimes damn unisex, nor even what appears to be a generation adverse to parenting: it may be that this is our species' response to overcrowding. It may even be that we are becoming extinct. But as psychologists we must deal with social realities, including historical and economic and medical changes which have altered "traditions." We may, as private persons, regret the passing of traditions; as students of human behavior we must also be watching for the emergence of new roles, adapted to our transformed circumstances.

NANCY DATAN
Department of Psychology
West Virginia University
Morgantown, West Virginia

DAVID GUTMANN writes:

I particularly appreciate Steven Goldberg's capsule statement of his theory because—without sacrificing the parsimony and elegance of his earlier statements—he has given particular weight to the influence of female biology, and even female instigation, in bringing about patriarchy. This is about the best statement that I have read on the "fittedness," the mutual facilitation, of biological potentials and cultural norms.

I have read Herbert Zimiles's letter three times, and can only conclude that he is attacking a straw man (or, as he might prefer, a straw person). That is, he faults me for omissions that I cannot find in my text. For example, he complains that I am so "impressed with the survival value of this pattern of sexual differentiation" that I do not "dwell upon the motive for its development." Life may be easier at Bank Street than it is in Ann Arbor, but I always thought that survival was the basis of important motives, and that by discussing the survival value of sex differences I had pointed to a necessary (if not sufficient) basis for these distinctions. But Mr. Zimiles will not agree that I have discussed the motives for sex distinction until I locate them where he does, in society rather than in some trans-social parental imperative. But if Mr. Zimiles insists that sex differences are only responsive to cultural goading, in the service of capitalistic and chauvinistic goals, then he ends up, strangely enough, with a position that is far more chauvinistic than mine. After all, behind every theory of social causation—including that of Mr. Zimiles—there is an implicit theory of human nature, a model of the kind of person who would be congenial to the social institutions and forces in question. It is not clear from his text, but I assume that Mr. Zimiles admits the universality of the "social pressures" that turn out patriarchal men and gracefully acquiescent women. But these universal social coercions must be invented and served by people: they must speak for intrinsic sex differences—power-hunger in men, cow-like passivity in women. I have argued that both sexes are equal before the great demands and necessities of parenthood; but Mr. Zimiles's conception of explicit social coercions (and corresponding but implicit sex differences) disparages both sexes, and particularly women. Sexism strikes again: Mr. Zimiles has forcefully argued the case for essential female masochism.

I entirely agree with Nancy Datan in her view that we have to be ready for "new roles, adapted to our transformed circumstances." After all, I ended my article by insisting that the parental imperative has to be fitted to our time and to our circumstances. My argument is not against new roles, *per se*, nor do I claim that we should portion out parental responsibilities among the sexes as though we were still living in the jungle. But I do insist that the parental emergency has not ended with the decline in infant mortality and the ebbing of the physical threats to children's health. There is much research and clinical evidence to show that young children need emotional security as well as physical security, and that children whose emotional needs are unmet—even if they are well-fed, warm, and vaccinated—will neither thrive as children nor succeed as parents. The question is whether the new roles now being proposed by the radical feminists will continue to insure the emotional security of young children. After all, young children do not get essential security from peer groups, from encounter groups, or even from day-care centers; they get the sense of basic security, of basic trust, from parents who can look after them because they also look after each other.

The new roles, the new forms of marriage proposed by the radical feminists go a long way toward guaranteeing the autonomy of parents, their liberation from each other. Mutual commitment, mutual

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support between parents—particularly when these conflict with the individual's rights to "liberation" and "self-expression"—have relatively low priority. This arrangement can make for some great parties, for a swinging life, but it does not lead to the unquestioned, guaranteed sense of trust between mates that has always been a major goal—as well as the major virtue—of marriage. The trouble is that parents who cannot finally trust their mates are not likely to be trustworthy figures to their children. We may already be seeing the results of the liberated marriage: children who trust impersonal sources of comfort and security—drugs, liquor, plastic gurus, electronic noise—more than they trust other people. I do not think that it is the job of psychologists to sanction as "adaptive" the sex roles that lead to such outcomes merely because they are "new."

Kissinger & Foreign Policy

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Walter Laqueur's article, "Kissinger and the Politics of Détente" [December 1973], raises a number of interesting questions with respect both to the nature of foreign policy and to the particular choices facing American statecraft. Despite the title of his article, Mr. Laqueur has great difficulty in distinguishing between Henry Kissinger and Richard M. Nixon as the authors of various aspects of American foreign policy. I shall not attempt to do so, for Richard M. Nixon, even more than most previous American Presidents, considers himself an expert in this area. Any cursory effort by me to disentangle personal stands of American foreign policy would raise far more questions than it would answer.

I agree with Mr. Laqueur that the Washington press has bought an image of American foreign policy that badly misrepresents both its successes and failures. Paradoxically, I believe that the Nixon/Kissinger policy has been both more successful than Mr. Laqueur gives it credit for and also more awkward and self-defeating than he acknowledges.

Despite Mr. Laqueur's conservative stance on American policy, he shares with many of his liberal adversaries the illusion that the great changes in the contours of world politics that have occurred during the Nixon administration were "in the cards." He believes that any American government eventually would have got out of Vietnam, strengthened détente with the Soviet Union, achieved a rapprochement with China, and reached a SALT agreement, although perhaps a better one a few years later. Although the policies Mr. Laqueur would advocate to reach these "inevitable" end positions would differ from those that Abram Chayes, for instance, would have advocated as Senator McGovern's foreign-policy adviser, he essentially agrees with Chayes that we would have got them anyway.

It is difficult to argue a negative. I certainly would not wish to be put in the position of arguing that alternative policies could not possibly have produced the current state of affairs. The world is a very complicated place and is capable of producing many surprises despite the best assessments of which men are capable. However, I believe that the policies of the Nixon/Kissinger team facilitated developments that most Americans support and that well might not have occurred in their absence, and that further development can still be frustrated by inappropriate policies.

Although I doubt that any serious leadership faction in the Soviet Politburo wishes to return to the extreme conditions of the cold war, Brezhnev's policy of cooperation with the United States is under severe attack from a strong faction led by Suslov and Ponomarev. Despite the favorable aspects of SALT I for the Soviet Union, Brezhnev's signature upon the two agreements, although he holds no official Russian governmental position, was necessary to protect the agreements from Secretariat attack.

It is difficult to get information from inside China, but there apparently was some strong opposition to its realignment with the United States, despite the threat from the Soviet Union. If the United States had not pursued a reasonably firm policy in Vietnam, I believe that the value of the United States to China, with respect to direct reassurance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and its ability to serve as a counterweight against efforts by the Soviet Union to forge a *cordon sanitaire* around China in Southeast Asia, would have been severely damaged.

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

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

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that the firmness of the American position also facilitated Soviet accommodation with the United States by providing the moderates in the Politburo with one strong argument for accommodation—the resilience and the determination of the United States would make it a dangerous enemy—to reinforce other motivations such as the need for economic assistance and the desire to quiet things in the West while facing the Chinese "menace" in the East. Even here, we can see how this last motivation would have been greatly diminished if China had not seen the United States as a worthy source of assistance. It was not an accident that both China and the Soviet Union were motivated to assist the United States in bringing the Vietnamese war to a close in a way that did not produce a catastrophic debacle for American policy. If one can argue, as I believe is reasonable, that world conditions prepared the way for the successes of the Nixon/Kissinger team, they knew how to make use of these conditions and did so with considerable skill.

By the standard of Bismarck, which Mr. Laqueur cites, my evaluation tends to support the administration. By comparison with the two previous administrations, it also scores high grades. How, therefore, can I say that its record is even worse than Mr. Laqueur suggests? The answer to this lies in its style, and I will first refer to more particular aspects of style.

The Nixon/Kissinger team is given to a personalistic, heavy-handed diplomacy. It does not make use sufficiently well of the resources existing within the American government; nor does it collaborate well with its allies. It badly misuses the techniques of diplomacy. In late 1971, the placing of two warships in the Indian Ocean during the India-Pakistani dispute was an exercise in ridiculousness. A great power must not provide the world with a demonstration of its ineffectiveness, and the two rationales produced by the administration for this effort did not make sense.

The first rationale was that this move was required to prevent the Indians from moving against West Pakistan. If they had queried the Russians, they would have understood that the Russians had given this matter considerable thought with respect to their own interests and that Russian support for the Indian venture was predicated upon three considerations: 1) it would be over in a few days; 2) there were 1,200 miles between East and West Pakistan; 3) the particular nature of the provocation. If they had learned this, they would have known precisely when Russian policy would change in the United Nations. Moreover, as Soviet experts themselves point out, if the United States had discounted this information, there were more effective ways in which it could offer warning. The second rationale for this policy was to manifest a parallel line with the Chinese. The problem with this argument is that there were better ways of doing this. A diplomatic mission could have been sent to Peking for a joint statement. Other political and military actions were possible that would have shown some degree of support for China, if this were considered necessary. It is difficult to see how a manifestly unsuccessful action would serve as a buttress for policy. Surely Chou is too sophisticated to be impressed with this performance, except as a sign of a desire to please China.

The current Middle Eastern crisis was also badly handled by the administration. Kissinger, with all the chips in his pocket, sold himself short in Moscow. The Russians had to save the Egyptian Third Army to preserve their influence with Sadat. Kissinger could have got the same *quid pro quo*—an agreement for direct negotiations—for a cease-fire that would have occurred thirty-six hours later, provided his coordination with the Israelis had been good enough to guarantee the safety of the Egyptian Third Army. The additional thirty-six hours would have provided the Israelis with a defensible position on the West Suez bank, which then could have been used for legitimate trading purposes.

Having "flubbed" this one, and having provided the Russians with a legitimate reason for interfering after the Israelis secured a defensible position for themselves subsequent to the cease-fire, the Kissinger/Nixon team overreacted to the "threatened" Russian intervention. Perhaps there was a faction in the Politburo that desired a direct Russian presence. Even if this were so, however, the main Soviet objective was saving the Egyptian Third Army. Far more modest moves—and a more modest public presentation of them—such as moving the Mediterranean fleet or putting a single airborne division on the alert, would have served the Nixon administration as well and would have given Brezhnev the only arguments he needed within the Politburo for the more moderate course that he probably preferred anyway.

The difficulty with a worldwide alert including the nuclear strategic force, even at a low level, is that it devalues the currency of diplomacy. It makes it more difficult to give appropriate signals during a real crisis. Beyond this, Nixon weakened Brezhnev's position in defense of détente because he appeared to defeat humiliatingly a real Soviet intention to intervene, when Brezhnev's real purpose was probably achieved. He will probably pay back the administration for that one at an appropriate time. Moreover, if the administration is so clumsy, it is also less useful and trustworthy as a collaborator.

I agree with Mr. Laqueur that the SALT agreement was not a particularly good one for the United States. On the other hand, his suggestion that we could have done better by continuing the arms race overlooks the fact that in the absence of this agreement, the administration would have been unlikely to win any Congressional votes on this issue. For its own internal political reasons, the United States needed SALT I. However, it is true, for reasons other than those that Mr. Laqueur gives, that the Nixon/Kissinger team mishandled SALT. Its Congressional coordination was poor. There were things that could have been done that would have strengthened its hand such as the ULLMS item that was taken out of the supplemental defense budget in early 1972 because of poor coordination with Senator Stennis. The Nixon/Kissinger team also undermined its SALT negotiators by reaching agreements behind their backs on the basis of a poorly-evaluated posture. The Nixon/Kissinger team then were so eager to reach the agreements during Nixon's Moscow visit that they were signed without adequate definitions of key terms.

This was another exercise in the kind of personalistic diplomacy that produced the shocks with respect to Japan. The seeming dislike of the Nixon/Kissinger team for the Japanese, and its seeming personal preference for the Chinese, probably interferes seriously with its conduct of diplomacy.

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It would go beyond the confines of this particular letter to indicate the extent to which relations with our European allies were also unnecessarily injured by the brusque personal diplomacy of the Nixon/Kissinger team—a diplomacy not fully attuned to the information available in the bureaucracy. Although I am not an advocate of the bureaucracy's determining policy, it could be used far better than it is being used.

Finally, and briefly, I wish to refer to what may be the most important failure of the Nixon/Kissinger team, a failure that is reflected in Nixon's conduct of domestic policy. It is impossible to conduct policy in a democracy unless the Presidency symbolizes the highest values for which the nation stands. In the absence of such a posture, cynicism and distrust become inevitable. The area of foreign policy is a particularly difficult one for people to understand.

Without the NATO alliance, the Russians might Finlandize Europe and seize effective control of the Eurasian heartland. Yet authoritarian Greece is the linchpin of the Mediterranean and an essential member of NATO. Détente with the Soviet Union and China is essential to avoid global catastrophe. Yet these are authoritarian nations. The United Nations is designed to represent most of mankind. Yet most of its members have tyrannous and despotic regimes.

The compromises that policies in these areas force upon our nation confuse the public with respect to our objectives abroad. It is important for our national leadership to be able to symbolize these values in such a way that the public has faith in the probity of national objectives, for if it does not, it will be unwilling to make sacrifices for them. If cynicism reigns supreme, the public will support only those measures most directly and visibly connected with narrow self-interests.

There are many ways in which the President can symbolize national values, depending upon the candor and greatness of spirit that he manifests. There are potential instruments of policy available to him, although these are highly arguable, such as a possible organization of democratic states, regardless of internal economic system, with a non-compulsory court of human rights and cooperative efforts in solving the energy and pollution problems.

The greatest failure of the Nixon/Kissinger team is in this area of national values. It conveys no vision of the future. It does not manifest greatness of spirit. And here I am not referring to false abstract moralisms that have been current in recent debate, but to a concern for the future of men both here and abroad that takes into account the particularities of their conditions of life and the hopes that all decent men would share for their common future.

MORTON A. KAPLAN
Center for Policy Study
The University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois

"To the Country"

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Bette Howland's "'To the Country" [November 1973] is nothing less than superb. Bravo.

STEVE ALLEN
Van Nuys, California

Tragedy in Judaism

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Frederick Plotkin's article on what he calls the tragic dilemma of Judaism ["Jews and the Tragic Sense," November 1973], though courageously propounded and

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often brilliantly formulated, nevertheless seems to me to miss the full depth of its own ambitious scope. Mr. Plotkin starts out, evidently prompted by the eternal Jewish sufferings and the recent terrible experience of the Holocaust, to cast his doubt upon God's "good intentions" toward Israel and to utter his surprise at the fact that the "Jews think God cannot be our enemy." Earlier he had already voiced his uncertainty as to the "morals" of the Deity, only recognizing His might. Were it not for this restriction, one might think Mr. Plotkin were setting out to establish a new-fangled type of *modern rebellious atheism.* But then, toward the end of the article, he ironically attacks the "present American Jews of the secular kingdom.". . .

I would like first to note Mr. Plotkin's strange interpretation of the Book of Job. According to Mr. Plotkin, Job, contrary to Jewish tradition, is a rebel who is indignant about God's injustice to him and does not believe in His benevolence; Job's virtue has not proved to be a shield against the miseries and misfortunes of life. In sharp contrast to the teachings of rabbis and Talmudists on the one hand and the findings of modern psychology on the other, Mr. Plotkin takes the Job story at face value, neglecting its symbolism and hidden implications. These other sources see in the Book of Job a refutation of the thesis that virtue and reward, vice and punishment, are necessarily associated. The seemingly righteous man is made to suffer precisely as a test of his righteousnes. . . .

I was almost amazed to discover throughout the article a rather simplistic and all-too-popular concept of God. One has the feeling that Mr. Plotkin, despite his presumed sophistication, sees the relationship between God and the Jews as that of a good old father "above" who looks down at every individual as well as at all the nations and distributes his favors in a friendly but rather whimsical and arbitrary manner. This is the peak of a primitive anthropomorphism which turns out to be completely alien to genuine Judaism. The great Jewish philosophers, from Maimonides, the Kabbalists, and Spinoza up to Leo Baeck and Martin Buber, have never conceived of a God who personally intervenes in all human affairs and takes part in every ephemeral event. This is a thoroughly pagan idea which, unfortunately, has entered Christianity and partly destroyed the pure notion of God in its original Jewish form. . . . It was the greatness of the Jewish people that it maintained the concept of the unfathomable God of whom no graven image nor picture of any kind should ever be formed through three millennia of battles and persecution. This sublime concept enabled the Jewish nation from ancient times up to the present to develop . . . the highest form of ethical laws. . . .

Mr. Plotkin is right on one *point: there is no perfectibility* possible in this world, for the simple reason that the human soul contains elements of evil as well as of good and human life is finite and ephemeral (Schopenhauer, incidentally, attacked the doctrine of the perfectibility of the world, not because it was "irreligious" but because of its shallowness and lack of realism; he rejected Judeo-Christian religion, as he understood it). But there is no reason for despair even in the post-Holocaust world. In the final analysis, the conscious individual is capable of accomplishing higher goals in the framework of that immortal life force of which he forms but a small part. . . .

HENRY WALTER BRANN
Takoma Park, Maryland

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Frederick Plotkin's article falls into the error that is as old as humanity itself—and one that Spinoza wisely avoided—anthropomorphism. Mr. Plotkin sets up a God of fantasy, one sitting . . . in heaven, beloved of Jews and loving Jews alone, and then proceeds to show that He is not good. How could He treat His beloved in such a way? . . . As Frederick Kettner, noted Spinozist, once said: "Spinoza's idea of God cannot be understood from an anthropomorphic point of view, nor can His infinite attributes be comprehended numerically." . . . Spinoza's God was not an old man with a beard dispensing good and evil but the most lofty conception of God ever conceived by the human mind: "God is a being consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence." . . .

Mr. Plotkin's major premise, or definition, thus being faultily conceived, the rest of his structure totters, although some of his other ideas, such as the dual nature of man, are indisputable (Spinoza was perhaps the first in the modern period to elucidate this duality. . . . I also agree with Mr. Plotkin about the need for renunciation. Spinoza, having shown man's slavery to his passions in the fourth book of the *Ethics,* proceeds in the fifth book to show the way to human freedom, or blessedness, through learning to understand himself and his emotions and the idea of God. This renunciation is not a vague generality—the more the individual renounces false, fictitious, and doubtful ideas of God or Reality (such as the phantasm Mr. Plotkin has created), the more he comes to love this God of Reality, and liberate himself from useless things.

BURTON STONE
Cleveland Heights, Ohio

FREDERICK PLOTKIN writes:

I am grateful for the opportunity to respond to Henry Walter Brann and Burton Stone. I should like to tell them that to read essays on the Jewish sense of tragedy and on the Holocaust in particular without having in mind a general map of the Jewish theological meanings of evil, justice, guilt, and justification is to move about in the midst of ambiguities unrealized; and it is to fail to observe important causal factors in certain of the most momentous processes of change in Jewish thought and Jewish feeling in the 20th century. For "Holocaust" has, of course, been the chief and most pregnant word in the terminology of all the normative provinces of Jewish thought in our generation; and the multiplicity of its meanings has made it easy, and common, to slip more or less insensibly from one connotation to another, and thus in the end to pass from one ethical or subjective standard to its very antithesis, while nominally professing the same alleged principles of sense.

There has been no lack of juridical exegetes in the history of Judaism who have understood substitutive suffering as a supreme way of salvaging the law of retribution. According to that scheme, the suffering which is a gift from God would be the means by which mercy would give "satisfaction" to justice. In this mechanical balancing of the divine attributes, justice and mercy, the new quality of the offered suffering is swallowed up again in the quantitative law of retribution.

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

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In reality, the suffering that is a gift takes up into itself the suffering that is a scandal, and thus inverts the relation of guilt to suffering. According to biblical law, guilt was supposed to produce suffering. Perhaps that is the reason finally that a stage of absurd suffering, the stage of Job, and perhaps the Holocaust as well, was needed, to mediate the movement from punishment to generosity, or as the Kabbalistic tradition expresses it, to become the spokesman for the redemptive quality of suffering.

That is why tragedy in Judaism has never finished dying. The theme of the wrath of God, the ultimate *motive of the tragic consciousness*, is invincible to the arguments of the philosopher as well as of the theologian. For there is no rational vindication of the innocence of God; every explanation of the Stoic, Spinozistic, or Leibnizian type is wrecked, like the naive arguments of Job's friends, on the suffering of the innocent. They leave intact the opacity of evil and the opacity of the world; as soon as meaninglessness appears to swoop down intentionally on man, the schema of the wrath of God looms up and the tragic consciousness is once again restored.

The empiricists Stone and Brann therefore cannot argue that it would be self-contradictory to approve of God while disapproving of His works—to judge that He is all good though we judge any or all of His creation evil—because neither is the causal connection between God's act of creation and the evil that we disapprove an entailment, nor is there any entailment between our disapproval and that which causes it.

It would, for instance, be an utter non sequitur to argue that because I dislike pain, and God, being omnipotent, does not abolish pain, I *must* dislike God. And even if it did follow logically from my dislike of pain that I should disapprove of an omnipotent God, it would not, according to strict empiricism, follow causally. On this doctrine, then, approval of an omnipotent God is perfectly compatible with disapproval of any of His works, and the second horn of the dilemma is crumpled.

Ethnic Enterprise

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Murray Friedman's review of Ivan Light's *Ethnic Enterprise in America* [Books in Review, December 1973] and the book itself offer invaluable insights on the failure of black capitalism. The culture which social reality forced blacks to accept was devoid of the traditional foundations upon which could be built those social institutions which enabled all other ethnic groups to move upward. . . .

Mr. Friedman notes the poor showing of black-owned and -managed business ($473.4 million) in America's trillion-dollar economy and attributes it to the absence of a stable and cohesive black ethnic history. . . . I have no quarrel with this analysis. . . . I do, however, believe that there is another factor which might have been taken into account, an issue of importance in measuring all ethnic enterprise. . . . Suppose that instead of comparing the gross revenue of black businesses with the whole economy, it had been compared with the gross revenue of Jewish, Polish, Italian, and other ethnically-owned and -operated businesses. This would have provided a more valid index of the success of black enterprise. Then, too, what if each ethnic group had been compared with the economy as a whole? I believe if this had been done, the original estimation would stand in respect to black enterprise, but I also believe that some interesting additional facts would also have emerged. Using gross revenue, total assets, or any other comparable data, we would reach the inevitable conclusion that the economic wealth of America is not in the hands of the "ethnics," and probably will remain beyond their reach. Most of the wealth is owned and controlled by a small white-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant elite group which has remained virtually impenetrable and invincible throughout our history.

The May 1968 issue of *Fortune* magazine lists sixty-six of America's centi-millionaires in descending order of wealth, from $1.5 billion to $150 million . . . and identifies each with an industry or enterprise. Going down the list, and using surnames as my only criterion, I find three names which might possibly be Jewish, though they are perhaps German in origin. . . . None of the names appears to be Italian or ethnically identifiable with any but a Wasp background. . . .

Comparisons of black enterprises with any other ethnically-controlled enterprise are valid indicators of the success or failure of units within the total economy. However, by comparing individual units with the whole, we discover not the success of the unit in relation to other units, but the degree to which that individual unit is part of the whole in terms of a percentage. Thus, black capitalism represents *x* per cent of the gross revenue of the U.S., Jewish capitalism represents *x* per cent, and so forth. . . . I would venture to guess that . . . the total wealth of ethnic-controlled business would not come close to the wealth controlled by the industrial elite.

Black capitalism was an attempt to create a structure for the acquisition of wealth by blacks because the existing structure was closed to them. Its failure has unique and historical causes. Other ethnic groups excluded from the economic structure formed their own business enterprises, and succeeded for cultural and historical reasons. Thus in the realm of ethnic capitalism black capitalism has failed. However, in the overall realm of American capitalism, few of the ethnics seem to have done well. . . .

JON F. TUCKER
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

MURRAY FRIEDMAN writes:

I agree with Jon Tucker that the "economic wealth of America is not in the hands of the 'ethnics'" but disagree that it "probably will remain beyond their reach." The executive suite of the Wasp bank and corporation is beginning—admittedly, just beginning—to succumb to the historic process of ethnic succession in this country. On October 31, 1971, the New York *Times* cited, as examples of this, Iacocca of Ford, Riccardo of Chrysler, Halaby of Pan Am, Piore of IBM, and Goldman of Xerox. As I write, newspapers are featuring the elevation of Irving S. Shapiro as head of DuPont. I think this trend will continue. The 60's witnessed what Peter and Brigitte Berger called "the blueing of America," the emergence of working-class and ethnic groups at a time when elements of the traditional upper classes began to turn away from corporate careers and life styles.

A word of caution to Mr. Tucker (and others) about the term, "Wasp." It has been stretched out of all possibility of usefulness by having to cover such dissimilar groups as Appalachian whites, Mississippi dirt farmers, and New England Brahmins. Some of these "Wasps" are really ethnics.

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

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The Road to Geneva

Theodore Draper

IN ONE way or another, every phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been linked with the United Nations. The current Geneva conference is but the latest in this tradition—with a difference. In the past, the UN was Israel's benefactor and the Arabs' affliction. Now the sides have been reversed. The Israelis have come to distrust the UN so much that they grudgingly agreed to give it a minimal role at Geneva; the Arabs are so fond of the UN that they wanted its role to be maximal.

For a state with Israel's unique background, the change has been peculiarly painful and damaging. It was the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947, providing for an Arab and Jewish state in Palestine, that opened the way for the formal establishment of the state of Israel on May 14, 1948. After five Arab armies invaded Palestine and tried to strangle the new state at birth, a UN mediator, Dr. Ralph Bunche, helped to bring about the armistice agreements of 1949. In these first years, the Security Council tried repeatedly to restrain the Arabs. Egypt closed the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping in 1949 on the ground that, despite the armistice, it considered itself to be in a state of "belligerency" vis-à-vis Israel. Two years later, the Council called on Egypt to put an end to this restriction of the canal and held that it was "unreasonable" for Egypt to behave as if it were still an active belligerent. In 1954, when Israel protested against Egypt's blockade of the port of Eilat, Israel's only outlet to the Red Sea and the East, the Security Council upheld Israel, only to run into a Soviet veto. Though the UN did not open the Suez Canal for Israel or lift the blockade of Eilat—Israel never achieved the first and obtained the second in 1956—at least the UN did what it could. It passed resolutions, which the Arab nations ignored or defied.

Today the UN is Israel's affliction and the Arabs' benefactor. The Soviet veto for the Arabs has given way to the U.S. veto for the Israelis. The change that has taken place in the UN accounts for much of this change in Israel's position. The growth in UN membership from 51 to 135, together with the increasing prevalence of bloc voting, has altered the UN so much that its founding fathers would hardly recognize it. Where Israel is concerned, the bloc set-up works almost automatically against it. The Arabs start with their own eighteen votes. They are sure to pick up eight more from the non-Arab Muslim countries. Then come the twelve inevitable votes from the Communist countries. Twenty-six African nations, which do not now have diplomatic ties with Israel, unwaveringly back the Arabs as part of their dues in the Afro-Asian bloc, and they carry most of the other African nations along with them. About a dozen other "nonaligned" nations, such as India and Yugoslavia (for whom nonalignment has come to mean nonalignment with only one side), make no effort to hide their pro-Arab commitment. In Western Europe, France and Spain are consistently hostile to Israel, and Britain does not lag far behind. If most or all of the Latin-American bloc, as part of its lip service to the "Third World," goes along, as it usually does, the Arabs can count on at least two-thirds of the General Assembly on almost any issue that lines them up against Israel.

At the time of the October 1973 war, the Security Council was equally one-sided. Of the five permanent members, Communist China and Soviet Russia were so hostile that they did not have diplomatic relations with Israel. The competition between them took the form of seeing which one could be more pro-Arab than the Arabs. Of the remaining three permanent members, the Arabs could count on France, if not Britain too. Three of the ten non-permanent members, Sudan, Yugoslavia, and Indonesia, had no diplomatic relations with Israel, and a fourth, India, virtually belonged in the same category. The 1974-75 Security Council is even worse from Israel's point of view. Of the five non-permanent members whose term expired at the end of 1973, only two had no diplomatic relations with Israel; of the five that replaced them four (Byelorussia, Cameroon, Iraq, and Mauretania) have no diplomatic relations with Israel. The Israeli diplomat who re-

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THEODORE DRAPER, the eminent historian, has written some of the most widely discussed analyses of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including "Israel and World Politics" (COMMENTARY, August 1967) and "From 1967 to 1973" (December 1973). He is also the author of many articles and books on international affairs, among them *Abuse of Power, Castroism: Theory and Practice*, and *American Communism and Soviet Russia*. Some of the research in Arabic for the present article was done by Boaz Shoshan.

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marked that Arabs could get a majority in the UN for a resolution declaring that the earth is flat was exaggerating only a little.

In a previous article,[1] I referred harshly to the UN's role in the October 1973 war. The trouble with referring to the UN as a single entity is that the organization does not live a life of its own. The UN may be international in form, but it is national in content; it is no more than the member states, and especially the permanent members of the Security Council, choose to make it. Whatever it was intended to be, it has become little more than an international forum in which member states ruthlessly pursue their national interests according to certain rules or principles which they recognize, ignore, or violate as they see fit. The UN is not a "supranational" government with any power of its own; it is not the "conscience of mankind," dispensing a higher law equally to all. Whenever Israel is concerned, a disturbing pattern of behavior has developed. It should disturb the most those who wish the UN the best.

II

THE pattern emerged clearly in 1967. When Egypt began to mass troops in the Sinai region bordering Israel on May 14, and especially when Egypt demanded the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) on May 16, and even more so when Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran and blockaded the Israeli port of Eilat on May 22, a crisis was clearly on its way. What happened in the UN?

On May 23, Canada and Denmark requested an immediate meeting of the Security Council to deal with the Middle East crisis. On May 24, the Soviet representative, Nikolai T. Fedorenko, prevented the Council from even taking up the subject. He accused the Western powers of "artificially heating up the atmosphere" and insistently pooh-poohed the seriousness of the situation.[2] As late as May 29, Fedorenko accused the U.S. representative, Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, of uselessly engaging in "histrionics of all kinds."[3] Until war broke out on June 5, the Soviet representative sought by one means or another to prevent serious discussion of the issue in the Security Council.

While the Soviet representative was running diplomatic interference, the Egyptian representative, Ambassador Mohammad Awad el-Kony, made head-on verbal attacks on Israel to justify Egypt's actions. He did not deny that they were acts of war, especially in the case of the blockade of Eilat. Nor were the Soviets in a good position to justify the blockade because that would have set a precedent for the unilateral closure of the Dardanelles by Turkey, blockading the Soviet ports in the Black Sea. Ambassador el-Kony boldly defended Egypt's action on the ground that "a state of overt war" had existed and continued to exist between the Arabs and Israelis.[4] It is a mistake, then, to think that the Egyptians did not knowingly commit acts of war before June 5. A blockade of an international waterway, such as the Gulf of Aqaba, was an act of war—and the Egyptians did not try to hide that fact as long as they were confident of victory.

Thus, at least two things took place in the Security Council before the 1967 war. First, the Soviets immobilized the Council in the period of aggressive Egyptian actions. Second, a double-bookkeeping system operated as soon as the Egyptians were thrown on the defensive.

The second point is particularly striking because the charge of "Israeli aggression" came to have such importance for the Egyptians. The Egyptian rationale for blockading Eilat on May 22 was equally a rationale for the Israeli attack on June 5. If the one was a justified act of war because a state of war already existed, the other was no more than a justifiable response. So long as the Egyptians thought that they were sure to win the war, they wanted the world to know that they had started it. If the Egyptians had not miscalculated and had won the war, they would have dated it from May 14 or at latest May 22, not June 5.

But as soon as their plans misfired, and the war was lost in six days, the Arabs filled the air with cries of "Israeli aggression." Forgotten was Ambassador el-Kony's proud boast that a "state of war" had always existed between Israel and the Arab states and that it gave Egypt the "legitimate right" to blockade the Straits of Tiran, an admittedly aggressive act. Now the Arabs were innocent victims of an unprovoked Israeli aggression which had broken the peace and harmony of the Middle East. In this way a double standard was smuggled into the Middle East conflict and has plagued it ever since.

III

AFTER the 1967 war broke out on June 5, neither the Arabs nor the Israelis asked the Security Council to intervene. The Arabs were at first too confident of victory. As for the Israelis, they were determined to push back the 80,000 or so heavily armed Egyptian troops on their Sinai border and to reopen free passage of the Straits of Tiran. The Security Council met on

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[1] "From 1967 to 1973: The Arab-Israeli Wars," COMMENTARY, December 1973.

[2] United Nations, Security Council Doc. S/1342 (May 24, 1967), p. 4.

[3] *Ibid.*, S/1343 (May 29, 1967), p. 20.

[4] El-Kony stated that "there is not a shadow of doubt as to the continued existence of the state of war between the Israelis and both the Arabs of Palestine and their brethren in the Arab countries" and that "a state of overt war has been existing." It was this state of war, he insisted, that gave the Egyptian government "the legitimate right" to restrict navigation in the Straits of Tiran "with respect to shipping to an enemy" (S/1343 [May 29, 1967], p. 8).

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June 5 without result. The legal position was obviously double-edged. As a fair-minded account by the former Indian ambassador to the UN, Arthur Lall, put it, the UN charter outlaws "not only the use of force or aggression but the threat of force." On the latter count, Egypt had made threats of force repeatedly in the previous days. When did hostilities begin? When the Gulf of Aqaba was blockaded by Egypt or when Israel responded to it? Only the Soviet Union demanded unconditional condemnation of Israeli "aggression," and it was supported by no more than two members, all the way by Bulgaria, less forcefully by Mali. On the second day of the war, June 6, the Egyptians knew that they were in trouble. "Late that afternoon," Lall relates, "the Egyptians informed the Soviet Union that they would accept a cease-fire unless they received immediate military assistance. It was clear, however, that such assistance could not be given."[5]

So the Arabs shopped around for a quick cease-fire to save them from further military disaster. A resolution limited to calling for an immediate cease-fire was unanimously voted on the early evening of June 6. But the fighting raged on after the Council's belated awakening to the seriousness of the situation. Still another Soviet-sponsored cease-fire resolution, this one with a specific time limit, was unanimously adopted on June 7. With an Arab military collapse approaching, the Arabs and their Communist allies had changed their attitude toward UN intervention. For at least three weeks before, and for thirty-two hours after the fighting started, they had blocked every effort to bring the issue before the Security Council. Now, suddenly, Security-Council resolutions were flaunted as if they had the force of absolute, peremptory, self-enforcing law. For years, the Security Council had passed resolutions obnoxious to the Arabs without the slightest effect on their behavior. This time it was different. The vaguest call of the Security Council for a cease-fire was touted as if it had come from on high.

Another innovation became a bad habit in the Security Council. As Arthur Lall has noted, "condemnation" has no place in the tasks allotted to the Council in the UN charter. "Unfortunately," he observed reproachfully, "it has become a tendency of certain organs of the United Nations to overlook the charter injunctions relating to conciliation and the harmonizing of the actions of nations, and to substitute for these approaches that of condemnation. It may, of course, be a matter of opinion as to whether condemnation is a more effective approach toward achieving settlements than the approach of skillful urgings, even demands, and quiet pressures. However, the essential point is that the charter rejects the former approach in favor of the latter, and whatever individual governments may say or do in their bilateral dealings, in the organs of the United Nations they should adhere to the charter's approaches."[6]

The chief specialist in these "condemnations" —always, of course, against Israel—was the Soviet Union. While the Egyptians were satisfied for the moment to get no more than a cease-fire, the Soviet representative, Fedorenko, held out for an Israeli withdrawal from Arab territory; the "main task," he said, was to condemn Israel as "the aggressor."[7] But Fedorenko failed to get Israel condemned as the "aggressor" or ordered to withdraw its forces. As matters stood when the Security Council adjourned on June 14, only a cease-fire had been agreed on by all parties. As Lall noted sadly: "The Council had missed its most constructive opportunities when it had failed to act in May, and thereafter it had never really caught up with the flow of events in the region."[8] And if it failed to act in May, as he makes clear, the Soviet Union was primarily responsible.

But this was only the beginning of the diplomatic battle that followed the military struggle.

IV

WE HAVE now come to the magic number: 242.

After several futile attempts to reach an agreement acceptable to all sides in the dispute, the Security Council met again in November 1967. It did not seem like a propitious moment. The Arab states had come together at Khartoum two months earlier and had arrived at an intransigent formula vis-à-vis Israel: no peace, no recognition, no negotiations. Nevertheless, the mood in the Security Council favored one more big try to reach a settlement.

The Arab states, in line with the Khartoum formula, were merely interested in getting Israel out of the occupied territories. For Israel, the occupation of the territories won in June was still a somewhat unreal, fortuitous experience. Most Israelis were as yet less interested in keeping all or some of the territories than in using them to get the Arabs to recognize the state of Israel within "secure borders." All outside efforts at the November meeting were bent on incorporating and reconciling these two main Arab and Israeli aims.

After a number of false starts by the Afro-Asian bloc, the Soviet Union, and the United States, the winner was—Resolution 242. The chief impresario was the British member, Lord Caradon, who gave a classical exhibition of diplomatic unflappability. The diplomatic struggle accompanying the military battle since 1967 has been based on

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[5] Arthur Lall, *The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967* (Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 51.

[6] Lall, p. 65.

[7] S/1351 (June 8, 1967), p. 4.

[8] Lall, p. 106.

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this resolution. The present Geneva conference was set in motion by Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973, which in turn implements Resolution 242. Thus everything that has happened in the Arab-Israeli conflict in the past six years goes back in one way or another to Resolution 242. How it was concocted and why it was adopted constitute one of the most curious operations in recent diplomatic history.

Caradon's stratagem was to give something to everyone, and everything to no one—in such a way that no one knew whether he had anything.

In the preamble, Caradon managed to write a paragraph which began with something for the Arabs and ended with something for Israel. The first portion emphasized "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" and the second "the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security." Egypt, which had acquired the Gaza territory (that had not been Egyptian) and Jordan, which had acquired the territory on the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Old City of Jerusalem (that had not been Jordanian) by war in 1948, blithely hailed the principle of the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" because, in their interpretation, it was aimed solely at Israel. As for the Soviet Union, it had acquired through World War II 272,500 square miles of territory with a population two-and-a-half times as large as Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq combined, but was not inhibited from voting for this lofty principle for someone else.[9] Israel enjoyed reading the words "a just and lasting peace" and "security," which had evaded it for so long.

But preambles are merely the appetizers of UN resolutions. The main courses come in the operative paragraphs. The Egyptians wanted most the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from Arab territory. So Caradon gave them the first operative paragraph, which provided for the

> Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.

This combination of words was not as clear and simple as it may seem. For a previous Soviet resolution had stipulated that Israel "should immediately and unconditionally withdraw all its forces from the territory of those States [United Arab Republic, Syria, and Jordan] to positions behind the armistice demarcation lines [i.e., before June 5, 1967]." And another Latin-American draft resolution had urgently requested Israel "to withdraw all its forces from all the territories occupied by it as a result of the recent conflict."

CARADON'S formula omitted four key words: "immediately," "unconditionally," "all," and "the." By omitting "immediately" and "unconditionally" in the Soviet text, it implied that the withdrawal might not be immediate or unconditional. By omitting the first "all," before the mention of Israeli "forces," it implied that not all of them might be withdrawn—or, as in the previous case, at least left the question open. But the crucial excision was made in the reference to "the territory," in the Russian text, or to "all the territories," in the Latin-American text. By removing "the," and even more so, "all the" before the word "territories" in his final text, Caradon deliberately left open the possibility that the Israeli withdrawal might be partial rather than complete. The Israelis could accept it because it might be partial; the Arabs could vote for it, albeit less enthusiastically, because it might be complete. In short, what Resolution 242 did not say was fully as important as what it did say.

To make matters even more complicated and dubious, the equally authoritative French version of Resolution 242, owing to the exigencies of the French language, translated "territories occupied" as *"des territoires occupés,"* making it possible for an interpretation to include the word "the" before territories. Thus, in effect, the English version seemed to favor the Israelis, the French version the Arabs.

The Israelis, of course, wanted recognition of their state within secure borders. So Caradon gave them the second operative paragraph:

> Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.

This paragraph also bears close scrutiny. It will be noticed that the state which was in contention, Israel, was not mentioned by name as deserving respect for its "sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence." Did or did not the reference to "every State" include Israel? It might or it might not, depending on whether Israel was accepted as a valid, legitimate state. True, Israel was a member in good standing of the United Nations. On the other hand, the Arab states had ostentatiously refused to recognize Israel's rightful statehood. Israel in fact wanted to be mentioned by name. But Caradon's resolution bypassed the issue by using the much more general formulation, giving the Arabs the possibility of denying Israel the right to be accepted in their minds as a "State in the area."

However, assuming that Israel was such a state

[9] On September 2, 1964, *Pravda* defended the Soviet acquisition of territory in these terms: "A people which has been attacked, has defended itself, and wins the war is bound in sacred duty to establish in perpetuity a political situation which will ensure the liquidation of the sources of aggression. It is entitled to maintain this state of affairs as long as the danger of aggression does not cease. A nation which has attained security at the cost of numerous victims will never agree to the restoration of previous borders. No territories are to be returned as long as the danger of aggression prevails."

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—and for the United Nations as such, its status was unquestionable—the most important words in the resolution were the "right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries." Without the reference to such boundaries Israel would probably not have accepted this resolution. For two things were inextricably meshed. One was the abstract acceptance of the state of Israel. But what and where was this state? What boundaries did it have? Without a clear and final delineation of its boundaries, Israel's acceptance as a state could mean anything or nothing. By challenging its boundaries concretely, the Arabs could make a mockery of accepting the state of Israel abstractly. As we shall see, the problem of "boundaries" is one of the most vexed and venomous of all aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Resolution 242 demanded its solution without in the least resolving it.

Resolution 242 included three more major operative paragraphs:

Guaranteed "freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area." This stipulation was supposed to reopen the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping.

"A just settlement of the refugee problem." Each side, of course, wanted such a settlement, but whether they could agree on what was "just," which the resolution did not define, was something else.

And the designation by the Secretary-General of the UN of a "Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution." On this provision hinged all the others. Everyone knew that Resolution 242 was merely the beginning of a long and tortuous process. This process was made all the more difficult by the Arab refusal to negotiate directly with Israel. As in 1949, the UN resorted to an intermediary to get the process going indirectly.

ALAS, we are not yet finished with Resolution 242. Something more was needed before the diplomatic tapestry could be woven.

First, there apparently were private, behind-the-scenes, unwritten understandings. The most important of these related to the most hotly disputed clause about the "withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." What did the omission of "all" and "the" before "territories" mean? An Arab delegate later revealed that the Arab delegations had been privately given the explanation that the omission of these words "really related to the possibility of minor and mutually agreed rectifications of the frontier."[10] He complained that Israel subsequently wanted more "substantial changes" than the Arabs had been led to expect. There was, evidently, some kind of private understanding about some frontier changes, even if opinions might differ about which were minor or major.

On the other hand, the Egyptian delegate, Mohammad Hassan el-Zayyat, claimed that Lord Caradon had privately told the then Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Riad, that "the words 'territories occupied' meant all territories occupied." El-Zayyat also claimed that the U.S. delegate, Arthur J. Goldberg, had given a private assurance that "not an inch of Egyptian territory is going to be touched."[11] Both Caradon and Goldberg have gone on record denying that Resolution 242 meant any such thing.[12] In the fall of 1968, according to former Undersecretary of State, Eugene V. Rostow, who was then in charge of the Arab-Israeli conflict at the State Department, Soviet ambassadors both in Washington and at the UN indicated that they could agree to "insubstantial" modifications of the pre-1967 borders as part of a "package deal." The next day, however, they reversed themselves.[13]

The former Indian ambassador, Arthur Lall, who was in a good position to know, tells us what went on behind the scenes between the Soviets and Arabs before the resolution was voted on. The Arab delegates came to the Soviet representative, V. V. Kuznetsov, to complain about the British version. "They insisted that the wording read either that Israeli forces would be withdrawn from 'all the territories,' instead of 'territories' occupied by Israel, or that Israel would 'withdraw to the positions of 4 June 1967.' In addition, the Arabs were unwilling to accept the phrase 'recognized boundaries' also occurring in the first operative paragraph." But the Arabs changed their minds the next day because they "concluded that it was better to get a resolution backed by all fifteen votes in the Council than to insist on a resolution which might not be adopted or might obtain the bare minimum of nine votes." They also tried to prevail on Caradon to substitute "all the territories" for "territories" in the crucial clause on Israeli withdrawal. He soothingly told them that his draft represented "a delicate balance" which could not be upset.[14]

It is obviously not safe to rely on anything but the actual words in the resolution. Yet some private give-and-take undoubtedly played a part in getting agreement on the resolution.

Of one all-important aspect of the resolution there can be no doubt. It was a "package deal."

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[10] Al-Pachachi, United Arab Emirates, S/PV. 1724 (June 13, 1973), p. 51.

[11] S/PV. 1726 (June 14, 1973), pp. 117-18.

[12] Lord Caradon, interview of February 10, 1973, and Arthur J. Goldberg, speech in Washington, May 8, 1973, cited in S/PV. 1721 (June 11, 1973), pp. 43-5, 56.

[13] Eugene V. Rostow, *Peace in the Balance* (Simon & Schuster, 1972), p. 270.

[14] Lall, pp. 253-54.

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If it had not been such a deal, the Arabs could have claimed—as they proceeded to claim anyway—that it was necessary or possible to put into effect the first operative paragraph on Israeli withdrawal, in which they were primarily interested, before or without putting into effect the other operative paragraphs in which the Israelis were primarily interested. As a matter of fact, the order in which the various provisions were listed had nothing to do with priority or preeminence. The resolution was to be taken as a whole or not at all.

This point was clearly made by Lord Caradon at the time. He called the resolution "a balanced whole."[15] What he meant by this was later spelled out by him and other authoritative British officials who, after all, knew best what they had put together. In an interview on February 10, 1973, Caradon gave this explanation: "Withdrawal should take place to secure and recognized boundaries, and these words were carefully chosen: they have to be secure, and they have to be recognized. They will not be secure unless they are recognized." Other British explications have emphasized the term "concurrently" to stress how the parts of Resolution 242 were linked together. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Michael Stewart, stated in the House of Commons on November 17, 1969: "The resolution speaks of secure and recognized boundaries. Those words must be read concurrently with the statement on withdrawal."[16] A British member of the Security Council, K. D. Jamieson, reiterated as late as June 11, 1973, that "we for our part have always considered that there is a close interconnection between all the elements of the settlement envisaged in resolution 242 (1967)."[17] Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco, in charge of Middle East affairs, has stated: "The Security Council did not call for unconditional Israeli withdrawal to the armistice lines [of 1949] as had been the case at the time of the 1956 war in Sinai. Rather, it called for 'withdrawal . . . from territories occupied' in the 1967 war as part of a package settlement in which the parties would agree to respect each other's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries."[18]

It should be clear by now what Resolution 242 did and did not say.

Ah, but no—nothing about Resolution 242 was—or is—that easy.

When the members of the Security Council explained their votes on November 22, 1967, the disparity between their explanations was so great that one might have imagined that they were talking about different things. Although he did not rule out "mutual territorial adjustments," the Indian member, Gopalaswami Parthasarathi, maintained: "It is our understanding that the draft resolution, if approved by the Council, will commit it to the application of the principle of total withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the territories—I repeat, all the territories—occupied by Israel as a result of the conflict which began on 5 June, 1967." To which Lord Caradon coyly responded that only the resolution itself was binding but that "all of us, no doubt, have our own views and interpretations and understandings." Foreign Minister Abba Eban of Israel cautioned: "The representative of India has now sought to interpret the resolution in the image of his own wishes. For us, the resolution says what it says. It does not say that which it has specifically and consciously avoided saying." But this advice did not stop the Soviet member, Kuznetsov, from declaring that "we voted for the United Kingdom draft resolution, as interpreted by the representative of India, whose views we share." Heedless of everything that had been said by the United Kingdom delegate, he continued, "We understand the decision to mean the withdrawal of Israel forces from all, and we repeat all, territories belonging to Arab States and seized by Israel following its attack on those States on 5 June 1967." The Bulgarian member, Milko Tarabanov, echoed Kuznetsov. The Egyptian representative, Mahmoud Riad, insisted that the "full withdrawal of Israel forces from all territories they have occupied as a result of their aggression on 5 June" was the first step to be taken and that other steps could then follow. The Jordanian representative, Abdul Monem Rifa'i, called "the immediate and complete withdrawal"—neither of these qualifiers was in the resolution—the "essential step." The U.S. member, Arthur Goldberg, gently chided: "The voting, of course, has taken place not on the individual views and policies of various members, but on the draft resolution. I, and I assume other members of the Council, voted for the draft resolution and not for each and every speech that has been made." But he then slightly opened the door to the possibility of multiple interpretations: "I hastily add that I have voted for my own speech, and I assume others have done likewise with respect to their speeches." Finally, the Israeli representative, Abba Eban, apparently aiming at the French version, informed the Council that he was communicating "nothing except the original English text of the draft resolution" to his government.[19]

From all this one might gather that a private understanding had been reached to permit members of the Security Council to vote for the res-

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15 S/1382 (November 22, 1967), p. 7.

16 *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), House of Commons, November 17, 1969, p. 846. See also George Brown, *In My Way*, Gollancz (London, 1971), p. 233.

17 S/PV. 1721 (June 11, 1973), p. 33.

18 *Department of State Bulletin*, June 11, 1973, pp. 846-47.

19 S/1382 (November 22, 1967), pp. 6-7 (Parthasarathi); 7 (Caradon); 10 (Eban); 12-13 (Kuznetsov); 14 (Tarabanov); 15 (Riad, Rifa'i); 18 (Goldberg); 19 (Eban).

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olution unanimously but to interpret it individually. This diplomatic technique for obtaining unanimity was such that it was sure to breed future confusion and contradiction. Nevertheless, this arrangement was probably the only course if unanimity was desirable or necessary to make any progress at all.

When the Security Council met in June 1973, however, arbitrary reinterpretations of Resolution 242 came from both sides. The Soviet member, Y. A. Malik, proclaimed that a complete Israeli withdrawal was "a primary prerequisite for peace in the Middle East" and "the key question of a Middle East settlement."[20] On the other hand, the Israeli representative, Yosef Tekoah, held that "the question of secure and recognized boundaries" was "the central problem."[21] Both sought shelter under Resolution 242 which had clearly and deliberately refrained from making withdrawal or boundaries "primary," "the key," or "central." My impression is that by sheer repetition the Arabs and Soviets have come out ahead in this propaganda argument. Most people who read or think about Resolution 242 probably have the impression that it exclusively or mainly "orders" Israel to withdraw completely from the occupied territories.

And yet, all diplomatic activity since 1967 to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict has been based on the shifting sands of this resolution.[22]

V

WHATEVER Resolution 242 said or did not say, its fate depended on what the UN's Special Representative did or did not do. As representative, the Secretary-General appointed the Swedish ambassador to Moscow, Gunnar Jarring, who set up his headquarters in Cyprus.

The failure of the Jarring mission was one of the preconditions of the 1973 war. Why it failed is still critical for a full understanding of the deepest, most irreconcilable issues underlying the entire Arab-Israeli conflict.

The divergent interpretations of Resolution 242 were quick to emerge. Israel advised Jarring that the best way "to promote agreement" as provided for in the resolution was through direct negotiations, the first step of which should be an Israeli-Egyptian meeting to discuss an "agenda for peace." Egypt—and Jordan too—replied that such discussion was out of the question so long as Israeli armed forces had not withdrawn from the occupied territories. The essential "ambiguity" built into Resolution 242 began to torment Jarring by the end of 1967.

The next gambit took the form of "indirect negotiations." After some attempt to make "indirect negotiations" lead to "direct negotiations," Israel accepted the indirect approach without conditions. But again the fundamental differences, especially the dispute over complete Israeli withdrawal, emphasized the hopelessness of Jarring's task. There is no need here to go into all the ingenious efforts made by Jarring to get around the main stumbling blocks. By the end of 1970, after three years of frustration and disenchantment with all sides, he seemed to have reached the end of the road.

Early in 1971, Jarring decided to make one final, desperate effort. What had thwarted him he thought, was the question of priorities. The Egyptians wanted to get a commitment on complete Israeli withdrawal before they did anything else, and the Israelis wanted to be sure of their security before they gave up anything. Jarring decided that the way to break the deadlock was to approach both sides to make "parallel and simultaneous" commitments. On February 8, 1971, Jarring sent proposals to this effect to Israel and Egypt. From Israel, in the main, he asked for a commitment to withdraw its forces from the occupied territories, and from Egypt he essentially wanted "respect for and acknowledgment of each other's right to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries." This time, Jarring had most trouble with Israel. On the most vital point of withdrawal, the Israeli reply of February 26, 1971, was willing to accept only the following: "Withdrawal of Israel's armed forces from the Israel-United Arab Republic cease-fire line to the secure, recognized, and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement. Israel will not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines."[23]

What was the trouble? Israel made known its objection that Jarring had overstepped the bounds of his authority as set forth in Resolution 242. In it the special representative had been enjoined "to promote agreement and assist efforts" of the states themselves to reach a peaceful settlement. Jarring, however, specified that Israel was to withdraw to "the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine." The extent of the withdrawal had been deliberately left open in the resolution; Jarring had taken it on himself to spell it out. This was not a merely technical or formal deviation; for Israel, it went to the heart of the matter. Israel had agreed to the resolution in order to negotiate the precise boundaries with Egypt. Now Jarring had done all the "negotiating" by himself and had confronted Israel with a *fait accompli*.

Neither side was totally satisfied with the map of withdrawal as drawn by Jarring. Egypt's reply demanded Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip as well as from Sinai, even though the former

[20] S/PV. 1723 (June 12, 1973), p. 11, and S/PV. 1733 (July 20, 1973), p. 58.

[21] S/PV. 1733, p. 32.

[22] On Resolution 242, see also Eugene V. Rostow's article in this issue, especially pp. 52-53.—ED.

[23] The final report on the Jarring mission, with documents, is S/10929, dated May 18, 1973.

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had not been Egyptian territory during the British Mandate of Palestine. But the Israeli problem in this respect was probably more serious. Jarring's plan entailed only the Israeli-Egyptian border. Even there, Israel was supposed to get "respect" and "acknowledgment"—at most a promissory note that might be exceedingly difficult to collect on—in return for giving Egypt an immediate commitment on a definite delineation of the Israeli withdrawal. This exchange, from the Israeli point of view, was flagrantly one-sided. Israel had agreed in Resolution 242 to some form of withdrawal in return for "secure and recognized boundaries"—not on one side but on all sides. Jarring, however, could not deliver Jordan at the same time as Egypt, and Syria was out of the question altogether—Syria had never even accepted Resolution 242. If Israel was truly "to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force," as the resolution required, its existence could not be separated from its boundaries, and its boundaries could not be decided only on the Egyptian front.

Jarring no doubt had opted for the piecemeal approach because he could not bring off a "balanced whole." Whatever his motives, he had transmogrified Resolution 242 in such a way that his plan was far more acceptable to the Egyptians and their Soviet backers than to the Israelis. Jarring had jarred loose the "package deal" and had spilled the pieces on the floor, hoping to pick them up and put them together as in a jigsaw puzzle one at a time. Whether he would have succeeded is more than doubtful, but he was never given the chance.

By March 1971, Jarring's mission was virtually dead. Those who imagine that Israel lost its great opportunity to make peace by not accepting Jarring's plan in 1971 have not fully understood why it failed.

VI

In 1968, in the first months of Jarring's mission, the influential Egyptian editor, Mohammad Hassanein Heykal, put into words what he must have thought was a very witty idea:

> If somebody says, for example, let's assume that Israel would demand recognition of the former cease-fire lines as permanent and recognized boundaries, the answer would be the following: What could prevent us in such a situation from stating that according to our own conception, the secure and recognized boundaries are one Jewish synagogue in Tel Aviv and ten meters around it?[24]

If this were written about almost any other country, it might stir up a little amusement or, at worst, annoyance. In Tel Aviv, it can inspire real consternation. The reason is not that Israelis are so very different from other people. The cause is buried deep in Israel's peculiar history.

At this point, we must step back a quarter of a century in order to go forward to the present. History has haunted the Arab-Israeli conflict in every phase and at every step, and never more than from 1967 to the present.

The Jewish state envisaged in the original UN partition plan of 1947 was a minuscule geopolitical monstrosity. The plan divided Palestine into seven parts, three Jewish and three Arab, each virtually disjointed, plus Jerusalem, which was to be "internationalized." A condition of the partition was the economic union of the Jewish and Arab parts. The largest Jewish part consisted of the Negev, then a wasteland.

As if this were not enough, the UN plan also gave the Jewish state the "wrong" parts of Palestine. The Jewish parts were made up of those districts in which the Jews had been able to settle and own land, not where God had presumably put them in biblical times. "The nursery of the Jewish race and the Jewish religion," as Cecil Roth put it, had been the Kingdom of Judah, which the UN plan allotted to the Arabs. David was anointed King of Judah in Hebron—an Arab center in the UN plan and still today. Tel Aviv was made up of little more than barren and swampy dunes at the beginning of the 20th century, disconcertingly situated in ancient Philistine territory.

If the Arabs had permitted the 1947 partition plan to go through, even temporarily, it is doubtful whether Israel could have survived until the present. Despite misgivings and dissension, the Jews accepted the plan. Confident of their superior numbers and arms, the Arabs did not. The result of the war that followed in 1948 was the enlargement of the Jewish state by about one fourth. But the Jewish state was not the only one that benefited territorially from the war. Instead of going ahead with the projected new Arab state in Palestine, Egypt and Transjordan proceeded to divide the remaining territory between themselves. Egypt gobbled up the Gaza Strip, which it never made part of the state of Egypt but ruled through a military governor. The Emirate of Transjordan, as it was then called, refused to give up the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Old City of Jerusalem, despite the bitter opposition of the other Arab states, and soon changed its name to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. All these territorial changes, according to the armistice agreements of 1949, were supposed to be provisional and temporary. Article XII of the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement of February 24, 1949, for example, stated that the provisions "shall remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the parties is achieved." But such a peaceful settlement was never achieved

[24] *Al-Ahram*, February 2, 1968.

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because the Arab states would never agree to negotiate one with Israel.

So the armistice agreements of 1949, not the UN partition plan of 1947, became the *de facto* basis of Arab-Israeli relations. No one, and certainly not the Soviet Union, objected to this change. No one denounced Israel as an aggressor because it had turned back the armies of five Arab states and had forced them to sign armistice agreements. No one was scandalized because the Arabs were compelled to pay a penalty for provoking and losing a war. As a result, the armistice agreements of 1949 set a precedent for territorial changes brought about by wars provoked by the Arabs themselves—a precedent which the Arabs have insistently tried to revoke by provoking more wars.

Nevertheless, the armistice agreements of 1949 left a difficult and dubious legacy which is still at the crux of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The trouble with those armistice agreements was that they were nothing more than—armistice agreements. From 1949 to 1967, the boundaries of Israel were not secure and were not recognized because they were not confirmed by a peace settlement. Indeed, since Egypt considered itself to be at war with Israel despite the armistice agreements and, the Egyptians even argued, by virtue of them, secure and recognized boundaries could not result from the armistice agreements of 1949 any more than they could derive from the cease-fire lines of 1967. Ironically, the claim to Palestinian territory by Egypt and Jordan is just as tenuous as they regard Israel's claim to be, since they are equally dependent on the armistice agreements of 1949 for any title to that land. By challenging Israel's boundaries, Egypt and Jordan logically call into question their own. Yet only Israel has been asked to justify being where it is.

History, then, has exerted a tormenting pull on both sides—on the Arabs to reduce Israel to an empty shell, on the Israelis to realize the Zionist dream of restoring the Jews to their ancient "homeland." This pressure could have been held back if both sides had been able to reach some kind of stable territorial settlement. If such a settlement had been based on the UN partition plan of 1947 or the armistice agreements of 1949, it would not have been fully satisfactory to either side. But at least they would have arrived at some fixed points in their relationship. By never going beyond the armistice agreements or cease-fire lines, everything always remained open, uncertain, unhinged. When Israel asks to be a secure and recognized state, it asks for secure and recognized boundaries. Or conversely, without secure and recognized boundaries, Israel cannot be a secure and recognized state. Arabs and others are sometimes willing to pay lip-service to Israel as a state but never to what boundaries that state has. This is the "dirty little secret" of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

THE secret has been fairly well kept from the general public—except, of course, in Israel, which has almost been fixated by the problem of boundaries. The impression must still be widespread that the Arab leaders wish nothing more than Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 5, 1967 boundaries and that all would be well if only the Israelis agreed.

This myth should not have outlived the session of the Security Council in June 1973. Unfortunately, few bother to go through the dreary pages of Security Council discussions, though they sometimes contain the most devastating revelations of what official policies really are.

The Security Council met on June 6, 1973, to consider the Middle East problem as a whole for the first time since November 1967. Almost six years after Resolution 242 had been unanimously adopted, the Arab states had come to the conclusion that it was too ambiguous for their purposes and that it needed modification in their favor in order to serve as a diplomatic bludgeon against Israel. They also had had time to harden their position on the resolution's critical reference to "secure and recognized boundaries."

The Egyptian press had already foreshadowed that position, which went far beyond any possible interpretation of Resolution 242. On February 25, 1971, Heykal had written in *al-Ahram*:

> There are only two specific Arab goals at present: elimination of the consequences of the 1967 aggression through Israel's withdrawal from all the lands it occupied that year, and elimination of the consequences of the 1948 aggression through the eradication of Israel.
>
> The second goal is not, in fact, specific but abstract, and some of us make the mistake of starting with the second step instead of the first. On the basis of the conditions I have mentioned, it is possible to believe in the possibility of attaining the first goal. As for the second goal, we should learn from the enemy to move step by step.

So, according to this highly authoritative spokesman and confidant of Egypt's top leaders, the goal in Resolution 242 was only the first step. If that were achieved, the second goal would be to go back to 1948 when Israel was established as a state.

An even more authoritative Egyptian spokesman and top leader, President Anwar el-Sadat, made another significant allusion to the first and second steps on February 17, 1972:

> Nor do we have the right to compel the Palestinian people to accept the Security Council resolution because the land is their land, both those areas occupied in 1948 and the remainder of Palestine occupied after 1967 (*al-Ahram*, February 18, 1972).

From this, the Egyptians were clearly thinking far beyond Resolution 242, which seemingly concerned only the post-1967 occupied areas. In the

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background, but already emerging publicly, was another resolve to undo the 1948 war in the name of the "Palestinian people."

All this came out openly in the Security Council in June 1973. At the very first meeting on June 6, the Egyptian representative, el-Zayyat, called on the Council to:

> Resolve that all the rights and aspirations of the Palestinian nation be respected, including their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries in their homeland of Palestine as it was before the partition, as it was under the Mandate.[25]

Now the familiar terms, "homeland" and "secure and recognized boundaries" were made to apply to the "Palestinian nation" rather than to Israel. And the homeland of the "Palestinian nation" was so defined—"before the partition, as it was under the [British] Mandate"—that it antedated even the UN plan of 1947, when the state of Israel had not yet been established.

On June 11, the Sudanese representative, Khalid, also brought up 1947 in a somewhat more veiled form:

> The truth of the matter is that the June [1967] war is a consequence of the unresolved crisis since Israel burgeoned its way into a State in 1947 [*sic*]. Any reference to the Armistice Agreement vexes Israel, because going back twenty-five years helps clear our thinking, though it does not necessarily mean that we are unaware of the facts created by war and current international diplomacy. The present cannot be divorced from the past. It is one piece with it. It is the prelude of the future. [26]

On the same day, another Egyptian representative, Abdel Meguid, again opened up the question of boundaries in this provocative fashion:

> The logic of the representative of Israel surprises us, to say the least. He speaks about "safe and recognized boundaries" for Israel. Of what boundaries is he talking: those of 1947, 1948, 1949, 1956, or 1967? When certain States recognized the State of Israel they recognized it with boundaries that were defined in the partition plan—in other words, within a territory that had been allocated to it by a United Nations resolution, and nothing more.[27]

On June 13, the Egyptian, el-Zayyat, took the position that Egypt gave the Palestinians the right to decide the fate of Israel, again going back to 1947:

> It is up to them [the Palestinians], if and when they desire, to put the territorial and political boundaries between them and the Jewish State —if and when they desire to accept the partition resolution of 1947, which they deem to be unjust.[28]

This strategy of "two stages"—one Egyptian, the other Palestinian—is now so deeply rooted in Egyptian thinking[28A] that it was expressed by Heykal in *al-Ahram* on October 19, 1973, just before the present cease-fire agreement:

> The issue at present is not connected with the liberation of the Arab territories occupied after June 5, 1967, but concerns the Israeli future in a deeper sense and in the long run—even if this is not obvious right now. The issue is as follows: If the Arabs would be capable of liberating the territories occupied after June 5, 1967, by armed force, then what is there to prevent them in the next stage from liberating Palestine itself by armed force?

This Egyptian line clearly threatens the state of Jordan as well as the state of Israel. King Hussein of Jordan knew what he was doing at the end of November 1973 when he refused to attend the Arab leaders' "summit meeting" in Algiers which issued a declaration that, among other things, called for "Re-establishment of the full national rights for the Palestinian people." This formula could only mean the dismemberment of Jordan by means of a new Palestinian state in the West Bank, or the overthrow of the Hashemite regime and takeover of all Jordan by the Palestinians. This threat to the present state of Jordan logically flowed from the strategy of returning to the boundaries of 1947—if at all—in the case of Israel. By going so far back, the other Arab states undercut all claim of Jordan to the West Bank, which dated only from the military invasion of 1948. Hussein now has far more to fear from his Arab neighbors than from Israel, though he has been living dangerously by playing the game of his would-be executioners.

In effect, the Arabs had fully worked out their political and military strategy by the time they came to the Security Council in June 1973. It was, basically, a strategy of "stages." The reason they could not live with Resolution 242 as a "package deal" was that it precluded a strategy of stages. When they could not get what they wanted out of 242, they went back to the Security Council in 1973 to get something stronger. In July, they almost got what they wanted.

THE last diplomatic struggle in the UN before the outbreak of war took place over a draft resolution known as document S/10974, submitted by eight co-sponsors (Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, and Yugoslavia) on July 24. The vote two days later showed how much had changed in the UN since November 1967.

S/10974 changed Resolution 242 in at least three basic respects. It substituted "the territories" for "territories" in the second operative

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[25] S/PV. 1717 (June 6, 1973), p. 41.
[26] S/PV. 1721 (June 11, 1973), pp. 9-10.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 72.
[28] S/PV. 1724 (June 13, 1973), pp. 98-100.
[28A] On the "two-stage" strategy, see also Gil Carl AlRoy's article on p. 56 of this issue.—ED.

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paragraph dealing with Israeli withdrawal. It substituted "the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people," the new code term, for what had been "a just settlement of the refugee problem." And it substituted a piecemeal approach for the "package deal," which had been the essence of Resolution 242.

The vote on S/10974 was 13 to 1 (with China not voting). Since the one vote was cast by the United States, the draft resolution was vetoed. Only the Australian and British members expressed some discomfort in going along with the majority.

As has now been admitted, Egypt was already actively preparing for its attack when this vote was taken. If the diplomatic isolation of Israel was one of the preconditions of the attack, Egypt had succeeded in its purpose. Since all those who voted for S/10974 knew in advance that the United States was going to cast a veto, it also represented an advanced state of U.S. isolation in the UN.

This action was but a prelude to what happened in the UN after the war actually broke out.

VII

BEFORE we see how the UN—or, more exactly, the members of the Security Council—dealt with the October 1973 war, let us try to reconstruct, as best we can, how the war came about.

There is one firm bit of evidence from an unimpeachable source, Major General Sa'ad ad-Din al-Shazli, the Egyptian Chief of Staff. He has disclosed that the planning of the war took nine to ten months before the outbreak of hostilities.[29] This would put the initiation of active Egyptian war preparations at the beginning of 1973.

A most circumstantial account has been given by the Middle East correspondent of *Le Monde*, Eric Rouleau. Long *persona grata* in Egypt, Rouleau has had unrivaled Arab sources, though, of course, we cannot be sure of every detail in the story that he has put together.

Rouleau draws particular attention to one occurrence, unnoticed at the time. In July 1972, about 20,000 Soviet advisers and technicians had been expelled from Egypt. But, Rouleau informs us, an important Soviet military mission came back to Egypt on February 1, 1973. The arrival of the new Soviet military mission would coincide with the date of Egypt's initial war preparations given by General al-Shazli.

The actual date for the outbreak of hostilities, according to Rouleau, was probably fixed in July or August 1973. In any case, Sadat is said to have referred to the "imminence" of war on several occasions in August 1973. No one, it seems, took him seriously. The first operational military measures, such as moving forward Egyptian infantry forces, were taken on September 3. Sadat and Syrian President Assad discussed these military preparations in Cairo on September 10. U.S. intelligence sources allegedly learned on September 26 that Egyptian forces had been put on the alert. When the Americans, it is said, tried to warn the Israelis, the latter refused to be alarmed and interpreted the troop movements as "routine maneuvers." On October 3, Sadat and Assad informed the Soviet ambassadors in Cairo and Damascus that war was imminent. Soviet planes were immediately sent to evacuate the families of Soviet "advisers" in Egypt and Syria. U.S. diplomats allegedly interpreted the evacuation as evidence of another Soviet-Arab break. Until the morning of October 4, the exact timing of the Arab attack was a closely guarded secret, known only to four men, the presidents and war ministers of Egypt and Syria. At 2 PM on October 6, the attack was launched across the canal by 8,000 men and hundreds of tanks.[30]

An American version places the Egyptian decision "to resume war with Israel" in March 1973, and the final operational decision to invade the Sinai "sometime in early August," the operation itself being set for "sometime in October." The March decision, according to this account, came because Sadat was disappointed with the result of the mission to Washington the month before by his foreign-policy adviser, Hafez Ismail. After March 1973, Sadat was mainly bent on lining up the support of other Arab states and camouflaging his war preparations.[31]

A reliable Israeli source has reported that the Israeli Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General David Elazar, doubted until the early morning hours of October 6 that war was imminent. A single item of intelligence from one source, not yet revealed publicly, caused the Israeli General Staff to change its evaluation of the situation. Soon after 4 AM that day, General Elazar proposed a preemptive air strike and asked permission to mobilize reserves. The first request was rejected, the second granted. A top state of alert was ordered at 11 AM, too late to save the limited Israeli forces at the canal and in the Golan Heights from being taken by almost absolute surprise.[32] As Prime Minister Golda Meir later put it: "What happened was a disaster. It is no secret, and no one intended, or intends, to keep it a secret. We misinterpreted the information we had."[33]

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[29] *Al-Ahram*, December 6, 1973.

[30] *Le Monde*, November 24, 25-26, 1973.

[31] Edward R. F. Sheehan, New York *Times Magazine*, November 18, 1973.

[32] Ze'ev Schul, Jerusalem *Post Weekly*, December 4, 1973, p. 12.

[33] Interview on Israeli radio, Jerusalem *Post Weekly*, December 11, 1973, p. 11. Accordng to the former Israeli Chief of Staff, Haim Bar-Lev, now Minister of Commerce and Industry, Israeli intelligence had no shortage of reliable information on Egyptian and Syrian preparations, but "the evaluation did not stand the test" (*ibid.*, November 6, 1973, p. 8).

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Still another version, in the *Sunday Times* (London), says that the order to prepare to reopen hostilities was given by President Sadat in November 1972. The actual planning, however, began the following February, which would coincide with the arrival of the Soviet military mission. By September 10, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan were lined up together militarily and diplomatically. Egyptian tanks began assembling the last week of September; Syrian tanks and heavy artillery moved to forward positions on October 1. Though these movements were being closely watched, Israeli—and influenced by it, U.S.—intelligence was not convinced that war was imminent until 4 AM on October 6 when, according to this account, "Israeli and American monitors picked up the unmistakable radio traffic patterns of final Arab preparations for war." When General Elazar proposed a preemptive air strike, Prime Minister Meir is supposed to have asked: "How many friends would we have left if we did that?" Two hours later, Mrs. Meir summoned the U.S. ambassador, Kenneth Keating, who, it is said, reinforced her decision against the preemptive strike by warning her, in effect, that "if Israel struck first, world opinion would make it hard for America to supply Israel with war material."

This British version also purports to give the inside story of a bitter U.S.-British falling-out during the war. The Israelis, it is said, asked for U.S. arms as early as October 7, the second day of the fighting, and were turned down by Secretary Kissinger. His first diplomatic stance was to call for a cease-fire based on a return to the pre-October 6 positions; it never had a chance because the Egyptians were ahead and had no intention of withdrawing. Four or five days later, Kissinger presented another cease-fire proposal, but this time based on pinning down both warring sides to the positions held at the time; now the Israelis were unhappy because it meant giving up all hope of driving the Egyptians back across the canal. By October 12, Secretary Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin had concocted a plan to get Britain to sponsor a resolution in the Security Council for just such a cease-fire "in place." Unfortunately, the British ambassador in Cairo, Sir Philip Adams, checked this plan with Sadat and found him totally uninterested in it owing to what still seemed the favorable prospects of the Egyptian army. When the British refused to act as front men for the U.S.-USSR scheme, which fell through on October 13, "Kissinger blew up"—if we may believe this account which apparently derives from British sources. Obviously we need to learn much more before we can know what to believe about this entire sequence of events.[33A]

THE UN, of all parties, should have had no doubt which side had started the war. Even if it knew nothing about Yom Kippur, the state of Israeli mobilization, or the Egyptian-Syrian preparations, it had its own observers on the spot. The first report from the war fronts came through on October 6 at 12:14 GMT (two hours earlier than Cairo time): "General heavy activity along Israel-Syria and Suez Canal sectors. Further information will follow." The second report at 12:21 was still inconclusive. But the third at 13:40 read: "General heavy air and ground activity continues along all sectors. Egyptian ground forces have crossed the Suez Canal in vicinity of OP's Copper, Yellow, Pink, Red, and Blue. Syrian forces have crossed the area between the limits of the forward defended localities indicating the cease-fire lines in the vicinity of Quneitra and near OP November. Detailed summaries of incidents now under preparation." A more detailed report was made at 2 PM, confirming that Syrian and Egyptian forces had taken the initiative.[34]

It has been reported without denial that "sizable segments" of the U.S. intelligence community continued to believe for as much as eight hours after the outbreak of hostilities that Israel, not the Arabs, had launched the attack.[35] If so, "sizable segments" of the U.S. intelligence community should have their heads examined or were too predisposed against Israel to think clearly.

From all this, it is abundantly clear that the key Arab war decisions antedated the meetings of the Security Council in June-July 1973. Even if the United States had not vetoed S/10974, it is hard to see what the Arabs would have gained immediately, inasmuch as its provisions were not self-enforceable. A 13-1 vote was not much worse than a 14-0 vote if the diplomatic isolation of Israel was the objective. The United States might even have cast a favorable vote without doing much more for Egypt. Some Egyptian comments have sought to give the impression that the vote on S/10974 was the last straw, after which war was inevitable. In fact, the diplomatic struggle over S/10974 was a propaganda operation which led to the war because it was so successful, not because it was such a failure.

As for the Soviet Union, the available evidence indicates that it must be judged by Lord Salisbury's rule that "those who have the absolute power of preventing lamentable events, and, knowing what is taking place, refuse to exercise that power, are responsible for what happens." The Soviet Union certainly had the power to prevent this war, because it had to furnish the enormous quantity of arms that made it possible. The Soviet military missions with the Egyptian and Syrian forces certainly knew what was taking place, advised both Arab commands in their planning, and trained the Arab military

[33A] "Insight on the Middle East War," *Sunday Times Weekly Review* (London), December 9 and 16, 1973.

[34] S/7930/Add. 2141 and S/7930/Add. 2142 (October 6, 1973).

[35] John W. Finney, New York *Times*, October 31, 1973.

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in the use of Soviet equipment, much of it of the latest vintage.[36] The Soviet Union is not in the habit of giving away thousands of tanks, and hundreds of planes, missiles, rockets, and artillery pieces without having a good idea of what is going to be done with them. Even if the Soviet ambassadors in Cairo and Damascus were not officially informed that war was imminent until October 3, Soviet military intelligence had other sources of information, and there is reason to believe that preparations for the airlift and resupply operation had been set in motion considerably before October 3.

These are some aspects of the situation that should be kept in mind as we follow what happened in the UN after October 6.

VIII

THE UN did not react to the October 1973 war the way it had reacted to the June 1967 war. When the earlier war broke out on June 5, none of the combatants asked for a cease-fire, but their reticence did not stop the Security Council from voting for a cease-fire twenty-four hours later. In 1973, the combatants again did not ask for a cease-fire, but this time the Security Council did not vote for a cease-fire until seventeen days later.

In those seventeen days, this is what happened in the Security Council:

October 8: This first meeting of the Security Council after the outbreak of war was requested by the United States, which, however, did not present any cease-fire resolution, no doubt because it would have been a futile gesture. The Egyptian representative, el-Zayyat, accused Israel of "aggression" on October 6 and pretended that the Israelis had attacked at points where the UN did not have observers. The Chinese member, Huang, was so sure of what had happened in the Middle East that he denounced Israel for having "flagrantly launched on 6 October fresh military attacks on a large scale in expanded aggression against Egypt, Syria, and the Palestinian guerrillas." In a demonstration of how little ideology may have to do with reality, the Chinese spokesman accused the Soviet Union as well as the United States of "conniving at and supporting the Israeli policies of expansion and aggression." It remained for the Soviet Union's Malik to reveal why the Security Council had done nothing and was not likely to do anything until the Soviet Union was ready and willing to let it do something. Reminiscent of Fedorenko's obstructionism before the June 1967 war, Malik coolly criticized the Security Council for having come together at all and insisted that no new decision or resolution was called for on the part of the Council.[37]

So the first session of the Council after the outbreak of war was an almost total waste of time in an atmosphere of almost total unreality. Meanwhile, in Washington, a U.S. government spokesman reported that the Soviets were already providing a "massive" airlift of military supplies to Egypt and Syria.

October 9: The Yugoslav member, Minic, went farther than anyone had yet dared to go by threatening possible "sanctions" to punish Israel for its "aggression." The Syrian representative, Ismail, repeated a false report that Israeli planes had bombed the Soviet embassy in Damascus and had killed thirty of its members. Malik then outdid himself. "This bloody act is similar to the acts of Hitler when entire cities and villages were removed from the face of the earth," he shouted. And then this: "Like savage, barbaric tribes, in their mad destruction they [the Israelis] have annihilated, destroyed, and tried to remove from the surface of the earth cities, villages, the cultural heritage of mankind. They have ravaged entire civilizations." He accused Israel of responsibility for "world inflation and the rise of prices throughout the world." When the Israeli representative Tekoah tried to express his sympathy for all the human losses suffered in the war, including those at the Soviet cultural center in Damascus, which had been hit, Malik heatedly interrupted him with the words: "The Soviet delegation is unwilling to hear excuses and condolences from a representative of the murderers and international gangsters"—and stalked out of the chamber. At this, according to the Washington *Post*'s correspondent at the UN, Anthony Astrachan, "diplomats crowding the Council chamber burst into applause. Other diplomats said later that there had been a feeling of lynch mob and pogrom in the chamber of peace."[38]

Other than that, very little of importance happened at the second meeting of the Security Council.[39]

October 11: For the first time, an Arab representative, Baroody of Saudi Arabia, the UN's licensed jester, virtually gave up the pretense of an Israeli attack on October 6 and fell back on the plea that it was "immaterial" which side had started the present conflict. Malik, however, was

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[36] The enormity of the Soviet Union's investment in this war may be gathered from Israeli estimates, which are probably as close as we can get to it. According to Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, Syria used 450 tanks in 1967 and 2,700 in 1973, the Egyptians 1,000 tanks in 1967 and 2,600 in 1973 as well as 230 planes in 1967 and 680 in 1973 (Jerusalem *Post Weekly*, November 27, 1973, p. 5). The Syrians used about the same number of tanks against the Golan Heights as General Sir Bernard Montgomery had at the Battle of El Alamein in World War II.

[37] S/PV. 1743 (October 8, 1973), pp. 3-43.

[38] Anthony Astrachan, "The October War at the UN," *Midstream*, December 1973, p. 53.

[39] S/PV. 1744 (October 9, 1973), pp. 8 (Minic), 41 (Ismail), 43-45, 47 (Malik), 51 (Tekoah, Malik).

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less inhibited. He continued to inveigh against Israel as the "aggressor country," whose representatives at the UN were trying to justify "the barbarous murders of peaceful populations." He compared them to the Hitlerites: "This was how they 'Coventrified' Coventry; that was how they destroyed thousands of towns in the Soviet Union and tens of thousands of villages." Tekoah replied to Malik: "You mentioned, in your usual manner, Goebbels and his methods. If my memory does not fail me, there was a time when Goebbels was Stalin's ally; and if my memory does not fail me, you were brought up in the so-called Stalinist school." Malik spoke again, perhaps thinking that he had gone too far: "Do not speculate on these feelings of anti-Semitism. Do not accuse me of this. My best friends are Jews. I can mention their names here: Brodsky, Chernjak, and Shub."

Apart from these pleasantries, very little worth preserving happened at the third meeting of the Security Council.[40]

October 12: This relatively short meeting was taken up with tired charges and counter-charges, as if all the speakers knew that nothing they said could change anything.[41]

October 13-20: No meetings of the Security Council.

YET it was while the Council was not in session that the crucial turn in the war occurred. On October 13, the Israeli position was so precarious that President Nixon decided to start the resupply effort to Israel. On October 15, a small Israeli force turned the tide of battle by crossing the canal and establishing a foothold on the West Bank. According to Rouleau, it took the Egyptian high command in Cairo three or four days to realize how serious the situation had become. On October 16, President Sadat was so little cognizant of the true state of affairs at the front that he still spoke of liberating all of Sinai. On the same day, Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin arrived in Cairo. Evidently the U.S. resupply effort had shaken the Soviet leaders sufficiently to make them more amenable to renewed U.S. overtures for a cease-fire. Rouleau says that Sadat very probably was not fully conscious of the seriousness of the Israeli breakthrough until the 18th. Only on the 19th, in a meeting with Kosygin, was Sadat willing to accept a cease-fire in principle.[42] When Kosygin returned to Moscow later that same day, the men in the Kremlin must have received the news from Egypt with something akin to consternation. For they proceeded to send messages of such grave import to Washington that Secretary of State Kissinger, who was preparing to leave for Peking shortly, abruptly changed his plans and rushed off to Moscow in the early morning hours of October 20. One can only assume that Dr. Kissinger would not have acted with such unseemly haste if the Soviet messages had not been extraordinarily alarming. What these messages were, we still do not know and have been given no hint.

This sequence of events was the reason there were no meetings of the Security Council between October 13 and 20. It was also the reason why the Council was called together at 10:15 on the night of October 21. Now that the Soviets and their Egyptian clients were hell-bent on getting a cease-fire without delay, the Council could meet again.

October 21-22: On the seventeenth day of the war, the fifth meeting of the Security Council opened on the night of October 21 with the presentation by the U.S. member, John Scali, of a joint U.S.-USSR resolution, the product of the previous two days of hard bargaining in Moscow by Secretary Kissinger and General Secretary Brezhnev. It was made up of three interrelated parts: 1) A cease-fire in place within twelve hours after adoption of the resolution; 2) implementation of Resolution 242 "in all its parts" immediately after the cease-fire; and 3) "negotiations [to] start between the parties concerned" aimed at establishing "a just and durable peace in the Middle East" immediately and "concurrently" with the cease-fire and "under appropriate auspices." It was also explained by Mr. Scali that the cease-fire applied "not only to the parties directly concerned but also to those who have joined in the fighting by sending units" and that both sponsors had agreed that there should be an immediate exchange of prisoners of war.

In the discussion, Baroody of Saudi Arabia used the occasion to defend the Germans during and after the Weimar regime for having considered the Jews to be "their enemy" and for having believed that they had "been sold out by the Jews." The Indian, Sen, revealed that members of the Security Council had been informed only at 7 PM that evening that a meeting was planned and that he had received definite word only at 8:30 PM that the meeting was to be held. The members were thus given only about three hours for consultation among themselves and no time at all to get guidance or instructions from their governments. As Sen put it, "The United States and the Soviet Union have come to an agreement the details of which are not fully known and perhaps cannot and should not be known to us now or in the foreseeable future" and "the two Powers, however great and however powerful, have come to an agreement and we have to underwrite it quickly." The Chinese member, Huang, also protested against the methods of the two superpowers: "This practice of imposing one's view on the Security Council is most unreasonable and is one we cannot agree to." Nevertheless, the vote

[40] S/PV. 1745 (October 11, 1973), pp. 31 (Baroody), 77, 81 (Malik), 97 (Tekoah), 103-5 (Malik).
[41] S/PV. 1746 (October 12, 1973).
[42] *Le Monde*, November 25-26, 1973.

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at about 1 AM on October 22 went 14 to 0 in favor of the resolution (with China not voting).[43]

Resolution 338 of October 22, as it came to be known, was clearly a "trade-off." Egypt got the cease-fire which it desperately needed. Israel got a reinstatement of Resolution 242 as a "package deal" in the words "in all its parts," a promise of "negotiations," and a U.S.-USSR commitment, not in the resolution, for an immediate prisoner exchange. And so Resolution 242, with all its ambiguities and contradictory interpretations intact, was reincarnated in Resolution 338 but with something added that Israel had never obtained before—"negotiations" between "the parties concerned," whatever that might come to mean.

For all but two members of the Security Council, the night of October 21-22 was probably the most humiliating experience in UN history. After seventeen days of doing nothing in the face of an Israeli "disaster," the Security Council suddenly shook itself out of inertia in order, as a Chinese member rightly put it,[44] "to rubber-stamp" a U.S.-USSR deal with hardly enough time to know what it was doing when the Egyptians were facing disaster. The double standard had never operated more ruthlessly.

October 23: This sixth meeting of the Security Council was requested by Egypt because the proclamatory cease-fire provision of Resolution 338 had not been implemented and Israeli forces had succeeded in cutting off the Egyptian Third Army on the east bank of the canal. Each side accused the other of having violated the cease-fire agreement. According to Rouleau, the Israeli advance across the canal had resulted in the first signs of "panic" in both Cairo and Moscow. It would seem that the two top Egyptian commanders, including General al-Shazli, offered to resign, and Sadat himself thought of giving up the Presidency. If we may trust Rouleau, the Russians reacted with an "unaccustomed firmness" that surprised the Egyptian leaders. The Russians undertook to resupply the Egyptian Third Army by air if necessary, and allegedly told Sadat: "We will not permit a new defeat; we will be at your sides until the end and whatever the consequences may be."[45]

The Russians, who had now put their own power and prestige on the line, moved on three fronts—in Cairo to bolster Egyptian morale, in Washington to put additional pressure on the Israelis, and in the UN to give their next move a semblance of international legitimacy. In Washington, Secretary Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin worked out a new UN resolution urging the embattled forces in the Middle East to return to the original line of October 22 and requesting the UN Secretary-General to send observers to supervise the cease-fire. Unfortunately, no one knew where the original line had been. The resolution of October 22 had been drawn up so hastily that no provision had been made to implement it. To make matters worse, the Russians in the UN decided to take things into their own hands. They presented Ambassador Scali with a draft resolution which had changed a few key words from the version agreed on by Kissinger and Dobrynin in Washington. "Urges" was changed to "demands" in the provision pertaining to the return of the forces to the mysterious line of October 22, and the line itself was defined as that which had prevailed at the time of the vote by the Security Council, without the leeway of twelve hours clearly set forth in Resolution 338. This contretemps delayed the Council meeting on October 23 until agreement was reached to go back to the original Kissinger-Dobrynin version.[46]

For thirteen of the fifteen members, the meeting itself was in some ways even more humiliating than the previous one had been. Most of them had been ready to swallow their pride and go along with the first U.S.-USSR gang-up, but the second one, so soon after, was almost too much. Malik chose to behave in his most insufferable bully-boy fashion. His main victim was none other than Chiao Kuan-hua, the deputy foreign minister of the People's Republic of China. Malik took it upon himself to demand a vote on the new resolution without any prior discussion. When the Chinese representative protested, Malik repeatedly interrupted and tried to cut him off. The meeting degenerated into such a brawl that the presiding officer had to suspend it for ten minutes, the first such occurrence in the history of the Security Council. The Chinese member was finally able to complete his statement, which took about half an hour. The vote was 14 to 0 (with China not voting). Malik still could not leave the matter alone. When he spoke after the vote, he temporarily forgot that Israel was supposed to be the enemy and showed off his considerable repertoire of insult at the expense of the Chinese.

Several members could no longer repress their indignation. The Sudanese member, Khalid, started off by saying: "When we accepted the cease-fire resolution [of October 22] we did so in trust, and therefore refrained from discussing its implications. We marked the hasty manner in which it was conceived, we marked the hasty manner in which it was presented to us, we marked our rejection, as loyal members of this Organization and as a nonaligned country, of any concept of condominium that reduces this Council to a rubber stamp." The Indonesian member, Anwar Sani,

[43] S/PV. 1747 (October 21, 1973), pp. 6 (Scali), 12-15 (Baroody), 53-55 (Sen), 67 (Huang).
[44] S/PV. 1748 (October 23, 1973), p. 27-30 (Chiao).
[45] *Le Monde*, November 25-26, 1973.
[46] Astrachan, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

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observed: "Two days ago we were asked to vote on a draft resolution practically without being given time to study it properly." He expressed regret that his delegation had not asked how the previous cease-fire resolution was going to be implemented. The Peruvian member, Pérez de Cuellar, spoke of Resolution 338's "obvious lack of clarity" and suggested that the continuation of military action could be attributed "precisely to the lack of clarity in resolution 338 (1973) and also to the excessive speed with which it was adopted." Sadly, he confessed: "Once again we have adopted, almost without considering it, a draft resolution submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union." Then Huang of China revealed that his delegation had been asked to vote on the latest resolution without even having seen it.[47]

In truth, the first cease-fire Resolution 338 of October 22 was a diplomatic monstrosity. It violated every conceivable requirement for a successful cease-fire. As the British member of the Security Council, Sir Donald Maitland, soon observed, "It is unfortunately clear that a cease-fire in such a complex military situation could not have been self-policing. If the cease-fire is to be maintained, there must be proper arrangements on the ground to supervise it, of the sort which have been tested and have on the whole proved effective over the years."[48] Resolution 338 made no such arrangement. Instead, it was rushed through as if the United States and the Soviet Union could wave a magic wand and, by their joint fiat, bring to a sudden halt a war that had been raging in a Middle Eastern desert for seventeen boiling, bleeding days. Of the ten Arab states that had participated in the war against Israel, only one, Egypt, had accepted the cease-fire. The response of Syria had so little to do with what was actually in Resolution 338 that it approached the ludicrous.[49] Syria had never accepted Resolution 242; it did not, in fact, accept Resolution 338; it did not agree to attend the Geneva conference. Yet no Security Council resolution was ever passed or offered condemning or even gently reproaching Syria. Instead, an intense and incessant propaganda campaign was launched against Israel for having committed the crime of *lèse majesté* by not stopping in its tracks as soon as the Soviet Union decided to save the Egyptian army from disaster.

The road to Geneva was paved with Resolutions 242 and 338. They were the best the diplomatic mind could devise.

IX

WHAT is there to be learned from this history, if it is not to be repeated? One of the chief factors that makes this conflict so difficult to resolve is its asymmetry. The areas and populations of the combatants are so disproportionate that the perspective of each side must be fundamentally different. Israel cannot possibly swallow up Egypt, let alone the rest of the Arab world. The Arabs can very easily conceive of swallowing up Israel. Loss of territory means totally different things to Egypt and Israel—to the former, loss of territory; to the latter, the very basis of existence. If Israel had suffered the 1967 defeat, it would not be here today or it would have survived in such a puny, mangled state that the Arabs could have finished it off at will. But Egypt could survive an unprecedented debacle and immediately prepare for another, greater battle. Even though the Arabs have feared and fought against Israeli "expansionism," they well know that, even for Israeli extremists, it has logistical and historical limits. No such consolation can reassure the Israelis.

The Arabs cannot deny that this asymmetry exists; it is what gives them confidence in ultimate victory. As a consequence, any peace settlement which does not take this factor into consideration cannot be fair or "just" to both sides.

Yet the Arabs also face a problem with some Israelis' version of the strategy of stages. The more extremist or religious Zionists have regarded each war, even if forced on them, as a stage in the reclamation of the biblical land of Israel and the relocation of the Jews in the "right" places. In a postwar self-examination of Israeli "illusions" bred by the 1967 victory, Foreign Minister Abba Eban recently cited "the illusion that Israel's historic legacy was exclusively a matter of geography and not also, and principally, a heritage of prophetic values of which the central value was peace" and "the fallacy that to see anything temporary in some of Israel's positions west of the Jordan was tantamount to alienation from the biblical culture."[50] As long as the Arabs refused to settle for any boundaries, Israelis were almost irresistibly tempted to set those boundaries by themselves on the basis of historic legacy and military security. Though the Israelis did not threaten the Arab world the way the Arabs threatened Israel, that is not to say that the Arabs have not felt threatened, if to a much lesser degree, and much of it self-inflicted.

No diplomacy can do much about a holy war. A strategy of stages based on immemorial claims is a prescription for protracted conflict. The only way out of the dilemma is to start with the present and the living and not with the past and the dead. It is too late for Arabs to say that so many Jews do not belong in Palestine; they are there, and they cannot be removed or dispossessed without another Holocaust. It is too late for Israelis to say

47 S/PV. 1748 (October 23, 1973), pp. 16-36 (Malik, Chiao), 42 (Khalid), 61 (Anwar Sani), 62-63 (Pérez de Cuellar), 66 (Huang).

48 S/PV. 1748 (October 23, 1973), p. 46.

49 *Ibid.*, p. 122.

50 Jersualem *Post Weekly*, December 4, 1973, p. 10.

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that the West Bank does not belong to the Arabs; they are there, and they cannot be removed or disregarded without incalculable suffering. The trouble with history is that it is non-negotiable, and diplomacy is negotiation or it is nothing.

Without seeking to negotiate the Arab-Israeli differences here, it may be useful to clarify the terms of such a negotiation. Secretary Kissinger has given his understanding of what the Geneva conference is all about: "The question then is where are the borders and what are the security arrangements, and this is what is going to be negotiated in the next phase in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242."[51] On the Israeli side, Defense Minister Dayan has asserted: "The central issue is the borders of the state of Israel."[52] However difficult its implementation may be, the concept of "borders" is at least sufficiently clear and concrete to provide a basis for meaningful negotiations.

Those who have accepted Resolutions 242 and 338 on the road to Geneva have implicitly agreed to negotiate in good faith on "secure and recognized boundaries," as stated in Resolution 242, and "a just and durable peace," as in Resolution 338. There can be no negotiation if the Egyptians simply demand that the Israelis withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 borders, or if the Israelis take the position that they have already negotiated their borders with God. There must have been something wrong with the 1967 borders if they were such as to provoke a war on June 5. And, even if the borders should be God-given ones, the Jewish God has never been strong on security for His chosen people.

Something can also be gained from a closer examination of the term "secure and recognized boundaries." The two adjectives have become inseparable, but they need to be clearly differentiated. Boundaries can be recognized without being secure, and they can be secure without being recognized. Moreover, it is much easier to know what recognized boundaries are than what secure boundaries are. In the present circumstances, Israeli security depends on so much more than boundaries that the very notion of secure boundaries is far more complex than it may seem to be. Israeli security cannot be separated from, but neither can it be reduced to, Israeli territory.

Unfortunately, the very term, "secure boundaries," lends itself to some misconception. Security in this world is relative, but the term tends to make it appear to be absolute, as if boundaries by themselves can be secure or not secure instead of more or less secure. Surely the 1949 boundaries were more secure from the Israeli point of view than the 1947 boundaries in the sense that they were easier to defend. The post-1967 boundaries seemed to be easier to defend than the previous ones and yet they proved to be harder to defend because they lulled the Israelis into a false sense of security. The idea that Israel could have had security after the 1967 war by unilaterally withdrawing to the former boundaries is hardly credible; those were the very boundaries that had brought on the war in the first place. These examples of the security problem should be enough to show how tricky and deceptive the concept of security can be.

Until now, however, Israel has had neither recognized nor secure boundaries. It may be useful, as a starting point, to agree on the principle of recognized boundaries before tackling the more difficult question of secure boundaries. If, as heretofore, the Arabs refuse to recognize any boundaries for Israel, there is little point in trying to get them to recognize more secure boundaries.

The Israeli craving for security is historically understandable, but it will never be satisfied simplistically or to the exclusion of other factors. The Arabs, on the other hand, were not satisfied with any previous boundaries, and it is up to them to negotiate in good faith on boundaries before any progress can even be hoped for. If there is going to be negotiation in good faith at Geneva, the old issues in the UN are bound to arise again. Is negotiation in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242 going to take the form of a "package deal" or will it degenerate into a demand for a unilateral and arbitrary "priority" that favors only one side? Is Israeli withdrawal to be separated from agreeing on more secure, recognized boundaries? Is a strategy of stages going to be pursued, making impossible any prospect of a "durable peace"? These are some of the questions that were never satisfactorily answered in the Security Council and, therefore, must still seek for answers in Geneva. Diplomacy may be able to help but, like psychoanalysis, diplomacy helps those who want to be helped.

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[51] Interview in Peking, New York *Times*, November 13, 1973, p. 16.

[52] Speech in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem *Post Weekly*, November 27, 1973, p. 5.

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America, Europe, and the Middle East

Eugene V. Rostow

THE October war in the Middle East was a Pearl Harbor, an explosion which revealed acute tensions between reality and the models for reality which have dominated many minds. Like a flash of lightning, it illuminated the contours of a landscape large sectors of European and American opinion, in particular, were firmly resolved to ignore.

First of all, the fact that the war took place represented a failure of intelligence in a special sense—not a failure of knowledge, but a failure to understand what was known, because the event seemed incredible, in terms of the presuppositions about world politics which prevailed in high places. Like Stalin's refusal to believe that Hitler would attack him, like Pearl Harbor itself, neither the United States nor Israel could bring itself to conclude that Egypt and Syria would make war rather than carry out Security Council Resolution 242, at a time when, according to reports, Egypt had just agreed with Kissinger in Washington on a procedure for negotiation to implement the mandate of that resolution.

Second, despite its experience with the ill-fated cease-fire for Indochina, the American government resisted the hypothesis that the Soviet Union would approve—and indeed prepare, incite, and encourage—a flagrant act of aggression in the Middle East, completely contrary to the charter of the United Nations, and to its spectacular détente agreement with Nixon, on which both the Soviet Union and the United States had lavished so much public attention.

Third, the Arab-Soviet military attack of October, and the oil embargoes undertaken to support it, were a seismic shock to the North Atlantic alliance. Much to their surprise and chagrin, the allies discovered that they were in the midst of the most serious and difficult dilemmas of the entire postwar period, divided, angry at one another, and utterly unprepared.

The crisis in Atlantic relations revealed by the October war was more serious than the other crises in the history of the alliance—more serious even than Suez, traumatic as that was—because the struggle in the Middle East manifests a major and continuing Soviet threat to the security of Europe, which the allies did not face together, and are still not facing together. Unlike the war in Indochina, and a number of other issues on which the allies have differed in recent years, the long conflict over Israel's right to exist has become not only a difficult regional problem, but, in the American government's opinion, an important tool in the Soviet Union's effort to outflank NATO, divide Europe from America, and neutralize Western Europe. In Europe, however, this view of Middle Eastern affairs was often put aside or questioned. For the most part, the European governments preferred to consider the Arab-Israeli conflict almost entirely as a regional quarrel, perceived in terms of old controversies about the rightness or wrongness of a hundred disputed episodes since the days of Balfour, Truman, and Dulles.

The divisions among the allies over the October war were not simply the consequence of faulty intelligence, and insufficient consultation. They were occasioned by deeper causes, less available to the poultices of diplomacy. They were not brought about by the latest round of the Middle East war. On the contrary, the latest round of the Middle East war was brought about by divisions in the alliance which have existed for a long time, but have only now become generally visible. If the allies had followed the call of the Harmel Resolution adopted by the North Atlantic Council in 1967, and acted together for the last six years to protect their vital common interests in the Middle East, the risks of the October war, both for the Arabs and for their Soviet patrons, would have been far too great to consider. Indeed, had the allies been united in their policies toward the Middle East, as the Harmel Resolution recommended, they should long since have achieved a fair and balanced peace in the area.

But since the time of Suez the Atlantic allies have taken nominally different, and sometimes genuinely different, positions on an increasing number of issues of major importance, except for those directly concerned with the security of Central Europe against invasion from the East. The

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Middle East ranks high on the list of questions on which many of the allies have differed.

They have become so accustomed to the pattern that it no longer seems unnatural. But it is unnatural. In a relationship among nations so fundamental as that of the Atlantic alliance, a difference among the allies on a major political or economic question should be exceptional. It has become normal.

In at least three perspectives, then, the October war in the Middle East revealed error in the received wisdom of the foreign offices. 1) It proved that Arab resistance to all that has flowed from the Balfour Declaration was more intense and pervasive than many had chosen to believe. It may be that the terrible drama of Jew and Arab in the Middle East can only be resolved by a sustained dialogue between them in the spirit of Martin Buber. Until that dialogue occurs, however, the Middle East will remain what it has been throughout history, an arena where great powers exploit local passions for their own ends. It was a shock for many to realize that even moderate Arab leaders like Bourguiba and King Hussein, who genuinely believe in peace with Israel, could not fully reject a Soviet offer to sponsor a *jihad*. 2) The October war shattered the illusion that détente with the Soviet Union, earnestly sought since Truman's time, had actually been achieved. And 3), finally, it showed that the comfortable pattern of dissonance in European-American relations which had developed since Suez was no longer tenable as a basis for allied policy.

The impact of these events on the solidarity of the Atlantic alliance, and on the corresponding relationship between the United States and Japan, will determine the shape of the world for the next ten years at least. Will the allies rally to restore their unity—a unity nearly indispensable to the protection of their shared interests in relation to the political and military processes at work in the world—or will they continue to drift apart? Will they accept the October war as an unequivocal Pearl Harbor—a warning requiring their massive, energetic, and effective response—or dismiss it as a minor episode, as Britain dismissed the occupation of the Rhineland nearly forty years ago?

II

The relationship between North America and Western Europe is infinitely complex, and infinitely important: a palimpsest of relationships involving states, peoples, power, societies, and cultures in a dazzling web. Henry James devoted a considerable portion of his talent to its contemplation. Philosophers and sociologists study the similarities and differences among its artifacts. The North Atlantic universe, to recall Bernard Shaw's celebrated quip, is divided by a common pattern of social organization, common political and social ideals, and a common civilization. It shares a history of conflict and alliance whose echoes stir rivalry as often as they evoke trust. And, above all, the equilibrium of the Atlantic world is disturbed by the psychological shock of the reversal of European and American roles since 1945. De Gaulle spoke of America as "Europe's favorite daughter." It is never easy, for parent or for child, when the child is vested with ultimate responsibility for the safety of the family.

The political and security relationship between Europe and North America took its present shape in President Truman's time, as both Europe and America began unwillingly to perceive the nature of Soviet policy.

In the United States, in Canada, and in Europe alike, it was obvious then—and is obvious still—that the territorial integrity and political independence of Western Europe are vital security interests of the United States and of Canada. The balance of world power would tip disastrously against North America if the area, the people, and the resources of Western Europe fell under Soviet control. The North American national interests in Europe have many other dimensions—human and political. But in the end the United States must always fight, as it did in 1917 and 1941, to prevent a potential adversary from dominating Europe.

The policy laid down by Truman and Acheson, and fully accepted by Western Europe and Canada, was simple and clear-cut. And it was entirely sound.

The United States would help in the reconstruction of the European nations, and encourage the formation of a united Europe—a new polity large enough and strong enough to defend itself against the Soviet Union, and immune to the disease of fratricidal war. Meanwhile, the United States and Canada joined in establishing NATO, to help stand guard until the European egg was hatched. There were differences of emphasis among the partisans of the European idea. They favored a federal or a confederal Europe, a united Europe, a United States of Europe, a Third Force Europe, or a *Europe des patries*. But the heart of the matter was the concept of an autonomous and independent Europe—well disposed to the United States and Canada, to be sure, but also distinct, with a personality altogether its own, capable of fulfilling its own precepts of political life and social justice. When the new Europe emerged, the United States and Canada would withdraw their military forces, and return to something like the old state of normalcy. If anyone on either side of the Atlantic had prophesied in 1949 that there would be 300,000 American troops in and near Europe in 1974, he would have been committed to the nearest asylum.

Truman and Acheson approached the problem of security in terms of the classic principle of the balance of power. That principle remains valid. Indeed, it is the only possible basis for peace in the turbulent society of nations which emerged from the crucible of the Second World War. But

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the world of Truman's time is as remote from that of 1974 as 1945 was from 1914. Nonetheless, the solutions of Truman's time continue to grip men's minds on both sides of the ocean.

At the beginning of his administration, President Nixon expounded those ideas in his celebrated interview at Guam—a statement of policy which has had, and continues to have, a damaging effect on men's thinking about world politics everywhere. Nixon spoke about the evolution of a multipolar world, a world of diffuse power, in which the United States would do less to keep the general peace, and Europe and Japan more. In such a world, peace would be assured by the interplay of five great centers of power—China, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, the United States, and Japan. A principle of celestial mechanics would keep these planets in orbit, and prevent their collision.

Nixon's model has an immense appeal, In America, it seems to offer relief from the burdens the United States has carried since 1945—burdens odious to the historical vision Americans have of the rightful role of the nation in world affairs. In Europe, it appears to offer an opportunity for a Carolingian, a Churchillian Europe to play an altogether autonomous and vitally important role in world politics.

The ideas of Nixon's Guam interview were erroneous when they were put forward—as still-born as "massive retaliation," to which, indeed, they are closely related. They represent authentic American yearnings for a return to the past, but they do not correspond to the facts of life in a nuclear world, living under the growing pressure of Soviet imperial ambition.

Nixon's vision was that of a world of autonomous regional blocs. The large states would be the planets of the new system, each surrounded by satellites. Each regional system would be kept in its proper orbit by fear of the responses of the others if it should stray, or break the rules. Peace would be produced, in the 18th-century way, by the pure mechanics of the balance of power. But the Guam theory is not a permissible reading of recent history, nor indeed of 18th- and 19th-century history.

The search for a balance of power produced endless wars in the 18th century. It worked better in the 19th because the principle of the Concert of Europe was invented to guide and control it. The concert functioned diplomatically, and through occasional congresses, to harmonize policy in the light of certain accepted principles, limiting the extent to which force might be used in international politics. Its influence was sporadic, and not always effective. But until Germany began to defy the rules at the end of the century, it worked moderately well. Politics are not governed by the laws of astronomy. We can hardly expect peace to come without sustained and well-conceived effort, especially on the part of the larger states.

The vision of autonomous regional blocs is not a viable premise for American or European foreign policy. The location of indispensable resources in the world, and the patterns of trade and investment, do not allow a division of the world into blocs.

But there is a deeper reason why the notion of multipolarity is an illusion. In the context of world politics, the development of military technology, and particularly that of nuclear technology, makes the idea more and more obsolete. The geography of security no longer permits purely regional security arrangements. And the Non-Proliferation Treaty generates pressures for ultimate political orientation in a similar sense. That treaty rests on assurances against nuclear blackmail. The import of those assurances works implacably against multipolarity, and toward interdependence.

At the level of reality, it has been apparent for some years that the logic of the nuclear weapon has made Europe and the United States more completely interdependent in security than ever before. Despite the economic and political recovery of Europe since 1949, the overwhelming Soviet lead in nuclear armaments and the nature of Soviet policy have meant that the independence of the states of Western Europe cannot be assured save through a security alliance with the United States. Since it is the goal of Western nuclear policy that nuclear weapons not be used or brandished in world politics, the United States must maintain effective nuclear deterrence—that is to say, "second-strike capability"—to guarantee a nuclear stalemate.

Because nuclear weapons cannot be used, save in inconceivably ultimate circumstances of danger, nuclear stalemate must be matched by deterrent stalemate at the level of conventional force, and indeed at every other level of possible coercion. Without conventional deterrence, Soviet expansion could "nibble us to death," in Adlai Stevenson's phrase. It follows that the American nuclear umbrella requires the permanent presence of substantial American conventional forces in and near Europe, and in and near other areas vital to our security. Without such a presence, the nuclear deterrent might well be incredible; in a bipolar or a multipolar nuclear world, there could be no return to the policy of "massive retaliation" —which was an impossible notion even in its heyday. Dulles himself never seriously considered nuclear retaliation against the Soviet Union as a response to the various Soviet pressures with which he had to deal. American and allied conventional forces in and near Europe are not hostages or a psychological trip-wire. An attack on them would not automatically produce a nuclear attack on Moscow. Their role is quite a different one, as the recurring crises in the Middle East demonstrate. Their presence means that in the event of crisis, the allied governments do not have to

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choose between using the nuclear weapon and abandoning important interests. Conventional forces provide a conventional alternative, substantial enough to be effective, both in itself and in giving time for diplomacy.

Thus far, the basic rule in the intricate process of mutual nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union has been a taboo against the first shot between their own forces. It has proved a convenient safeguard against miscalculation which might become uncontrollable escalation. Save for the limited probe of the Cuban missile crisis, the United States had not used force against the Soviet Union, nor has the Soviet Union actually used its own military forces against us. We carried out our policies in Greece, in Berlin, and in Korea and Vietnam without direct Soviet interference. And the United States refrained from the use of force when the Soviets sent troops into East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. It was the sensitivity of this rule which was invoked in the Soviet and American alerts of October 24, 1973—two days after the cease-fire resolution for the Middle East had been accepted.

The implications of nuclear logic for world politics are underscored by the rapprochement between China and the United States. In many ways, it is the most fundamental and most hopeful development in the world political system since 1949. The cause for the shift in Chinese policy was China's perception of a Soviet threat, both from Siberia and from Southeast Asia. China did not respond to the inducement of American offers, put forward regularly for many years, and pressed insistently during the last eight. It did respond, however, to the fear of a Soviet attack. The shift occurred because the Chinese reached the conclusion that the mobilization of some fifty Soviet divisions in Siberia, coupled with the growing Soviet presence in Southern and Southeast Asia, constituted a danger to the regime, and to Chinese national autonomy, despite China's own formidable nuclear capability. To such a danger there was only one possible response for the Chinese if they wished to maintain their independence—association with the United States.

The decision could not have been easy for China. Originally a Soviet ally, it became autonomous during the 1950's, and indeed a Soviet rival for the leadership of the world revolutionary impulse. But simple and primitive reasons of safety have forced it now into association with the United States, despite the ideological distaste, and guilt, this change must involve. As a result, the world is less multipolar, and far more decidedly bipolar, than it was before. This condition will continue, I should suppose, even when the Chinese acquire a firm second-strike capability, because it is nearly unimaginable that the nuclear weapon be used, even between China and the Soviet Union.

The United States has made it plain that while deterring a Soviet attack on China is the central theme of the new relation between China and the United States, that relation is not an alliance against the Soviet Union. The goal of American policy is to achieve equally correct relations with both China and the Soviet Union, based on reciprocal respect for the rules of public order codified in the United Nations Charter. As China, Japan, and the United States have now made abundantly clear, they share a profound national interest in preventing Soviet hegemony in East Asia. China desires a strong, credible, forward American presence in East Asia, and a strong NATO as well. The risks of a Chinese attack on Taiwan have vanished for the time being. China wants United States forces to remain in South Korea, and has publicly endorsed the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States. In Southeast Asia, it has supported the enforcement of the cease-fire for Indochina reached in January 1973, and guaranteed by the powers in March 1973.

The Soviet response to the new relationship between China and the United States, and its extension to Japan, has been to oppose it, and to keep it from becoming a full-fledged alliance. After all, the goal of China's rapprochement with the United States is to restrain the Soviet Union. But in the long run, the new network of relationships among China, Japan, and the NATO alliance should assure restraint in Soviet as well as in Chinese policy. That potentiality is being tested now both in Indochina and in the Middle East.

If China, with an impressive nuclear arsenal of its own, had to turn to the United States for protection against what it perceived to be a massive Soviet threat from Siberia and Southeast Asia, the lesson for Japan and Western Europe is plain. For all three great centers, and many lesser ones as well, security policy must rest on the rock of a permanent security partnership with the United States. There is no other way.

To state the problem in different words, the world is becoming more and more bipolar: smaller, more tightly integrated, and more dangerous every day—so dangerous and so tightly integrated that it may soon have no alternative but genuine peace. In the nature of Soviet power and policy, there is no substitute for American nuclear support, even for large states like Japan and China, and for Western Europe as well. And in the nature of nuclear logic, nuclear deterrence requires the permanent forward deployment of American conventional forces. America cannot withdraw its conventional forces, and provide only a sanitary nuclear response—"massive retaliation." In most situations of crisis, from Korea and Vietnam to Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Cuba, nuclear weapons cannot be used, and crises are handled at the conventional level. It follows that the security of Western Europe and the United States will continue to require their organized interdependence. As the Middle East crisis in

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October made cruelly manifest, the only significant influence Europe can have in world politics is as an active member of the Atlantic alliance, that is, as a partner, and a more and more equal and responsible partner, of the United States. The European nations recognize this truth when they object, quite properly, to the withdrawal of American forces from Europe and the marches of Europe. But it is a truth with political corollaries. Interdependence cannot be confined indefinitely to the military sphere alone.

Yet at the level of belief and feeling, neither American nor European public opinion has fully accepted the force of these conclusions. In Europe, men still dream as they did in 1949 of an autonomous Europe, capable of defending itself, and playing an independent role in world affairs. And in America, strong political leaders ask why rich, modern Europe cannot defend itself without the presence of 300,000 American troops.

III

THE extraordinary development of the world economy since the Second World War reinforces the logic of the nuclear weapon. Economic forces, like those of security, are integrating the world, not dividing it into regional blocs. The centripetal pressures for economic integration are far stronger than those of separatism and multipolarity.

The liberal economic policies launched by Presidents Roosevelt and Truman—the policies represented by Bretton Woods, GATT, the Marshall Plan, and the successive programs of national and international assistance to the developing nations—precipitated a nearly miraculous process of cumulative development in many parts of the world. The success of those policies has brought about a new situation. requiring new measures and indeed new institutions if the world is to avoid a retreat into autarchy or worse.

Through twenty-five years of imaginative cooperation, the bankers, businessmen, trade unions, economists, and governments of Western Europe, North America, and Japan created an economic system of a kind which had been unknown since 1914: a closely unified economy of the industrialized nations. That economy functions as the nucleus of a far-reaching and progressive Western economic order, embracing many smaller industrialized nations, and large parts of the Third World as well. Like a magnet, it is rapidly drawing the economies of many Communist nations into its orbit.

The Western economic system is both planned and decentralized: directed, but also flexible. It is planned through the use of fiscal and monetary policies to maintain high levels of demand. And it is decentralized through its reliance on the responses of competitive markets to economic opportunities. For all its problems and shortcomings, the international Western economy has proved to be by far the most successful of all the economic systems now functioning in the world. It has raised living standards, and promoted a wide dispersal of power and opportunity. And, in countries which desired to pursue such goals, it has proved to be the solid foundation for a humane social order as well.

The fundamental economic problem which has emerged in the development of the Western international economy is structural. The economies of Western Europe, North America, and Japan are being integrated at an accelerating rate by irreversible flows of trade, capital, entrepreneurship, tourism, technology, and security expenditures. They have become a single economy in practice. But their economic activities are now more completely and effectively integrated than their institutions for economic control, and particularly their institutions for monetary management. Purely national monetary institutions and policies have lost their capacity to govern the economic relations among the key nations themselves, and their collective relations with many other nations, notably, but not exclusively, with the nations producing oil. The sheer volume of transfers required by the scale and complexity of international economic transactions today makes it impossible to manage monetary policy through a few phone calls and swaps among the central bankers, and an occasional secret weekend at agreeable country houses in France or Britain. Such methods worked well between 1945 and 1971. They collapsed in 1971 because of human mistakes, and, more fundamentally, because they were no longer adequate to the magnitude of the problem.

This structural weakness of the Western economic system—its failure thus far to establish workable machinery for collective monetary management—is the reason why inflation has become so endemic, and so dangerous, even in the relatively stable societies of the industrialized nations.

Unless the monetary problem is solved, and solved soon, the liberal economic policies of the period between 1945 and 1971 will be abandoned, and the world will retreat into self-defeating policies of autarchy and regionalism. Such a process would have more than economic costs. It would weaken the political foundations of security.

The current effort at worldwide monetary reform through the International Monetary Fund has some promise, and in any event the effort must be made. But the IMF cannot accomplish the task I regard as most urgently and immediately required—the development of a financial institution through which the main industrial nations could together manage their reserves, and harmonize their economic policies to a degree which implies unity rather than consultation. Whether the new institution is called an account, a fund, or a central bank is immaterial. The function must be undertaken.

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Here, as in the realm of security, the task is beyond the reach of Europe, or Japan, or the United States acting alone. On economic problems, there is no way even to begin to plan a solution for the problem of economic control save on the basis of cooperative action involving all the key nations functioning as a collectivity.

These economic pressures for closer and closer association are not confined to the circle of rich capitalist nations in the Northern Hemisphere. China has sought to enter the circle, for fundamental reasons of national security. And even the Soviet Union seems divided, as has happened several times in the past, between the advantages of economic cooperation with the West and the appeal of its national and ideological ambitions. It has sought credits to finance the purchase of machinery and technology from the United States—and of course it has bought grain on an extremely large scale. Thus far, however, it has been unwilling to make even the minimal political concessions without which such economic relations will remain beyond its reach.

Another phase of the same process of economic integration is taking place—a process with far-reaching implications for the shape of future world systems.

For the last twenty-five years, most industrial nations have suffered from a shortage of labor; during the same period, most of the developing nations have suffered from unemployment. In many of the developing nations, economic policy has been unable to mobilize either the capital or the entrepreneurship required to use its labor force.

There are only two possible answers to this paradox: the industrialized nations which are short of labor can either import labor from the developing nations which have a labor surplus, or export capital, entrepreneurship, and management to them. On a large scale, the first course is socially untenable. The second, which has great promise, requires careful, cooperative control.

A large-scale new movement of private capital, entrepreneurship, and management to the developing nations is already proceeding, and proceeding rapidly. It is the key to the development process in Brazil, Mexico, Taiwan, Israel, Iran, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia, and many other nations which are successfully raising their standards of living as full participants in the international Western economy. Various proposals have been put forward in recent years for international agreements through which the developing countries—and indeed all countries—could be assured a larger and more regular flow of private capital and entrepreneurship. The prompt negotiation and conclusion of a multilateral treaty that could achieve this goal, on fair and agreed terms, is one of the most important tasks for world statesmanship. The growth of most of the developing countries is inconceivable without it. So is the future of the industrial nations.

IV

If the arguments of sections II and III of this article are correct, considerations both of security and of economic advantage in a nuclear world require deeper and more effective methods of international cooperation, particularly among the industrialized nations. Without such cooperation, it will be impossible to organize the coalitions which could insist on the enforcement of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations against the international use of force. And it will be equally impossible to sustain the growth of developed and developing nations alike.

Manifestly, Europe and North America are indispensable participants in any workable programs for achieving these goals in the world of 1974. The indivisible security interests of Europe and North America in the independence of Western Europe and the territories adjacent to it can best be protected by their active partnership in security and political affairs. And their indivisible economic and social interests in the continued success of the international Western economy can only be assured by an equally active economic partnership involving Europe, North America, Japan, and a few other key countries.

Equally manifestly, both Europe and America have not yet accepted these propositions as the first principles of their foreign policies. In differing degrees, they are trying to deal with the problems of 1974 in terms of the formulas of 1949. A large part of European opinion has been unwilling to draw the necessary political conclusions from the fact of European and American interdependence in security. At the same time, there is a smaller but still important body of opinion in America which prefers the illusion of American freedom to take unilateral action, as we did when we devalued in August 1971, to the often tedious task of negotiating a concerted allied policy. Moreover, both in Europe and in North America there is a considerable minority which insists that the pressure of Soviet policy is a myth, and that both halves of the Atlantic world should withdraw into their shells, dismantle their military establishments, and face the future armed only with faith, innocence, and purity of spirit.

The habit of political dissonance in the affairs of the Atlantic alliance, save on the problem of protecting Europe against an attack across the central front in Germany, has many roots, and has been visible in many contexts. In recent years, it has had two major causes.

First, all the allied governments, and most notably the American government under Nixon, have propagated the view that the cold war is over, and that the allies have reached a condition of détente and peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union—that the United States and the Soviet Union have substituted negotiation for confrontation.

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But there is no détente. The Soviet Union continues to build up its armaments in every category on a scale that has no parallel in modern history. It deploys military forces around the world in an array which radiates an increasing threat to allied interests in many situations of conflict, to our supply lines, and to the possibility of maintaining the balance of power on which our security depends. The Soviet Union is pursuing a policy of 18th- or 19th-century imperialism, with some 20th-century ideological overtones.

American and allied policy has sought détente with the Soviet Union since the offer of the Baruch Plan and the Marshall Plan, and indeed well before that time. The only possible basis for détente, as the United States has stressed over and over again, is mutual and reciprocal respect for the rules of the charter of the United Nations governing the international use of force by states and from states. That principle will always be the essential theme of American foreign policy. The charter is not, after all, a suicide pact, and it is not self-enforcing. Under present circumstances it can only be vindicated by an active balance-of-power diplomacy. In the long run, it will be respected by one group of states only if it is respected by most of the others, and above all by the Soviet Union. At the moment, however, the United States and many of its allies talk soothingly of détente as if it had already been achieved, and live by the rules of the charter, which the Soviet Union ignores.

It is a bizarre state of affairs, recalling that of the decades before 1914 and 1939. It is no wonder that European and American public opinion is divided and confused, and that it is so difficult for all the allied governments to adopt and carry out security programs appropriate to the common danger.

The second major source of the division in the alliance has been the political *Gestalt* of Europe. For some time now, Europe has been needlessly paralyzed as an effective influence in world affairs because it has elected to pursue the chimera of a sharply separate European identity, at the expense of achieving a concerted alliance policy through which the combined influence of Europe and North America could be brought to bear on world problems of concern to the alliance. In many instances, it has chosen to demonstrate the existence of a European identity by taking positions different from those of the United States.

These sentences can easily be misunderstood. I have *not* said that the goal of a political Europe is a chimera, that it is already obsolete, or that it is necessarily opposed to the principle of an effective Atlantic alliance. The European and the Atlantic ideals are not rivals, and cannot be viewed as rivals. Indeed, the idea of Europe is inconceivable outside the framework of the Atlantic alliance. On the other hand, the concept of a Third Force Europe, fully protected by the United States, but free from the burden of serious responsibility except on the central front in Germany, is a contradiction in terms. For reasons fundamental to the nature of man, and of world politics, it cannot work much longer as the premise of policy, either for Europe or for the United States.

THE essence of the problem is not the evolution of a political Europe, but the evolution of a political Europe in a narrow, inward-looking, and rather parochial mood. The members of the European Community as a group have elected to pursue a particular conception of European policy. On issues arising outside the territorial limits specified in the North Atlantic Treaty, they have tended to be so preoccupied with the quest for a separate European personality that on one problem after another they have either differed publicly with the policy of the United States, or remained entirely passive—neutral, leaving the responsibility for the protection of alliance interests to the United States acting alone. Sometimes—as in the Middle East recently—they have done both.

The dynamic process of establishing a political Europe requires no such result. Everybody realizes that making a political Europe will take time, and that for the moment European positions are difficult to negotiate and tend to represent the least common denominator. If we really were living in a state of détente, there would be no harm in Europe's concentrating for a while on the task of European gestation. But we are not living in a state of détente. The United States is feeling the strain of having borne so many burdens alone for so long, and at such cost. And the world will not wait for a political Europe to be born. Decisions have to be made. They should be Atlantic decisions, not unilateral American decisions, for they affect all the allies alike.

There are other causes for this phenomenon, and they have all contributed to the crisis, but the root of the trouble is in these two related areas—the view that détente with the Soviet Union has been achieved, for which the United States is largely responsible, and the gradual adoption of the notion of Europe as a Third Force everywhere but in Europe itself. In short, the wounds of the alliance are self-inflicted.

Many have concluded that Europe is inhabited by a race of political pygmies, who prefer the comfortable posture of being an American protectorate, at minimal cost, to the risks and burdens of accepting political responsibility as the partner of the United States in concerted alliance policies. There are no European successors, they tell us, to the great generation of Adenauer, de Gasperi, Schumann, Monnet, Churchill, and Spaak. I do not share this view. Europe, like America, is struggling with the tension between old ideas and new realities. In the course of that struggle, European energies have been concentrated primarily on the complex problems of negotiating European unifi-

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cation. There has simply not been enough time or energy left over for Atlantic problems. Besides, the prevalence of mediocre politicians is not exclusively a European phenomenon. There are plenty of American leaders who qualify.

For many Europeans, it is disappointing—frustrating—to realize that Europe and North America are now just as interdependent, and perhaps more interdependent, than they were twenty-five years ago. They fear that the necessities of the Atlantic relation may prevent the fulfillment of the European idea. That sense of frustration expresses itself in formulas which discharge negative feelings in a number of ways: if Europe cannot protect its security without American help in any event, and if it is in America's interest to protect Europe, why should Europe do much by way of defense efforts itself? Why should Europe participate as an active partner of the United States in the difficult and often dangerous responsibilities of politics beyond its safe enclave? Wouldn't it hasten European integration, and the emergence of an independent European personality, to articulate anti-American attitudes, and engage in a little brisk confrontation with the United States, at least on safe subjects?

Attitudes of this kind stir vehement responses in American opinion. Why has the formation of a political Europe taken so long? Europe, these men charge, has become a parochial backwater, a protectorate without a coherent sense of world politics as a whole, or a real sense of responsibility. Why should the European nations be taken seriously, if they refuse to behave seriously?

These themes reinforce each other. The European isolationists and illusionists strengthen their American counterparts, and vice versa. Their outlook would justify a weakening of the habit of cooperation, and a positive preference for unilateral action.

This quarrel between the European and American Gaullists, as George Ball has called them, could produce irreversibly dangerous actions: conflicts over trade and monetary policies, for example, and, most important of all, a substantial withdrawal of American conventional forces from Europe and the Mediterranean.

V

For some years now, the interplay among these contending forces in European and American opinion has prevented allied agreement on a number of important problems.

Neutralizing the financial consequences of military decisions is one of the simplest of these issues, and politically the most sensitive. It is the nagging controversy which gives political force to Senator Mansfield's crusade to withdraw American conventional forces from Europe and from the Mediterranean.

It would seem obvious that allied security decisions should be made on military grounds, and only on military grounds. The deployment of troops, and the procurement of military equipment, should not be allowed to affect the balance of payments of any nation. The real resources involved should be paid for by the ally providing them.

The allies should have solved this problem twelve or fifteen years ago, when the dollar shortage of the early postwar period became the dollar overhang. While the alliance has made progress, it has proceeded slowly, rather grudgingly, and not on the footing of principle. Far too many of the arrangements and adjustments treated as offsets are incomprehensible accountants' devices, which do not meet the political problem in ways the public can understand. And far too many of them, still, involve credits, which is an indefensible solution for the problem.

No single step would be more helpful in clearing the political air between Europe and the United States than a European initiative to take the dollar sign out of security dispositions. What is needed is an ongoing alliance lend-lease program, which assured everyone that each ally was providing the resources needed from his country for the common defense, and that no country's balance of payments would be hurt, or improved, by the security decisions of the alliance. Such a program would be simple and comprehensible. And it would improve the climate for every other subject on the agenda, most especially for progress toward sanity in monetary affairs.

In that critical realm, too, the dream of an autonomous as distinguished from an Atlantic Europe has delayed the acceptance of reality on both sides of the ocean. I contended earlier that the development of an integrated Western international economy requires the establishment of a new institution for governing the monetary relations among the key industrial nations. But it has been impossible thus far to persuade that horse to run. The Europeans have been largely preoccupied with the problems of forming a European monetary union, and have been unwilling to consider an Atlantic-Japanese alternative. Progress in that effort will be governed by the cynical rule that things must get worse before they can get better. One might have supposed that they have been bad enough since August 1971 to stir even governments to rational action. In any event, things are all too likely to get much, much worse in the field of monetary affairs as the weapon of the oil embargo, and the new level of oil prices, explode all over the world.

The energy problem was a matter of intense concern for five or six years before the October war in the Middle East, with its catastrophic new techniques of economic warfare. The world energy crisis is not so much a matter of absolute petroleum shortage as it is a monetary crisis, and a political and security crisis. Under existing monetary arrangements, no nation's balance of pay-

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ments can sustain the transfer problems looming up. And—as is now obvious—it is hardly prudent to put national economic life, and national safety, at the mercy either of Soviet fleets or of political policies altogether inadmissible to the code of international law: policies, that is to say, which threaten the political independence of sovereign nations. Many of the ablest Western oil experts have long urged our sluggish and unwilling governments to face the issue and do something about it. Their warnings were ignored.

Here again, the only policy in everyone's interest is a policy of close collaboration among Europe, North America, and Japan. The rational course, as Secretary Kissinger has recently urged, is surely deepened integration, not fragmentation; solidarity, not autarchy and unilateralism. But thus far both Europe and Japan have preferred to seek separate bargains with the Arab oil states, rather than join forces with the United States. Here, as in every other field where the pattern of separatism has been tried, the result has been disastrous.

There are no easy solutions for the energy problem of the world at large, and particularly for the energy problem of the OECD nations. But surely their bargaining position in relation to the oil-producing states would be stronger if they acted together; and together they should be able to press forward more effectively with the development and use of alternative sources of energy.

VI

THE October war in the Middle East was the culminating stage, thus far at least, in the process of political division among the Atlantic allies. On both sides of the Atlantic, it suddenly became clear that unilateralism had gone too far. The event was so important to the security of Europe, and so disturbing in other ways, that it was generally perceived by the allies —after the event—as a wound to be healed as quickly as possible. The December ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels registered a turning of the tide. For the first time in five years the forces within the alliance making for allied solidarity have gained, and those of separatism and unilateralism have diminished in strength.

What used to be called "the Eastern Question" has bedeviled European politics for millennia. It bedeviled the relationship among the allies during the Second World War, and has continued to do so ever since. Dakar, Casablanca, and Syria were neuralgic moments during the war, as Palestine, Algeria, Suez, and the successive wars against Israel were later on.

But except for France, the Atlantic allies were politically united during and after the Six-Day War of 1967. They were at the center of an intense and sustained diplomatic effort based on a common policy, which was developed and adapted through extensive and nearly continuous consultations. Despite differences with France on Middle East questions at the time, Great Britain and the United States, who took the lead in the diplomacy of the 1967 crisis, kept France fully informed, and regularly exchanged views with French representatives.

The pattern of 1973 was entirely different. Nothing mattered except the course of the war itself, and Soviet-American diplomacy. The United States did not undertake from the beginning an orchestrated and worldwide campaign, as it did in 1967 and 1968, to explain its policy to the Atlantic allies and to other governments, friendly and not-so-friendly alike, and to develop common positions with them where possible. We had full public support only from the Netherlands and from Portugal. Europe as such was on the sidelines, neutral, and often at odds with the United States.

To some extent, the 1973 gap among the allies may have been the consequence of a difference in diplomatic styles. Nixon and Kissinger have never practiced alliance and multilateral diplomacy as Johnson and Rusk did. They seem to prefer the drama of *tête-à-tête* bargaining—which invariably worries and irritates interested nations who are not present or well-briefed.

But Nixon's diplomatic style does not really explain the serious division among the Atlantic allies during the Middle East crisis of 1973. If the European allies had wished to consult with the United States, and reach a concerted alliance policy on Middle East problems, they could have insisted on doing so, either in Brussels or in Washington.

The basic cause of the split was different. As early as 1970, the Europe of the Six began to develop a European Community position on Middle East questions, and particularly on the settlement of the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. A European policy on these issues was hammered out—a position which differed sharply from that of the United States on certain critical points. A great deal of hammering was necessary before a unanimous European position was reached, and many compromises were made in order to obtain French acquiescence. The major goal of the exercise was to take a first step toward transforming the Community into a political as well as an economic body. Thus a unanimous position among the Six was considered to be a good in itself, almost without regard to the merits of the policies adopted, or their influence on the course of events.

As Britain approached the Community, it modified its policies of 1967 and 1968, and embraced the Community views on the issues in controversy. During the lengthy period when the Harmel Committee and the Davignon Committee of the European Community were debating these problems, a rule of secrecy was invoked, and normal diplomatic exchanges with the United States on the subject were suspended. After the Community po-

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sition was achieved, it was discussed with the United States, with Israel, and with the Arab states, but it could not be changed without a further round of difficult negotiation among the Six, and now the Nine.

As a matter of form, the differences between the European Community and the United States on the problems of the Arab war against Israel concern the interpretation of Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, which called on Israel and its Arab neighbors to reach agreements establishing a condition of peace, in accordance with principles and provisions stated in the resolution. The significance of the disagreements among the allies can be understood only in the context of the history of the Palestine problem, and of the legal norms which have been applied, stage by stage, in resolving it.

The paragraphs which follow attempt to evoke a few of the high points of that story, in synoptic form.

At the end of the First World War, the ancient Ottoman Empire was dismembered by treaty. Large parts of its Asiatic territories were transferred to the authority of the League of Nations, which established Mandates for many of them, with Britain and France as trustees. The region called Palestine was one of Britain's Mandates, under a special charter, different from that of the other mandates. It embodied the Balfour Declaration of 1917, "in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." The Mandate recognized the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country. And Article 6 required the mandatory power to facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions "while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced."

The boundaries of the Palestine Mandate did not correspond to ancient maps, nor even to Turkish administrative arrangements. Britain and France bargained hard over the northern boundaries, since France was the mandatory power in what is now Lebanon and Syria, and the British authorities in Egypt, which was at that time a British protectorate, were much involved in establishing the western boundary of the mandated territory.

When the charter of the United Nations was drafted, Article 80 provided, with the Palestine Mandate in mind, that except as may be agreed in new trusteeship agreements, and until such agreements have been concluded, "nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any States or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which members of the United Nations may respectively be parties."

The ultimate Arab position has always been that the Palestine Mandate was beyond the powers of the League of Nations, which was authorized by the covenant of the League, in Arab opinion, only to administer mandated territories as "a sacred trust" for the benefit of the *existing* inhabitants of the territories. The inhabitants, in turn, were to be prepared for self-government as rapidly as possible, and the territories then transferred to them.

The Arab argument against the legality of the Mandate has been repeatedly and authoritatively denied. But it continues to be asserted, and is, in fact, the first legal predicate for the Arab claim of a "right" to destroy Israel. It symbolizes a deep and widespread Arab conviction that the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate were an injustice to the Arab peoples—a taking of their lands without their consent.

In the late 30's, Britain concluded that the twin principles of the Mandate were unenforceable. Arab resistance to large-scale Jewish immigration, and to the rapid evolution of the Jewish Agency as the embryo of a state, was becoming more and more determined, and more violent. The territories of the Mandate west of the Jordan had been separated by Great Britain from the Mandate administration in 1922, and taken over by the new Kingdom of Transjordan, without objection from the League. In the 30's, and again after the Second World War, Britain proposed a further partition of the remaining territories of the Mandate into Arab and Jewish areas of settlement, with a special regime for Jerusalem. Other schemes were also considered at the time—a unified binational state in the mandated region, like Lebanon in political character, or a new trusteeship under a modified mandate from the United Nations.

SHORTLY after the end of the Second World War, Britain began to discuss the Palestine question with the United States, for the same reasons which led her to raise Greece and other problems with us. Britain was hard pressed at home. The imperial impulse had died, victim of the war. The nation was retreating from empire, and seeking to arrange for stable and responsible transitions of power, in many instances by persuading the United States to take the falling baton. Furthermore, Palestine was becoming impossibly difficult to govern, as the conflict among the communities became steadily more intense. When it became clear that the United States would advise Britain with the utmost freedom, but take no responsibility whatever for Palestine, Britain decided to give up the Mandate, and return the territory to the authority of the United Nations. Although there is a hiatus in the charter on the problem, Britain assumed—as everyone else has done since—that the United Nations has in-

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herent jurisdiction over the surviving League mandates, both as the legal successor of the League, and because there is no other conceivable solution for the problem. This is the legal basis for the United Nations position on Southwest Africa.

After tumultuous negotiation and debate, the Assembly of the United Nations received a report from its Special Committee recommending a plan for the future government of Palestine—the famous plan for partitioning the territory into an Arab and a Jewish state, joined in economic union, with a special regime for Jerusalem. In turn, the Assembly recommended the adoption of that plan on November 29, 1947, and requested the Security Council to take the necessary measures for its implementation, including a "determination" by the Council that any use of force to alter the settlement envisaged in the resolution be considered a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. While the General Assembly has special authority under Article 85 of the charter to exercise all the functions of the United Nations with respect to trusteeship agreements, it did not attempt to make its recommendation of the 1947 partition plan binding under Article 85.

As the end of the Mandate approached, in May 1948, it became apparent that the Arabs of Palestine and of neighboring countries would fight the partition plan, which the Jews had accepted. With chilling irresponsibility, the Security Council did nothing, and remitted the outcome to trial by battle, qualified only by a series of calls for an end to the fighting within Palestine. As the British gave up the Mandate, the State of Israel was proclaimed for the territories of Palestine allotted to the Jews under the partition resolution, and recognized by the United States and the Soviet Union, and then by other countries. The Arab armies marched against it across the frontiers of the mandated territory.

The war of 1948-49 occurred in stages, interrupted by short truces. As the Israeli forces slowly gained the initiative, and finally defeated the Egyptian army in the Eastern Sinai, the Security Council passed a series of resolutions which gave legal form to the outcome of the fighting. After Egypt had been decisively defeated in a campaign from which the other Arab states abstained, the Security Council pressed successfully for the armistice agreements of 1949, negotiated at Rhodes—the only formal agreements thus far reached between Israel and its Arab neighbors. And it set up machinery through which the parties might make peace. Within the armistice demarcation lines, Israel became a member of the United Nations, generally recognized by the international community. In 1951 the Security Council found that the armistice regime is of a permanent character, precluding acts of hostility among the parties, and that neither party can reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent, or claim belligerent rights against the other, including the right to visit, search, or seize vessels transiting the Suez Canal.

This pattern of decisions reflected a collective judgment that the Arab states had been in the wrong in attacking Israel in 1948; that Israel had come into existence legitimately, through proclamation, recognition, and the exercise of its inherent right of self-defense as a state; and that the Arab states were obliged to make peace with Israel in full conformity with the charter. The armistice agreements provide, at Arab insistence, that the armistice demarcation lines of 1949 are not political boundaries, but can be changed by agreement when the parties move from armistice to peace.

The settlement of 1949 faithfully applied the norms of the charter with respect to the international use of force. States cannot use or threaten the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. They are responsible for all international uses of force from their territory—whether by their own armed forces, or by guerrilla groups, armed bands, or territorists. Emerging from the chrysalis of the Mandate, Israel was a state, in fact and in law, and was entitled to use force in its own defense. Having used force legally to resist the Arab attacks of 1948, it was entitled to all the protections of the charter behind the armistice lines, until those lines were altered by agreement when peace was made.

Between 1949 and 1956, the circumstances of world politics changed. The Soviet Union, restrained in Europe and then in Korea, pressed forward in the Middle East. Having supported Israel in 1947 and 1948, it turned to the Arabs, and by the middle 50's had laid the foundation for its present-day relation with Egypt. Britain and France had grievances against Egypt—France because of Egyptian support for the rebels in Algeria, both nations because of the nationalization of the Suez Canal. And Egypt, sustained by Soviet arms, renewed its interest in the Palestine question. It closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, as it had previously closed the Suez Canal. The Straits are an international waterway connecting two parts of the high seas. Closing them to Israeli shipping was an act of force, a blockade, justifying an Israeli use of force in self-defense. In addition, Egypt began to allow—or to encourage—guerrillas to use its territory as a base from which to attack Israel.

IN SETTLING the Suez war, the international community sharply distinguished the legal positions of Britain and France, on the one hand, and of Israel on the other. No justification was found for the French and British attack on Egypt. But the decision as to Israel's part in the Suez operation was different. United Nations forces were emplaced in the Gaza Strip, along the Sinai frontier, and at Sharm el-Sheikh to protect Israel against Egyptian attack, and

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above all to protect Israel in its right to use the Straits of Tiran as an international waterway. These dispositions necessarily derive from a judgment that Israel's participation in the Suez affair was based in large part on her legitimate right of self-defense.

The settlement of 1957 between Israel and Egypt was negotiated by the United States, as go-between. Israel was induced to withdraw from the whole of the Sinai, without peace, in exchange for a series of promises, embodied in carefully prepared statements before the General Assembly, and other forums: Egypt would make peace in due course; the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran would be open to Israel; and Egypt would take responsibility for stopping guerrilla attacks against Israel from Egypt and from the Gaza Strip. And it was expressly stipulated that if Egypt ever used force to close the Straits of Tiran, Israel would be justified in using force to open them, as an act of self-defense. It was also understood that if Egypt ever attempted to withdraw the United Nations Emergency Force, the Secretary General would undertake extended consultations before the withdrawal occurred.

The peculiar form of the 1957 settlement was a concession to Arab sensibilities, in order to permit Nasser to pretend that he was still loyal to the Arab policy of "no peace with Israel, no negotiations, and no recognition."

All these promises were broken, one by one, until Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran in May 1967, put large forces into the Sinai, formed a united Arab command, mobilized Arab armies around Israel, and thus made the Six-Day War nearly inevitable. As a high American official said at the time: "When Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran, he cut our throat from ear to ear." These acts constituted an armed attack on Israel. Under the charter, and the international understandings of 1957, Israel was authorized to use force in self-defense. This is why the United Nations rejected every proposal to characterize Israel as the aggressor in 1967.

For twenty years, the United States, Great Britain, and a number of other allies have been concerned about the process of Soviet penetration in the Near East and the Mediterranean area. I do not mean to suggest that the Arab-Israeli conflict has no existence of its own. Of course it does. But the Arab-Israeli quarrel became a threat to world peace only because the Soviet Union has been exploiting it as a most effective weapon of its own policy. The Arab grievance at the existence of Israel is used in all the Arab countries to arouse political tides which no Arab statesman, however moderate, can ignore. These nationalist pressures are used to radicalize the moderate Arab regimes, break their ties to the West, and thus, hopefully, permit the Soviet Union to gain control of the oil and space of the region as a means for outflanking NATO from the south, neutralizing Europe, and driving the United States out of the Mediterranean and Europe itself.

So ambitious a program required the forcing-ground of war. The Arab attacks on Israel since the middle 1950's could not have occurred without deliberate Soviet supplies of more and more sophisticated arms, which nullified the policy of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950.

In 1967, the North Atlantic Council resolved to pursue studies and consultations about security interests of the alliance that might be threatened by developments outside the area defined in the North Atlantic Treaty, which, the Council said, "cannot be treated in isolation from the rest of the world." It resolved that the allies should examine with particular attention the defense problems of the Mediterranean basin. The resolution provided for a standing body of the North Atlantic Council, open to interested members of the alliance, to deal with Middle East and Mediterranean questions. Through the work of that body, a concerted alliance policy toward these questions could have been developed. The allies are now paying a heavy price for their failure to follow that course.

What has happened since is now all too clear. The Soviet plan was the same in 1967 and in 1973: using Arab hostility to the existence of Israel as a catalyst, to initiate a war which would have certain clearly defined goals—first, by arousing Arab nationalist passions to a fever pitch, to radicalize the moderate Arab regimes, à la Iraq, and to bring them under Soviet influence and ultimately under Soviet control; second, to divide Western Europe from the United States; and third, to create a situation in which Israel would be in danger, and the United States and other nations would be drawn into conflict and perhaps into war with the whole Muslim world. The Soviets have repeatedly used two metaphors to describe their purpose—a war which would be worse for the United States than Vietnam; and a return for the Cuban missile crisis. In Cuba, after all, the outcome was entirely in American hands, if the issue were pushed too far. In the Middle East, as has been apparent since October, the problem is entirely different. It is the risk of Soviet control of the great arc between Morocco and Iran—the risk President Pompidou once described as a threat to the soft underbelly of Europe, and a continuing Cuban missile crisis. And it was also a risk of confronting the horrifying moral and political dilemma of standing by while Israel was destroyed. For the Arab armies, had they been successful, would not have stopped at the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip.

In 1967, as the Soviets said at the time, they overestimated the Arabs, and underestimated the Israelis. They have spent six years, and many billions of dollars since then, in training, equipping, and preparing the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces for the October 6, 1973 attack.

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THE nominal political issues of the October war and the peace negotiations at Geneva concern Security Council Resolution 242, adopted in November 1967, after five months of hard diplomatic effort by Great Britain, the United States, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Italy, and many other nations.

There were three positions taken in the 1967 debates before the United Nations and elsewhere about the legality of the Six-Day War. The Soviet Union and the Arabs urged the condemnation of Israel as the aggressor, and action by the Security Council to force her back at once to the 1949 borders, with a few nugatory concessions about the status of the Straits of Tiran as an international waterway. Israel took the view that the Arab states had repudiated the armistice agreements of 1949 by waging aggressive war against her, and that peace should be negotiated by the parties, without outside assistance, from the cease-fire lines established at the end of the Six-Day War. The United States, her European allies (except for France), and a stable majority of the United Nations took a third view, drawn from the long history of the controversy. The major premise of that view, which ultimately prevailed, was that the time had come to make peace, and that the refusal of the Arab states since 1949 to make peace with Israel had become a burden to world peace. The judgments behind Resolution 242 all derived from this basic proposition. As for the immediate circumstances leading to the outbreak of large-scale hostilities, the Security Council declared that Israel had full rights of navigation both in the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran, and indeed through all the international waterways of the area.

The form and structure of Resolution 242 were determined by the experience of 1957, which was vivid in every mind when Resolution 242 was drafted and debated. This time, the Security Council said, there should be no Israeli withdrawals until Egypt and the other Arab states actually made peace, and took public responsibility for the terms of peace. The resolution constituted a "package deal," withdrawal for peace. The peace agreements, it was provided, should settle the refugee question; establish guarantees for maritime rights through the Suez Canal, the Straits of Tiran, and other international waterways of the region, and guarantees also for border security, including demilitarized zones; and establish secure and recognized boundaries, to which Israel should withdraw.

Until the parties reached the agreement called for by paragraph 3 of Resolution 242, Israel had the right to remain in the territories it occupied in 1967, as the occupying power under international law. The use of force to disturb that occupation would be a breach of the charter, and of the resolutions of the Security Council interpreting and applying it. This is the reason why the Arab attack on Israel of October 6, 1973, ostensibly to recover the occupied territories, is so flagrant an act of aggression. It is notable that no attempt has been made to justify that attack under international law.

On this central feature of the resolution, Europe and the United States have been in full agreement. They have seemed to disagree in recent years on an important but secondary point: whether the secure and recognized boundaries to which Israel would withdraw, after peace is made, should be the armistice demarcation lines of 1949.

It was made clear in 1967, when the resolution was adopted, that the new boundaries need not be the armistice demarcation lines of 1949, as they stood on June 4, 1967. In a passage much discussed, and hotly debated, the resolution calls for Israeli withdrawal "from territories"—and not from "the territories"—occupied during the Six-Day War. The resolution is based on a number of principles, including the principle of "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." The concept of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war applies differently when territory is acquired by aggressive war than when it is occupied in the course of legitimate self-defense, as the 1949 settlement attests. The Council reconciled the competing ideas of the resolution by basing its resolution, so far as boundaries are concerned, on the armistice agreements of 1949, which provide, as I noted earlier, that the demarcation lines are not political boundaries, and could be changed by agreement when the parties move from armistice to peace. The text of the resolution and the debates over its passage, as well as statements by President Johnson, Lord George-Brown, Michael Stewart, Secretary of State Rogers, Lord Caradon, Sir Harold Beeley, and others confirm this position. No scholar has yet challenged this construction of the resolution, in terms of the evidence on which it rests.

The European Community and some other nations now profess to disagree with the United States on this point. To justify their position, they rely on the French text of the resolution, which speaks of Israeli withdrawal "*des territoires*" occupied during the Six-Day War, as a translation of the English text, which calls for withdrawal only "from territories" occupied during the conflict. When this version appeared, the United States and Great Britain protested to the United Nations, only to be told that the French language permitted no other translation of the English text. Since several amendments expressly requiring Israeli withdrawal from "all the territories" it had occupied in the course of the war had been defeated, without recourse to the veto, and since the debates on the subject were altogether explicit on the point, the matter was dropped.*

The 1967 resolution called upon the parties to fulfill its terms by reaching agreement with the

* On this point, see also p. 26 of Theodore Draper's article in this issue.—ED.

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assistance of Ambassador Jarring. What has blocked that process until now has not been Israeli "intransigence" or "arrogance," words freely used both in the press and in diplomatic conversations, but a steady and consistent Egyptian refusal to accept any feasible procedure, direct or indirect, for negotiating the agreement required by Resolution 242. The only exception I know to that position on the part of Egypt is the extraordinary fact that in the week before October 6, the Egyptian Foreign Minister is reliably reported to have agreed in Washington to so-called "proximity talks" with Israel for the purpose of carrying out Resolution 242—private procedures for negotiating in separate rooms, with an American go-between. These negotiations played a part in Israel's failure to mobilize during the week before the war broke out again.

They played a part as well in the cease-fire resolution of October 22. The United States refused to consider any cease-fire which did not contain the mandatory language of the October 22 resolution, a binding "decision" of the Security Council which requires the parties at long last to negotiate peace in accordance with the principles and provisions of the 1967 resolution. This provision has transformed the politics of the Arab-Israeli problem. After twenty-five years of entreaty, the Security Council has now ordered the Arab states to make peace with Israel.

If at any time between 1967 and 1973 Egypt had been willing to go to Geneva for a public conference to negotiate an agreement with Israel for the implementation of Resolution 242, it could have obtained far more favorable terms than any it is likely to obtain now. During the entire period, the words "conference," "Geneva," and "negotiation" were forbidden words, connoting peace. Diplomacy had to find ambiguous substitutes.

ON PAPER, at least, there is a new and more hopeful diplomatic situation. The Arab summit conference at Algiers, unlike the Khartoum conference of 1967, abandoned the formula of "no peace, no recognition, no negotiations." It did not forbid the Geneva conference. Nor did it require a commitment in advance of that conference to the "French" interpretation of Resolution 242 which the Arabs have now required Europe, Japan, and many other nations to espouse in order to obtain oil.

In fact, of course, the political posture of Israel and the United States in the Geneva conference is widely regarded as less favorable than the simple command of the Security Council resolution of October 22, 1973 would suggest. That command reflects the silent judgment of international law and politics as to the true cause of the five wars against Israel since 1948—the Arab refusal to accept the irreversible decisions of history, and make peace with Israel. On the other hand, an outcry now suggests that Israel's bargaining position and that of the United States have been weakened by the oil embargoes; by the diplomatic "isolation" the Arab states have sought to impose on Israel; and by the apparent mobilization of voices throughout the world demanding quick Israeli withdrawals on almost any terms. But Israel's diplomatic isolation is more apparent than real. The coercive tactics involved in organizing the political boycott of Israel are widely resented. The bargaining position of the Soviet Union has been weakened by Israel's brilliant military victory. And the inherent strength of the American position, especially if the Atlantic allies come together quickly on a concerted political line, is unassailable, so long as we do not lose our nerve, or our patience.

If Egypt has now finally decided to make a genuine peace with Israel, the problems between the two nations are simple—far simpler than those between Israel and Jordan. A fair and balanced peace agreement between Egypt and Israel should not be difficult to negotiate. After all that has happened, and especially after the Arab attack of October 6, 1973, Israel has a right to have the whole of the Sinai demilitarized. Most students of the problem have long contended that the complete demilitarization of the Sinai is the key to peace between Israel and Egypt. This view would be supported, tacitly at least, by Jordan, Lebanon, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the smaller states of the Persian Gulf, who wish to be protected against the threat of Egyptian hegemony. They have not forgotten the war in the Yemen, and many other events.

Once the principle of demilitarization is accepted, the other bilateral problems between Egypt and Israel fall into place. Egypt has always advocated Israeli withdrawals in accordance with a timetable. And withdrawal over time is surely a sensible approach to the problem of protecting Israeli security against the risks which materialized on October 6. The stages of the timetable should be measured not simply in years, but by the realization of political conditions as well—the end of the Arab economic and political boycott, and the establishment of normal economic, political, diplomatic, and human relations. Only such steps could begin to diminish the fevers of twenty-six tragic years of Arab resistance to the existence of Israel. In the context of the total demilitarization of the Sinai, the question whether the Sharm el-Sheikh area should be annexed becomes a secondary, though still an important, issue. Aggression should not be costless, in any system of law. In any event, Israel should occupy the region—perhaps under a lease—for a long time.

On the problem of boundaries, the parties should be free to agree on a wide range of procedures for establishing and securing definitive boundaries, ranging from annexations, leases, and condominiums to extraterritorial arrangements, custodianships, and special corridors.

In this connection, it should be noted that the

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status of the occupied territories under international law is quite different. While Egyptian sovereignty in the Sinai is controversial, Israel has not recently contested the Egyptian territorial claim in that area. Egypt makes no claim of sovereignty over the Gaza Strip. And the claim of Jordan to sovereignty in the West Bank has never been recognized internationally by the United States and many other countries. They regard Jordan as the occupying power in that region, under the armistice agreements of 1949, holding part of the mandated territories as a result of the fighting which followed the Arab armed attack on the partition plan recommended by the General Assembly in 1947.

Resolution 242 also calls upon the parties to reach a just settlement of the refugee problem as an integral part of their agreements of peace.

Manifestly, all the nations should approach this serious human and political issue magnanimously. Like many other problems of refugees and displaced persons, it is an issue which concerns the international community as a whole.

In order to facilitate a solution of the problem, the international community should arrange a series of alternatives for the Arab refugees—the possibility of immigration to Brazil, Canada, and many other countries, as well as to Arab nations. They should be allowed to elect among these alternatives through secret procedures of individual choice. A reasonable number could well be allowed to return to Israel, pursuant to proposals of the kind Israel has made from time to time in the past, especially to facilitate family reunions.

A fair compensation plan should be a basic element of any refugee settlement.

On the much mooted problem of Palestinian self-determination, Resolution 242 remits the issue to the Kingdom of Jordan, which has been recognized by the international community since 1922 as the state which should include the Arab parts of the lands taken from Turkey at the end of the First World War, and included in the Palestinian Mandate by the League of Nations.

There is deep and widespread anger in the United States at several aspects of European policy toward the Middle East in October: the British arms embargo; the political position taken by many European governments; and the protests about American arms shipments to Israel from American bases in Europe.

The American reproach to Europe is twofold: 1) The United States has objected that many European states, and the Community as a group, abandoned Resolution 242 by urging an advance commitment to Israeli withdrawal from all the territories it occupied in 1967, without conditions. In some contexts, the European position even seemed to be a retreat to 1957—a withdrawal without peace. Even the official European position would make it impossible to negotiate demilitarized zones and other security guarantees. It would amount to a political defeat in the indispensable task of demonstrating to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq that their flirtation with the Soviet Union has brought them nothing but tragedy, and that they can achieve a fair and evenhanded peace only by working with the United States. Beyond that, it would be an act of injustice to Israel, and a danger to the fragile and precarious system of peace, in that it would reward aggression. 2) The United States was offended because various European governments objected to the American airlift from Europe of supplies desperately needed by the Israelis. It seemed obvious to American opinion that the Israelis were fighting not only for themselves but for NATO as a whole, in defeating what was in fact a mortal Soviet threat to Europe and to the alliance.

On both counts—the political and the military—Europe was perceived in the United States to be taking an irresponsible stand.

The European answer—lack of advance consultation—was brushed aside in the United States. As to the political issues, centered on Resolution 242, there have been years of consultation. And as to the sudden Soviet threat of an airlift to help the Egyptians with substantial Soviet forces, there was simply no time for consultation if the Soviet move was to be deterred at all.

VII

In the aftermath of the October war, the Atlantic allies confront a new situation. They have been forced to recognize Soviet penetration of the Maghreb and the Middle East as an attack on NATO. They have suddenly felt the monopoly power of Saudi Arabia over the supply of petroleum, and all its implications, political, economic, and military. And they have begun to realize that they may soon be called upon to meet their immense moral and political responsibility for the very existence of Israel, which came into being under international protection, and in reliance on the promises of the international community.

If nations share a common destiny, it would seem apparent that they should not be at loggerheads on the political and economic problems which may bring them to the brink of war. They should at least consult regularly and seek to minimize their differences. At best, their policies should be harmonized and concerted. But this admonition, frequently repeated by the prophets of the Atlantic alliance, has been honored more in the breach than in the observance. On topic after topic, the allies have not only failed to concert their policies, they have pursued divergent policies.

The risks in this habit of allied dissonance became obvious during and since the October war in the Middle East. In physics, perhaps, every action generates an equal and opposite counter-reaction. In human affairs, there is no such symmetry between thesis and antithesis. Counter-reactions

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are often exaggerated and intensified by resentment, pride, anger, or fear. As a result, men can become absorbed in a spiral of self-reinforcing irrationality. For example, how much has France's policy since 1958 been influenced by American acts or omissions with regard to nuclear partnership, Indochina, Algeria, and Suez twenty years ago?

A major purpose of American diplomacy, restated with eloquence in Secretary Kissinger's speech of April 24, 1973, is to rally Europe to accept responsibilities it has avoided for some years. Kissinger's speech was not a program, but an appeal—an appeal that Western Europe and North America move together on every possible front to stabilize and consolidate their relations, and concert their policies, in order to protect their indivisible common interests in the system of peace.

The inherent position of the Atlantic allies and of Japan is strong—stronger, indeed, than has been the case for many years, because of the change in China's policy. But the pressures against them are also strong—stronger than ever before.

To have any chance of success in a program of unity will require an act of will both in Europe and in the United States. On both sides of the ocean, political leaders should explain the situation as it is, and call for military, political, and economic policies appropriate to its gravity.

Chancellor Brandt and other European leaders have said recently that the events of October and November should speed up the process of forming a political Europe. Most Americans would welcome such a development. A responsible political Europe, committed to acting with the United States as an equal in the manifold tasks of peace and prosperity, could be a constructive and stabilizing force in world affairs.

Meanwhile, how will the allies behave in the period before that effort succeeds? The situation is far too dangerous for the nations of Europe to abstain from responsible political action until a true political Europe is born—in 1980, or before. During the period of transition, the full weight of concerted Atlantic policies, and concerted Atlantic-Japanese policies, are nearly a necessity on a dozen issues—money, oil, offsets, Middle Eastern affairs, and many others—to counter the growing pressures, both of anarchy and of threat, which the allies necessarily face together.

The ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council in December signaled a movement toward solidarity among the Atlantic allies. It is too soon to judge whether that movement will gain in strength, or peter out. The factors of stress and separatism in the alliance are real, and they have genuine causes. They can be overcome only if the allies face them together, understand them, and undertake a far-ranging effort to reverse their course. To prevail in that effort will require a certain largeness and generosity of spirit, and the support of a public opinion which has fully accepted the lesson of events. It will require as well the active and confident leadership of the United States, in the tradition of Truman, Marshall, and Acheson, to mention only the founding fathers.

CAN we generate that measure of creative energy, after the trials of Vietnam and Watergate? We have no choice but to try, in the spirit of Foch at the Marne, because we are at a moment of climax which could well determine whether the hold of law on the mind of modern man will be vindicated, or destroyed: that is, whether civilization will endure, or vanish into the night.

The influence of international law on the use of force by states has been weakened in recent years. A failure to carry out the twin Security Council resolutions of 1973 and 1967 with regard to peace in the Middle East, and the agreements of January and March 1973, calling for peace in Indochina, would further, and perhaps irreparably diminish the effectiveness of international law as a restraint against war. The ideas of law play a powerful, and often a nearly inarticulate role in the behavior of men. It is not written in the stars that it will always be thus.

The most dangerous of social conflicts are those between new facts and old ideas. How societies resolve such conflicts determines whether they rise, survive, endure, or fall. Will they adapt their habits, their institutions, and their laws to their new condition, in ways which fulfill their shared code of common morality? Or will they and their value systems be destroyed by forces they refuse to acknowledge, because the new facts do not fit the model world in their minds?

For us, now, the answer to these questions depends in large part on how the Atlantic allies and Japan deal with the present crisis of world politics.

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Do the Arabs Want Peace?

Gil Carl AlRoy

EVERY Arab-Israeli war is immediately followed, at least in the West, by sharply heightened expectations (soon dashed) of a long-term peaceful solution to the conflict. In the aftermath of Israel's War of Independence in 1948, the armistice agreements reached between Israel and her Arab attackers were generally regarded as preludes to peace treaties. Following the Suez campaign similar hopes were kindled by the less conventional arrangements worked out by Secretary of State Dulles and Dag Hammarskjold. The Six-Day War was followed by frantic peace offensives on a global scale. Now, in the wake of the Yom Kippur War, we are again gripped by the great expectation that peace is about to come to the Middle East.

While the sad litany of disillusionment is troubling, hope springs eternal; after all, things must start some time, and now is as good as any. But what is most disturbing is the thinness of the ground on which current hopes rest—for one thing, the assurances of the Nixon administration that peace is not only possible, but nearer at hand than ever before. Why the Nixon administration, so egregiously unbelieved in every other area, should be successful in persuading anyone of the plausibility of this view is cause for speculation. The truth is that, in light of the converging pressures on the administration—the need for foreign-policy successes to divert attention from domestic troubles; the need to save the détente with the Soviet Union; the energy crisis; the pro-Arab stance of the bulk of the Western alliance—what it really means to say is not that peace is at hand, but that it (or something, anything, resembling it) had better be.

Yet perhaps the major reason for the conviction that peace is now near in the Middle East is the widespread, if not by now universally held, assumption that a radical change has come about in the attitude of the Arab states to Israel. Everyone says so, on the air, in journals, even among circles the public regards as expert. The press is replete with news of sudden and thoroughgoing reversals in the Arab world, and all this talk sounds impressive. Algeria, it is asserted one day, has drastically changed her old position and is now for a "negotiated peace with Israel," as are the *fedayeen* and others. Egypt has just accomplished an "astonishing shift of position," endorsed by the other Arab states, one reads another day. According to a typical summary of the November summit in Algiers: "Imbued with new confidence, the Arab states for the first time tacitly recognized the right of Israel to exist as a state."[1] In the New York *Times*, straight from Cairo, Henry Tanner reports that the acquiescence by Arab states in Egypt's participation in the Geneva conference "implies" recognition of Israel.[2] A *Times* editorial had earlier averred that "Egypt *in effect* acknowledges Israel's right to exist. . . ."[3]

The practice of unsolicited spokesmanship for the Arabs, of which these quotations are an example, is not a recent development; from the very beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict, many Westerners have presumed to spell out, to the Arabs' credit, what the Arabs have seemed too embarrassed to claim for themselves, though some do encourage the propagation of such notions in the West. (Thus, it was once explained that, by not walking out of the United Nations when Israel was admitted in 1949, the Arabs had granted *de facto* recognition to the Jewish state.)

This assumption of the essential artificiality of Arab antagonism to Israel—obviously a backbone of the current sanguine peace expectations—is shared as well by most of the writers on the Middle East whom the press habitually presents to the larger public as experts, a varied group in which one hardly ever finds a serious scholar. Interestingly enough, however, the weight of opinion among scholars on the prospects for peace in the Middle East is almost exactly opposed to that of the media "experts": while the latter are largely optimistic, the consensus of the former is markedly pessimistic. It is perhaps not altogether a coincidence that the great mass of Americans has consistently and intuitively sided

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[1] *Newsweek*, December 10, 1973.
[2] November 29, 1973.
[3] June 20, 1973 (emphasis added).

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with the scholars and against the amateurs on this issue: opinion polls show overwhelming support for the proposition that the Arabs are not really prepared for peace with Israel.

One source of the current optimism, which itself may give a clue to the real complexity of the problem, is the impression that spread during the last round of fighting that the Egyptians had finally agreed to direct negotiations with Israel. This concession seemed particularly important in view of the adamancy with which Cairo had previously resisted direct talks. Then, suddenly, it appeared by December that Sadat had not agreed to direct talks after all, or so Sadat himself was saying at that time.[4] Had we, then, had an optical illusion, or was Sadat performing a demagogic trick to disguise reality from his people? We might think the latter, since a "peace conference" denotes just what he was now denying. Yet the Egyptians were quite openly asserting that they viewed Geneva merely as an occasion for the United Nations and the world powers to compel Israeli compliance with their demands.[5] All they were doing was agreeing to "gather" in the same hall with Israelis and others under United Nations auspices—just what they had been doing all along in New York and elsewhere.

We may ask the question again: were the Egyptians being evasive, or merely trying to save face? Moreover, whose perceptions of the situation are more likely to govern Cairo's implementation of whatever may be agreed on at Geneva—ours, or theirs? *Is* there any evidence in the Arab world itself, finally, for the "astonishing shift of position" that is repeatedly alleged to have occurred there?

So far, the disturbing answer to the last question is: no, not even in Egypt, the most enthusiastic supporter of the Geneva conference. A careful study of Egypt's most important newspaper, *al-Ahram*, as well as a survey of some other sources in the Arab world, discloses no such changes since the Yom Kippur War as have been confidently announced in the Western press. Israel, for the Arabs, remains the quintessence of evil, damned in a typical statement in *al-Ahram* as the fount of aggression, racism, imperialism, and more.[6] "The banner of Zionism is the banner of aggression," reads another such statement.[7] President Sadat is quoted as follows: "This struggle [with Israel] is as old as our Arab nation. It goes back to the days of the struggle against the Tartars and the Crusades. . . . Today we fight Zionism in order to protect our rights, our territory, and our values."[8]

Not only are there no signs that the struggle with Israel may be about to end, but the Geneva conference itself has been presented to readers of the Arab press as just one phase of an ongoing struggle whose conclusion lies in the misty, distant future. The Algiers summit conferees who backed Egypt's Geneva strategy declared: "The Arab world is passing through a decisive stage in its history. The struggle against the Zionist invasion is a long-haul, historic responsibility that will require still further trials and sacrifices."[9] The end of the struggle will come only with the end of all the outrages that spell "Zionism" in the Arab world.

What we have in these statements is neither bargaining ploy nor rhetorical flourish, but the very gist of the old familiar Arab stance toward Israel. "The Zionist invasion," President Sadat explained once before, "will not be ended with the return of our conquered lands. This invasion has gone on during our generation and will go on during the lifetime of our children as well. Israeli aggression will continue even after the most urgent task has been accomplished, which is the liberation of the land."[10] It is in the light of a statement like this that one must understand the assertion by the Arab heads of state at Algiers that so long as "aggression" exists there cannot possibly be lasting peace in the Middle East; what this means, simply, is that Jewish statehood and lasting peace are to the Arab mind incompatible. In Arab usage the idea of Israeli aggression never requires the commission of a specific act; the very existence of the Jewish state is aggression enough. Similarly, "occupied territory" refers in Arab usage not just to lands lost in 1967 but to all the land inhabited by Israelis.[11]

II

THERE is a tendency in the West to dismiss whatever Arabs may say as being irrelevant to what they intend to do. Arabs, so the line goes, are seduced by the peculiar properties of their language into saying things they do not mean; hence, the relationship between words and deeds among them is random, at best. This patronizing notion, freely spread about by "experts," is consistent with the old missionary idea of the Arabs as delightfully naughty children for whom one must forever apologize. In the view of most scholars, however, the Arabic language has no such properties as are imputed to it. If anything, rather than making one say what one does not intend, it tends to add a special stress to that which *is* intended. Thus an Arab's "no" may

4 New York *Times*, December 15, 1973.
5 *Ibid.*, December 11, 1973.
6 November 29, 1973.
7 October 23, 1973.
8 November 29, 1973.
9 New York *Times*, November 29, 1973.
10 Speech to the nation, June 10, 1971 (Middle East News Agency).
11 On March 17, 1968, the "Voice of the Arabs" (Radio Cairo) explained: "The real Palestine problem is the existence of Israel in Palestine. As long as a Zionist existence remains even in a tiny part of it—that will mean occupation. The important thing is to liquidate the Israel occupation, and there is no difference between the territories lately occupied and those occupied before."

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become thunderous and emphatic, but would not mean "yes." Arabs may indeed give utterance to ideas they do not mean to carry out—as who does not?—but rarely on issues about which they feel strongly; on such issues they tend rather to say what they would dearly love to see happen, though they may not be capable of bringing it about.[12] From their failure to accomplish the physical destruction of the Jewish state, some have deduced that the Arabs never really intended or wished to do so; yet rare has been the opportunity passed up by the Arabs to deal harmful blows to Israel, whether through diplomatic harassment or a bloody war of attrition.

Another Western tendency is to point to contradictions between the private and the public utterances of Arab leaders as confirmation of their good intentions. Arab public life is notoriously mendacious and corrupt, and so when a politician makes a public statement that may happen to offend Westerners it is often dismissed as demagogic claptrap, meant for the ears of the mob alone, while in private Arab leaders are pictured as gracious and conciliatory. Western diplomats and journalists were forever coming away from meetings with Nasser aglow in the conviction of his freedom from hostility toward—if not his warm concern for—the state of Israel. In fact, a comparison of the private and public utterances of Arab leaders shows them to be remarkably similar, the main difference being that the latter are somewhat more explicit than the former.

After a quarter of a century, the Jewish state remains in Arab eyes a factitious, artificial, unnatural, alien, and illegitimate entity, an outrage to nature and history. When expressed by radicals among themselves the categorical rejection of the very essence of Jewish statehood is blunt and brutal, as in Article 20 of the Palestine National Covenant, intended as the constitutional framework for an envisioned Arab state, which denies even the possibility of any national character for Jews living therein. When moderates address foreign publics, on the other hand, they often speak in a veiled way of an eventual "secularization" or "normalization" of the Middle East, by which they mean that Jews will assume minority status as a tolerated religious group under Arab rule.[13]

Nostalgic visions of the past are often invoked in such speeches, and there has been much talk of an ultimate resolution of the Middle East conflict through a return to the historic pattern of Jewish-Arab coexistence. There have indeed been periods of contentment for Jews over the thirteen centuries of Islamic history, but even in the best of times Jews never enjoyed any status but that of a tolerated religious minority, not to speak of the times in which they were demeaned and slaughtered with impunity.

Sometimes the vision of fraternity takes on a more contemporary coloration, as in the proposal for an Arab federation with a Jewish component. But the intensity with which all Arabs reject the notion of Jewish dominion may be gathered from the fact that even Israeli Arabs, who regard themselves as loyal citizens of the state, deem the prospect of indefinite Jewish nationhood painful if not intolerable. Time, of course, has made for a growing realization that Israel is not likely to disappear right away, that it is, in the words of King Hussein in an article published last year in the London *Times*, "a fact of life which we have refused to admit, and fought to prevent for a quarter of a century." One must not underrate the pain accompanying even this admission of fact, but neither must one overrate it. Recognition or acceptance of the fact of Israel is much like facing up to a terrible disease: pretending one has not got it will not make it go away, much less provide a cure. The real problem is how to cope with it.

The war launched by the Arabs in October 1973, and their alleged readiness now to consider a "just peace" upon Israel's withdrawal from occupied territory, are an expression of the new Arab strategy for coping with the "disease" of Israel.

III

On our side of the water the aim of the Egyptian attack on Yom Kippur was widely explained as recovery of the Sinai; Secretary Kissinger expressed his sympathetic understanding of this goal, both before and after the attack. Yet, in Cairo's *al-Ahram*, the man generally credited with speaking the mind of Egypt's leadership gave quite another motive for the attack. "The issue," wrote Mohammad Hassanein Heykal on October 19, "is not just the liberation of the Arab territories occupied since June 5, 1967, but strikes against the future of Israel more powerfully and in a more profound manner, although this is not obvious right now. This means that if the Arabs are able to liberate their territories occupied since June 5, 1967 by force, what can prevent them in the next stage from liberating Palestine itself by force?"

In any consideration of Arab attitudes the place of the UN Security Council Resolution of November 1967 (Number 242) must figure prominently. This resolution was intended to provide the framework for an overall settlement of the "Palestine question," but in the Arab world it

[12] See E. Shouby, "The Influence of the Arabic Language on the Psychology of the Arabs," *Middle East Journal* (Summer 1951) and Bernard Lewis, "Semites and Anti-Semites: Race in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," *Survey* (Spring 1971).

[13] Speaking at the Geneva conference, Premier Rifa'i of Jordan, notoriously the most moderate of the Arab belligerents, asked, "Could it be that Israel doesn't belong in our environment? Could it be that it is a stranger in our homeland?" (New York *Times*, December 24, 1973).

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was always understood as being confined in its scope to the situation caused by the losses of 1967.[14] Thus, for Egypt the problem was "liquidating the results of the June 1967 aggression [recovery of territorial losses] without losing sight of the aim of liquidating the results of the aggression of May 1948 [establishment of Jewish statehood]."[15] The *fedayeen* were of course free to aim directly for the latter goal; in one of his many statements on the theme the late President Nasser said of the *fedayeen*; "They are entitled to reject this resolution [No. 242], which may serve the purpose of eliminating the consequences of the aggression carried out in June 1967, but is inadequate for determining Palestine's fate."[16]

The two-stage strategy followed by the Arab states since 1967 has conformed more or less closely to a line first put forth by President Bourguiba of Tunisia, whose message to his fellow Arabs has long been that Israel is more vulnerable to peace offensives than to war offensives. "What I proposed," he explained after his sensational tour of the Arab world in 1965, "is the application of the United Nations resolutions; that is, the one about partition [1947] which would permit restoring to an Arab Palestinian state an important part of the territories now occupied by [Israel], and the one concerning the return of the refugees. . . . It will be difficult to escape or to hide any longer, once Israel agrees to negotiate on the basis I have indicated."

The fact that even extreme concessions by Israel on the issues of territory and the Palestinian refugees would not be sufficient was recognized by Bourguiba; the shift he was urging on the Arab states was merely a tactical one. Yet even this was resisted, at the time. "This is what the leaders in charge do not understand. It is unheard of! The very notion of tactics and efficiency eludes them. I told them there is perhaps a way to embarrass Israel, but they prefer instead to insult her." [17]

THE REAL change since 1967, then, is that the shock of defeat in the Six-Day War put Egypt and other Arab states earnestly behind the "Bourguiba method," although movement in that direction had begun even before the war. In a remarkably prescient passage, Bernard Lewis noted in 1964:

> The official Arab demand is no longer for the immediate destruction of Israel but for its reduction to the frontiers laid down in the 1947 partition proposals—obviously as a first step toward its ultimate disappearance. Since Israel, clearly, would not submit voluntarily to such a truncation, and since the Arab states alone are unable to enforce it, this amounts in effect to a demand for an imposed settlement by the great powers—a kind of compulsory surgery on the conference table, in which, perhaps, Soviet arms would wield the knife, while Western diplomacy administered the anaesthetic.[18]

IN adopting its two-stage strategy in the aftermath of the November 1967 UN resolution, Egypt gained a tactical flexibility that would stand her in good stead in the ensuing years. "Egypt risks nothing," argued Heykal, "by attempting first of all to solve the first phase by political means. The same does not apply to Israel. If the Arabs wish to retract their agreement to the Security Council resolution, it is easy for them to do so by a single word. But if Israel should wish to retract the implementation of this resolution, it will have to fight a new war in order to occupy again the territories it will have evacuated in accordance with the resolution."[19] Thus, Egypt's declared readiness, in February 1971, for a "peaceful agreement" with Israel, which stunned the West, did not in fact represent a material change in policy, Heykal explained on February 26. As President Sadat said on February 28, speaking before the National Council of Palestine: "The liberation of the territories is what we have chosen *for this stage* [emphasis added]. Revolutionary Arab thought must define the stages of a consistent and diligent policy out of the necessity that all the various strategies used in the confrontation with the enemy should flow out of one grand strategy. This will assure the victory of the Arab will."

The change in strategy was not the only alteration undertaken by the Arabs in the last six years. As Cairo's *al-Mussawar* concluded in the wake of the Six-Day War, talk of pushing the Israelis into the sea had merely "made it easy for Israel to win the propaganda war against us."[20] The Arabs lacked the capacity to overrun Israel, and the futile attempts to do so had only resulted in territorial losses at home and public-relations losses abroad. A change in rhetoric was accordingly instituted, and has proved more than successful. Emphatic and repeated denials of murderous intentions toward Israel in the years since 1967 have won plaudits abroad and continue to do so. Thus, without stipulating any further what the Israelis are entitled to have in the Middle East of the future, President Bourguiba of Tunisia was recently hailed in the United States for saying that they do have a right "not to be exterminated and cast into the sea."[21]

To Westerners, with their either/or conception

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[14] On Resolution 242 see Theodore Draper, p. 23, and Eugene V. Rostow, p. 40, in this issue.—ED.

[15] *Al-Ahram*, December 29, 1967.

[16] Speech to the National Assembly, January 20, 1969.

[17] Cited in Samuel Merlin, *The Search for Peace in the Middle East* (1968), pp. 91, 94.

[18] *The Middle East and the West*, p. 125.

[19] *Al-Ahram*, August 2, 1970.

[20] New York *Times*, June 26, 1967.

[21] New York *Times*, June 20, 1973 and June 22, 1973. The *Times* erroneously reported Bourguiba as referring in this statement to Israel as a political entity, rather than to Israelis as individuals. The original is cited correctly in *Arab Report & Record 12*, 1973 (16-30 June).

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of peace and war, and their ideas of international law, the waging of protracted war through peace offensives may seem strange and uncongenial if not unbelievable. Harold W. Glidden has captured the cultural differences between the Western and the Arab view very well:

> The problem, as the non-Arab sees it, is how to establish peace between the Arabs and Israel; it is felt that time is of the essence. Westerners consider peace to be high on the scale of values, and conflict is deprecated. We also have a highly developed consciousness of the value of time. But on the Arab scale the relative position of the elements is quite different. Overriding is the emotional need for vengeance to eliminate the ego-destroying feeling of shame. Peace is secondary to this need, which is why one often gets the impression that in the Arab context peace is merely the temporary absence of conflict. In fact, in Arab tribal society (where Arab values originated), strife, not peace, was the normal state of affairs because raiding was one of the two main supports of the economy. Even in Islam itself, the ideal of permanent peace was restricted to the community of Islam and to those non-Muslims who accepted the position of protected persons and paid tribute to Islam. . . . As for the element of time, the Arabs consider it to be of little account in the quest for vengeance, which to them is an integral part of what they conceive of as "justice."[22]

The terms the Arabs are now using in connection with the current "peace initiative"—the Geneva conference, the negotiations aimed at reaching an agreement with Israel—is *salaam*, which means less than real peace, and is more closely equivalent to our notion of an armistice. *Sulh*, or real peace, has been emphatically ruled out by the Arabs and is not used to refer to the present diplomatic activity.[23]

Recently (December 7, 1973), the editor-in-chief of *al-Mussawar*, Egypt's leading weekly magazine, spelled out the difference between *sulh* and *salaam* in unmistakable terms:

> The English word "peace" can be translated into Arabic as both *sulh* and *salaam*, whereas in Arabic, there is a difference between the two. *Sulh* is one thing, *salaam* another.
>
> The conference that everyone is talking about, the one to be held in Geneva to solve the problems of the Middle East, is liable to confuse these two words because of their single meaning in the European languages, and as a result, the meaning of the conference might not be clear to others.

The article goes on to explain that Israel can have *salaam* in exchange for a total acceptance of present Arab demands.

> But *sulh* is another thing altogether. *Sulh* means that the Jews of Palestine—and I repeat and emphasize the expression, Jews of Palestine—will return to their senses and will dwell under one roof and under one flag with the Arabs of Palestine, in a secular state devoid of any bigotry or racialism, proportional to their respective numerical ratio in 1948.
>
> By this I mean that the original Palestinian Jews and their children and grandchildren shall remain on the Palestinian soil and will live there with the original Palestinian Arabs. The Jews who came from abroad will return to their countries of origin, where they lived as did their fathers and forefathers before 1948—for these countries bear them no ill will.

IV

But where will this unconventional and protracted war lead the Arabs—and the Israelis? The strains and pitfalls that will attend the new policy are frankly and widely discussed in the Arab world. Mohammad Heykal recently opined that a strategy of peace will be more demanding than a simple military strategy, requiring a greater degree of unity and coordination of effort.[24] Nor, as is widely recognized, has the policy as yet won the backing of all Arabs. Iraqis, Libyans, and others still wish to continue the pursuit of *guerre à outrance;* but for the "states of confrontation," whose capitals lie virtually within a single push of Israeli forces, the change of strategy seems imperative.[25]

Apart from the difficulties they foresee—really matters of detail—the conviction seems unshakable among Arabs that triumph will ultimately be theirs. The advantages of the new policy are remarkable, as Bourguiba, Heykal, and others constantly argue. The Arabs are free to shift gears whenever convenient, while for Israel any concessions made at the bargaining table will not be reversible except by catastrophic war. Moreover, although the Arabs are militarily weak at the moment, diplomatic and other opportunities to harass Israel are not wanting; and once they are militarily strong, who will stop them? That time

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22 "The Arab World," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, February 1972.

23 See, for example, the founders' memorandum (April 1971) on the establishment of the Egypt-Libya-Syria Federation. After he shook the West in 1971 with his offer to Gunnar Jarring to make peace with Israel in return for withdrawal from occupied territories, President Sadat took great care to explain to an American journalist (whose journal saw fit to cut those remarks from its American [home] edition) that he had *not* offered full peace. See *Newsweek* (Atlantic edition), July 31, 1972.

24 *Al-Ahram*, November 9, 1973.

25 This insistence on the *necessity* for change is no doubt intended to offset the charge, voiced among others by Colonel Qaddafi of Libya, that by going to Geneva the "states of confrontation" are betraying the Arab cause—a charge which has always had deep resonances in the Arab world. As Harold W. Glidden notes, the fear of betrayal "inevitably produces an inter-Arab relationship characterized by anxiety expressed in generalized suspicion and distrust, which has been labeled 'free-floating hostility'" (Glidden, *op. cit.*, p. 101).

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is on their side is a matter of dogmatic certainty with them.

Faith in the ultimate triumph over Zionism permeates the Arab world both as a moral imperative, without which life itself is deemed intolerable, and as the ineluctable direction of all history. Israel's growing diplomatic isolation is regarded with excitement, not simply for what it means for her bargaining position at Geneva, but also as an augur of her ultimate unviability as a political entity.

In this connection, America's opening to China occasioned particular pleasure in the Arab world, because of an analogy between the Chinese and the Arab predicaments which is natural in the Arab perspective. Like Communist China, the Arab nations appear to themselves as a humiliated and long-tormented giant, now fast regaining their might on a global scale; like Taiwan, Israel in their view is a dwarf-like, artificial prop of American imperialism, the instrument through which the United States had been striving to intimidate and exploit the mass of oppressed humanity. And if America could be forced to abandon Taiwan, surely Israel must follow sooner or later. Thus the notion of the "Taiwanization" of Israel entered the vocabulary of political discourse in the Arab world.

Settlement of the traumatic defeat of 1967 has itself assumed the nature of a test of the Arab cause. Observers in the West are well aware of the Arabs' insistence on complete or virtually complete restoration of territorial losses, and also tend to believe that Israel cannot have peace without this. But in the Arab context, the "liquidation of the traces of aggression" is actually conceived as a test of the Arab ability to bring about Israel's demise, not as a touchstone for peaceful coexistence. Acquiescence in Jewish statehood on moral grounds is out of the question, which means that Israel's only hope lies in its military power; if that power can be nullified or made irrelevant, Jewish statehood will be doomed.

THE elaboration of this article of faith is best left to Heykal—not just because of his articulateness, but because in the following passage he is captured in a moment of quiet, reflective conversation with another Arab intellectual, and hence cannot be faulted for vain posturing:

> Abdul Nasser [he is recalling] could not hope for a positive response from Israel [to the Rogers initiative of June 1970], for he knew that Israel would never accept total withdrawal. I believe that Abdul Nasser viewed the issue of withdrawal as the testing ground which would transform the issue into being purely one of territory. Would Israel withdraw from all the occupied territories or would it refuse to do so? That was the crucial question; he regarded everything else as secondary at that stage.
>
> Abdul Nasser was certain, nevertheless, that Israel would not accept total withdrawal, otherwise everything it had hoped to gain through what it did in 1967 would be lost, all the objectives of the campaign would remain unrealized.
>
> *Q.* Could you elaborate a little more on this? Are you saying that, if Israel were to withdraw, all its objectives would remain unrealized?
>
> *A.* Right. Why did Israel carry out the 1967 aggression? For two obvious reasons: in the first place, to prove that it has the upper hand as far as military strength is concerned—for military strength is the trump card; secondly, to acquire new territory and at the same time to undermine Arab claims to formerly occupied territories. . . .
>
> Once again, total Israeli withdrawal, if it were to take place, would be tantamount to showing that military strength is irrelevant to the outcome of the conflict, that the military factor is not decisive in the Middle East conflict, that it is perhaps capable of producing spectacular tactical results, but that these results will be shortlived.
>
> . . . If you could succeed in bringing it about, you would have passed sentence on the entire state of Israel. . . . [26]

The implications of this sort of thinking for the current international peacemaking efforts are truly startling. For these peacemaking efforts presume to end the Arab struggle with precisely what is certain to assure its continuation—Israel's return to the pre-June 1967 lines—while at the same time reassuring the Israelis with guarantees they both fear and deem useless. Perhaps, at this moment in history, nothing could deter the Arabs from their struggle (although one hesitates to predict what might have happened had the superpowers not jointly intervened last October to save Egypt and Syria from what was obviously becoming a debacle of perhaps even greater proportions than that of June 1967). As things fell out in the October war, the combination of Israeli unpreparedness plus the Arabs' own military performance has been taken by the Arabs to mean that no boundaries, however secure they might seem to the outside world, can protect Israel from eventual defeat.

[26] "Mohammad Hassanein Heykal Discusses War and Peace in the Middle East," *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Autumn 1971).

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The Problem of Euthanasia

Sonya Rudikoff

ALTHOUGH the death of close friends and relatives may have vanished as a vivid firsthand experience for most of us, almost everyone knows, or knows of, someone who is being kept alive by machines or tubes. It is quite common to hear people say that if they themselves should arrive at such a condition, they would hope for euthanasia. Thus, membership in the Euthanasia Society of America has jumped from 600 to over 50,000 in four years, and the society has been filling an unprecedented number of requests for copies of its "living will," a declaration of the wish for euthanasia, which, although not legally binding, exerts a powerful demand on physician and family.

Euthanasia, from the Greek *eu* and *thanatos*, signifies a good or peaceful death. It conjures up images of dignity and repose, a calm, reconciled conclusion to a life whose meaning has been accorded its due. Euthanasia, often called "death with dignity," also implies the necessary medical efforts to reduce pain without needlessly prolonging the agony of one who is going to die. Few in the past have been fortunate enough to die such a death, and not so many in the present. It is what used to be prayed for when dying people believed that death was a significant event to be followed by other unknown developments, and when the mortally ill were surrounded by those whose convictions were equally strong. It was not thought appropriate or desirable to hasten the onset of this event, which, in any case, was independent of human will and would come in its own time. The final weeks, days, or hours of the mortally ill were almost sacred, but perhaps only believers are still mindful of what everyone used to take thought for—the deathbed scene, perhaps a confession, the reconciliations, the promises made to the dying, the revelations, the assurances, the consolations and affirmations. To think of hastening the progress of this drama would have been unusual or even unconscionable. And, it should be added, the available pharmacopeia did not offer many alternatives, even for the rich and powerful: all were to encounter what used to be called "the Last Great Adventure" or, as Henry James greeted it, "the Distinguished Thing."

Euthanasia means deliberate intervention in this process. It violates unmistakably the commandment against killing, and it is also therefore illegal. In spite of numerous attempts to introduce the idea of extenuating circumstances in what is often called "mercy killing," euthanasia remains proscribed. Individual cases—as when a doctor gives a dying patient a fatal injection or when someone kills a dying relative—may be decided in favor of the killer, as recently happened in New Jersey, but the courts are reluctant to declare euthanasia acceptable. The Hippocratic Oath has always been interpreted as forbidding euthanasia, and the opinions of religious leaders have opposed it as a general practice, if with some qualifications. It is against the law to help a dying person to die quickly, although you can legally kill a healthy person if he seems about to kill you. And if you ask for lethal drugs with the intention of taking them yourself, that is suicide. Attempts to rationalize and clarify these seeming inconsistencies have not resulted in major reforms. England's Suicide Act of 1961 removes the illegality from suicide but still forbids assisting anyone else's suicide. Switzerland permits the doctor to put poison in the hand of the patient but not actually to administer it himself.

Some of the inconsistencies result from the complex conditions of modern medicine. It would be difficult to assert that the doctor who gives a humane overdose of drugs has "murdered" his patient. Obviously, when a patient has been receiving quite a lot of potentially lethal drugs, it is not always clear which or how much was the fatal dose. Prosecutors and juries have been and will continue to be reluctant to question the good faith of such doctors, or to demand precise proof whether death was hastened, induced, or merely not actively prevented. Doctors are of course most anxious to avoid anything remotely implying malpractice suits. At the same time, there are never unlimited resources, certainly not in personnel, and in every hospital there are unwritten customs to be followed in various cases, with coded notations on patients' charts indicating whether or not "heroic efforts" should be made at resuscitation in case of approaching

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death. Different emergencies demand different treatment, and the needs of patients, the exigencies of medical personnel, the availability of beds or operating rooms or other facilities are all factors which must be taken into account when sudden decisions are made.

So ambiguous is the matter that interested observers have developed distinctions between negative and positive, or active and passive, euthanasia, in order to account for some of the differences in the treatment of the mortally ill. Thus, doctors distinguish between the omission of certain drugs or mechanical supports at critical times, when the patient would proceed to die without them—this is negative euthanasia—and the more specific acts of administering an overdose of drugs, injecting an air bubble in the veins, or actually withdrawing drugs or intravenous feeding or the respirator with the intention of hastening the death of an already dying patient. If a doctor administers a drug with the intention of relieving suffering, and the drug is fatal, he has not committed murder because it was not his intention. Similarly, when a doctor performs a gall-bladder operation on an eighty-six-year-old man suffering from emphysema, heart trouble, and other ailments, and when the man has a stroke and dies after the operation, the operation is not murder, even though the patient died, because the doctor intended to relieve the gall-bladder condition and ease suffering. Even knowing the possibility of a patient's fatal reaction to a specific procedure does not make it murder without the explicit intention. The matter becomes more complex in the context of sophisticated medical alternatives, but euthanasia continues to mean not only the medical killing but the intent to accomplish it.

PERHAPS there are really only two important questions about euthanasia, and one is the same question that might be asked about suicide, or about many more commonplace forms of self-destruction such as alcoholism or smoking: Do our bodies and our selves belong to us so entirely, as private property, that we may dispose of them in any way we wish? All sorts of developments in the history of thought and faith have led many people to think so, and current ideas of individualism and self-determination and self-realization certainly underline it. Some people, however, continue to believe that they belong to God, or that their bodies, souls, and lives are as a gift or trust, rather than a private possession. Some believe that the breath of life in each of us is a part of a spirit of life, or a community of spirit over which we do not exert ultimate control; that life was given to us and we give it to others; that we may not extinguish life deliberately. Faced with the problem of balancing the two parts of that awful question, "Who shall live and who shall die?," many people find themselves willing to grant and place their trust in the power of human intervention on the one side, while insisting that the latter half remain beyond the pale of human meddling. Indeed, anyone who has seen a victim of acute coronary attack returned to life in the intensive heart-care unit of a modern hospital must be vividly aware of the degree to which it is within our power to regulate significantly the number of living and dead.

The other question involves new knowledge and possibilities for legal reform. It is the question whether *all* death nowadays is not really euthanasia, in view of recent developments in the definition of death. It may come as something of a surprise that there should be any question of defining death—surely even the untutored have known for countless millennia, and before recorded time, the difference between life and death, and have not had to be instructed in the matter by savants and researchers! The news that this certainty as well has been called into question by modern science may be greeted by impatience or even fury. Preposterous as it may seem, however, the exact determination of death has never been quite so clear-cut as might be thought, and has always implied the possibility of mysterious occurrences and inexplicable recoveries. Indeed, death, its manner of occurrence, and its precise certification, became of political and administrative importance as soon as settled civilizations developed and rulers desired to know how many people were to be taxed. Humane societies were especially interested in rudimentary methods of mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, and the growing sophistication of medical knowledge aroused an interest in the causes of death and the manner of determining them, such as by means of autopsies. The development of death certificates, of mortuaries, of special burial practices, the use of cadavers for autopsy, the registering of births and deaths, all came about along with public rolls, coroners, poor laws, and other social and economic aspects of modern life.

Yet ideas about death and the way a whole society will deal with it have now become a subject of intense concern, full of implications for many other aspects of life, in a way that would surprise our ancestors. Thus, it would be hard to find a more contemporary title than that of David Hendin's book, *Death as a Fact of Life,** with its subtitle, "New Thinking about the Legal, Medical, and Psychological Aspects of Our Most Repressed Reality." Certainly our ancestors would not or could not have considered death a "repressed" reality, and it probably would not have occurred to them that death was not a fact of life. And what conceivably could "new thinking" be? Equally up-to-date is the spectacle of a professor at a theological seminary, such as Robert Neale of Union, presenting *The Art of Dying,*† a set of

* Norton, 255 pp., $7.50.

† Harper & Row, 158 pp., $5.95.

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spiritual exercises for contemplating death and composing the entire mind for it; even though Montaigne said that to philosophize is to learn how to die, it was in a different context, and the means for spiritual self-examination hardly had to be learned as they do now. Ernest Becker's long discussion in *The Denial of Death** links the subject with contemporary psychoanalytic and existentialist thought in the most advanced fashion, and also with the theme of the absence of heroism in modern life, again one of the most contemporary of concerns. Arien Mack's interesting collection of essays, *Death in American Experience*,† is another distinctly modern example, with its exploration of the death themes in American poetry, in the youth culture, anthropological thought, and in social relations. Other recent studies may be more traditional in focus, such as the essays collected by H. M. Ruitenbeek in *Death: Interpretations*** which, although they deal with death and the pleasure principle, psychotherapy for the dying patient, mourning, and other related topics, are nevertheless more classically psychoanalytic in character. The observations of British psychoanalysts, such as Janice Norton, Hanna Segal, and Melanie Klein, and of others, although of superior quality, are not affected by the new knowledge about death, or the concept of "brain death," or by recent developments in organ transplantation, or by techniques of resuscitation, and might have been written at any time in the past hundred years. In contrast, a collection of essays assembled by Robert H. Williams, professor of medicine at the University of Washington, *To Live and to Die: When, Why, and How*,†† could come into being only as a result of the new knowledge—as exemplified by advances in the areas of chemical and hormonal intervention, psychosurgery, population control, genetic engineering—which Dr. Williams and others believe has transformed all the old ethical and legal questions.

WHAT does death mean, when cardiac massage can make the dead live, or when heart-lung machines, electric shock, or chemicals perform easily the spontaneous recoveries witnessed in the past? Patients who "die" during operations can be instantly revived by the trained personnel in the modern operating room. If cardiac arrest and cessation of breathing no longer mean death, or if heart-beat and breathing no longer mean life, then death has become an event entirely incidental to medical technology, and always, then, an act of euthanasia. The number of patients maintained in biological life by mechanical supports has increased greatly in recent years, and the question of their survival has been raised at the same time that there has been an increased interest in the concept of "brain death" as providing more reliable criteria than heart and breathing cessation. Such patients, often called "vegetables," are alive and yet not living as human beings. The interest in brain function has become more refined, but what has provided a special urgency requiring immediate attention has been the parallel development in highly complex techniques of organ transplantation. Not only does it become a matter of concern how long biological life should be maintained artificially if the brain has died, and at what social cost, but, more specifically, in order to proceed with organ transplants there must be absolute clarity about when the donor is to be considered legally dead. These recent developments are troubling, and they provide ample warrant for wondering whether anyone can die his own death anymore.

CLINICAL death occurs in humans when the heart and lungs stop functioning and the brain is deprived of oxygen. Unless resuscitation begins immediately, brain death follows, because the brain cannot survive without oxygen, and brain tissues do not heal or regenerate as other tissues do. The brain dies in stages, beginning with the cerebral cortex, then the mid-brain, and the brain stem. Cellular death follows, with organs and tissues remaining alive a bit longer. It is this sequence in death which makes possible the transplantation of living organs from the newly dead and thus raises the difficult question, when does death occur and what is it? If a serious accident destroys a victim's brain, but his basic functions are maintained artificially, does he ever die? When should the respirator be turned off, and for what reason. At what point would organ transplants, often called the "gift of life," be transformed unwittingly but unmistakably into the theft of life? Dr. Williams, throughout his collection, and especially in his own essays, emphasizes, as others do, the importance of mentation, of brain activity, as a sign of continued life. If cerebral functioning has virtually ceased, euthanasia is in a sense irrelevant. Death becomes an administrative matter: if the victim's organs are destined for use in transplants, the problem would be to synchronize the mechanically-supported life of the dying patient with the condition of the living patient awaiting a heart or kidney. Still, the question, "when?" remains.

As might be imagined, this subject has interested medical, legal, religious, and philosophical observers intensely ever since the first successful heart transplants in 1967 revealed the urgent need for immediate action, although the problem had been foreseen earlier. Legal and medical experts have been scrupulously concerned to set forth acceptable criteria for the cessation of cerebral function, and within the past five or six years,

* The Free Press, 320 pp., $7.95.
† Schocken, 201 pp., $7.50.
** Delta, 286 pp., $2.45.
†† Springer-Verlag (New York), 346 pp., $12.95.

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innumerable congresses and conferences have taken up the matter, legal scholars and theologians have explored it, and the courts have dealt with it. In 1968 an Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death proposed four major criteria* which would enable a doctor to pronounce a patient dead when the traditional signs of death —respiratory and circulatory failure—were obscured by the resuscitation machinery. The criteria would be: 1) irreversible coma; 2) complete absence of spontaneous breathing or muscular movement or response to pain; 3) complete absense of reflexes, or response to light, smells, heat, cold; fixed pupils; 4) a "flat" electroencephalogram, indicating no brain activity. Extreme care would be taken in administering such tests, and in insuring that they were not applied to patients suffering from hypothermia (temperature below 90° F.) or from central-nervous-system depressants. The tests would be repeated in twenty-four hours to ascertain any possible change, and some have suggested a longer waiting period. These tests have been used increasingly in the past five years and their usefulness has been confirmed.

The need of the medical profession for some clarity in the determination of death has become evident in a series of court cases in which the concept of "brain death" has been offered to jurors and judges. Indeed, two states have enacted statutes including "brain death" as an alternative to the traditional determination, Kansas in 1970 and Maryland in 1972, but the language of the statutes, and the attendant ambiguities, give cause for public and professional concern. An additional, perhaps a ghoulish, note is sounded by the seeming connection between new definitions of death and new techniques in organ transplantation, conjuring up an image of contemporary body-snatchers in the form of white-coated medical teams waiting to perform transplants. Are some people to be considered more dead than others if their organs are needed? All the possible abuses of this delicate situation may be imagined, when the death of a dying patient is not regarded as his own individual death but as an event contingent upon the needs of another patient with heart or kidney disease. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, which has been passed by fifty states in one version or another, specifies that time of death must be determined by a physician not involved in the transplant, but perhaps further efforts at separating these processes are required to allay inevitable disquiet and confusion.

In a careful examination of the problem, Alexander Morgan Capron, of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and Leon R. Kass, of the National Research Council, have proposed refinements of the statutes and clarification of two important questions about the mortally ill, namely, "when to allow to die" and "when to declare dead."† (A further question, "when or whether to hasten death," explicitly evokes the intentions of the euthanasia movement, but no useful purpose is served by uniting all these questions. Euthanasia is not the same thing as donating your body for scientific research, or donating your organs for transplant, or even dying in all but your biological functions.) The exact determination of death is relevant not only to the mortally ill but in cases of suicide, accidents, and slow expiration as well; criteria must be agreed upon no matter what caused the death. Even in a perspective entirely different from the medical, or legal, or social, namely, the religious perspective which regards as the most important thing about death the soul's departure from the body, some explicit criteria must be employed to determine whether this has in fact occurred. Thus, the concept of brain death may be introduced for accuracy so long as the limits of its usefulness are clearly understood.

THERE may be some question whether mentation, cerebral activity, comprehends all that we mean by human existence, but it is clear that what really troubles us, behind the horror at becoming "vegetables," with life mechanically maintained at its most minimal, is the quite reasonable fear of the fragility of life itself. The machines that maintain life with tubes and wires, the whole impressive battery of modern medical techniques, mock the very thing that is cherished, the human person. Indeed, it is, among other things, precisely the helpless surrender to medical technology and management which the euthanasia movement attempts to counteract, with its "living will" and its deliberate confrontation with irreversible illness. Advocates of euthanasia do not in fact urge it as public policy, but merely as a possible private alternative which should be removed from the criminal category. The Euthanasia Society believes that its "living will" insures the voluntary nature of the act. Like any other will, it is to be executed when the testator is of sound mind, and it instructs family and physician not to make extraordinary efforts to prolong his life if he should be so irreversibly ill that no recovery is possible. Obviously, the patient's initial act of consent is his visit to the doctor, and no subsequent medical procedures can be undertaken without further indications of consent. Even the sewing up of a wound in a hospital emergency room cannot be

* *Journal of the American Medical Association* (July 3, 1972, Vol. 221, Number 1), "Report of Task Force on Death and Dying, Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences." See also *JAMA*, Vol. 205, 1968, for the initial report of the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee.

† "A Statutory Definition of the Standards for Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, Volume 121, No. 1, November 1973.

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done without consent, nor can operations, transplants, autopsies, or other procedures. In the absence of a "living will," the family of the mortally ill may in effect be asking the doctor to perform euthanasia by not using all possible means of resuscitation, and the family may thus be giving its informed consent, although the patient, if comatose, does not give *his*. (In this matter—the ambiguity of consent—there is a connection with the concern of large numbers of people over the question of consent in medical and psychological research in general, and those interested in euthanasia are not unaware of it.)

Obviously, it has been the wish of many people who ponder the end of life, as people have done for centuries, that they not live beyond a certain point of disability, pain, deterioration, or unconsciousness. A calm and soberly determined and desired suicide has often seemed an appropriate alternative. Those who retain scruples about actually committing suicide might view the possibility of the "living will" as more acceptable. It is no public policy of killing the undesirables or the weaklings, but rather a stoic individual decision, as individual as wanting to leave money to a person or a cause, or wishing to be buried in a certain place, or cremation. Of course, a bureaucracy might exact consent to euthanasia from its citizens in the same cruel manner the Russians have exacted "voluntary" vows and confessions; uncontrolled bureaucracies become capable of these things when they verge on totalitarianism. And there is the other undesirable Russian practice of regarding all bodies as belonging to the state and therefore subject to autopsies or organ transplants or any other procedure without consent of the next of kin or of the patient himself. Still, there is quite a large leap from legally *permitting some* people to request that their own lives not be unnecessarily prolonged by artificial means, to a public policy *requiring all* lives to be terminated according to certain external criteria. Fears of "the entering wedge" and "the slippery slope" may blur or eliminate these significant distinctions. But does it make sense to think that we would remain unaware of all other bureaucratic encroachment on our lives and privacy until euthanasia were made mandatory? Actually, euthanasia, like abortion and contraception, might become a private matter between the patient and his doctor. Large numbers of our citizens might continue to think euthanasia a sin, as they do contraception and abortion, but they could no longer insist that it was a crime as well.

EUTHANASIA is not proclaimed frivolously by its advocates, or without thoughtful concern, and to speak of Nazis and ghoulish experiments in the same context is insulting. Nevertheless, instead of simplifying or clarifying a painful inevitable situation, there is reason to think that introducing euthanasia as a remedy for the travesty of death actually complicates it. To imagine euthanasia in practice, not as in a Nazi nightmare but as if it were working out in an ordinary system of medical care, is to provide more problems than cures, as the editors of a recent British book on the subject demonstrate.* For instance, an examination of the system of safeguards reveals how much care must be taken to establish certain qualifications for euthanasia, to have the declaration certified by witnesses, to insure that the declarer is of sound mind, and to release attending medical personnel from the violation of their Hippocratic oath and of any criminal responsibility. Then, the declaration must provide for a waiting period, for the possibility of revocation, and must include punishment for anyone willfully concealing, destroying, falsifying, or forging such a document. As the other procedural implications undergo scrutiny, so does the usual notion of euthanasia as a calm, sober act recalling Socrates nobly ending his life, or Phèdre, in grandeur, *par un chemin plus lent descendre chez les morts*. The scene becomes, rather, an execution chamber, with witnesses and documents and official certification —how could it not?

What if the patient were of sound mind but had changed his mind since signing a declaration? Twenty-five per cent of requests received by the Euthanasia Society are from young people; what if such a declaration were signed long ago, in another place; could it be easily revoked? One out of five Americans moves every year, and loss of documents always attends such population mobility; would a doctor in California know that his paralyzed, comatose patient had signed a "living will" in Maine? And what if the patient had forgotten? Which is the sound mind and who attests to it? Would the very doctors and nurses dedicated to healing be the ones to perform euthanasia and if not, would a special class or caste or guild do it, and would their arrival in a ward or private room signify the approach of their dread responsibility? Is it conceivable that certain hospitals would become known as euthanasia mills? And would it be an improvement if the sense of anxiety and mistrust which many patients already feel on entering a hospital were to be confirmed by such practices and if the hospital were transformed back to what it was once thought to be, a place to die in, or rather a place in which to be made dead?

Other instances of the use of euthanasia may be beyond the reach of safeguards. Thus, if an elderly patient knows that the crowded family at home needs his room, will he be more likely to sign such a declaration, especially if family rela-

* *Your Death Warrant? The Implications of Euthanasia*, Edited by Jonathan Gould and Lord Craigmyle, Arlington House, 144 pp., $6.95.

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tions are not ideal, if his illness *is* a burden? How can doctors be sure that such situations are not exerting pressure on their patients, or that the nursing homes and geriatric hospitals, with their limited facilities and with an ever-increasing number of old people, do not exert such pressures? And what of the old or ill who have no relatives, who are not being cared for by a friendly family doctor, but are treated all unknown in the impersonal wards of modern hospitals? The soundness of their minds, their unknowable wishes and intentions, the unknown circumstances of their lives, all are hidden from the understanding and ministration of most medical personnel, and this very lack of knowledge might be a source of pressure.

It is often said that everyone has a right to a death with dignity, or even a right to death parallel to a right to life. Whether or not such a right can be reasonably derived is a difficult question, but as the editors of *Your Death Warrant?* point out, what it really means is a right *to be put to death,* and put to death by others, which in fact proposes the duty of others to kill. There are comparable difficulties with the argument that legalized euthanasia would mean an improvement in the quality of life. Clearly, the improvement is not experienced by those who are put to death, because their experience of life thereby ceases. Rather, it is the quality of *other* people's lives that may be improved when the dead forfeit their own. And there is a question whether the quality of life would in fact be improved at all. It is generally held that overcrowding, competition for scarce resources, the pollution and overpopulation and bureaucratic nightmares which face us everywhere, would all be modified if fewer resources were consumed by unproductive elderly people; more would then be available for the rest of society, for more productive purposes. The allocation of resources is indeed a problem, but those who advance theoretical arguments about the proper use of resources were themselves once unproductive as infants, and will one day become the unproductive geriatric instances they now decry. Surely it would not really improve the quality of one's life to know that others have been deliberately sacrificed for it, or that one's own life, so full of quality, would one day be readied for sacrifice. Would not the quality of life of the entire society conceivably be poisoned if it were knowingly nourished in this way?

DEATH in dignity, significant death, is of course what we would all desire, and in a community of care and concern. No one likes to be thought of as a patient rather than a person, no one wants his body regarded as a mine of transplantable organs, or as a statistic in the tabulated death rates, or an item in the hospital budget or the mortician's accounting. An accumulating outrage has attended the development of modern medicine, which must reduce a person to a thing in order to return him to the status of a person once more. And yet to be treated as a thing may not be the worst that can befall a modern American patient; equally discomfiting is the pervasive habit of false personalization, such as having to endure fifteen or twenty minutes of a doctor's "relating" to you with all sorts of trivia about himself and his family in order to feel that he truly "cares" about you "as a person." This is especially painful as it affects treatment of the elderly or dying, whose condition cannot be reached by wearing a smile button and saying, "Have a nice day." When death is on the horizon there is need for a surrounding community of care, and it may be precisely the lack of such a community that as much as anything else has fostered the growing interest in euthanasia. Faced on the one hand with the antiseptic mechanical processes of efficiency which are the natural consequences of modern medical technology, and on the other with the feeble attempts to counteract these by a system of deception and false personalization, how much more acceptable becomes the wish to choose the time and circumstances of one's own death. And if one has already donated organs for transplant, one can even have a sense, not of immortality perhaps, but still of some meaning beyond one's self.

An interesting British development in this connection has been the establishment of the hospice as a kind of special half-way house for the dying. Those who are soon to die but are still alive, and for whom no further medical treatment is ordered or desired, are out of place in the modern hospital, with its dedication to cure and its efficient broad-scale response to emergencies. Nursing homes or old-age homes cannot provide the experienced medical care required by such patients, and of course have too many financial and administrative problems to take on other responsibilities. The hospice is intended to provide a community of care rather than a regimen of rehabilitation for patients who do not wish to commit suicide or have others perform euthanasia on them. Actually, the idea of the hospice is a very old one, it antedates the modern hospital, and even the old hospital, antedates advanced surgical knowledge, advanced pharmacopeia, and modern theories of disease and health. Before all of this, the hospice was an arm of the religious establishment, caring for the bodies and souls of the afflicted. Naturally there was little alternative then, and only the souls remained accessible to productive attention.

The treatment provided by a hospice, or similar programs at hospitals in this country, is a novel combination of psychotherapy and chemotherapy, along with what we can only call a decent human response to the dying person as a person. The number of those attending to these issues has grown remarkably in recent years. New groups like the Foundation of Thanatology or

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the Institute of Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences, with their publications, research programs, seminars, and meetings as well as the traditional journals like the *Journal of the American Medical Association*, the *Archives of Internal Medicine*, the *American Journal of Nursing*, the *New England Journal of Medicine*, *Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine*, all report regularly on the state of research and on the ethical, legal, and practical aspects of treating the dying patient. Among recent studies of great interest is a discussion by Avery D. Weisman, a psychiatrist at the Harvard Medical School, on his own work with dying patients in *On Dying and Denying*,* a book which explores with great sensitivity the implications of death for certain patients, their awareness of terminal illness, and their capacities for resolution and reconciliation. Elizabeth Kubler-Ross, of Chicago, and Albert Biel, of Jefferson Medical College, are engaged in similar work.

Despite what doctors and relatives want to believe, most terminal patients are aware of their illness and its prognosis, and apparently want someone to acknowledge it. The conspiracy of silence and denial, although intended to ease the patient, does not do so, but instead frightens those whose great need is for genuine candor. The dying patient dreams that he has died and is still in the hospital; when the nurse comes in, he asks whether he is dead or alive, and she replies, "Have you asked your doctor?" Dr. Kubler-Ross describes five stages of mental attitude in dying patients, from denial to resentment and anger, to a kind of bargaining and supplication of unknown forces, to depression, and perhaps, if the patient is fortunate, to a final stage of resolution, acceptance, integration of a sort. Dr. Weisman, with similar objectives, sees the progress somewhat differently, in terms of levels of awareness, levels of acceptance, illusion, and reconciliation. The responsibility of the hospice, or of any explicit program of care for the dying, is to assist and guide people in this final psychological and spiritual project, recognizing that healing of the body is no longer possible, accepting the very different goal of caring for the spirit.

* Behavioral Publications, 247 pp., $9.95.

THE requirement of significant death is perhaps even more compelling in our own day than in past ages with their shared beliefs in the stages along death's way, but it has never been more ignored. The entire culture is given over to other demands, and to a denial and dissimulation in which we all share, and there are few efforts or institutions, like the hospice, working to counteract the universal pattern In contrast to the people after the Black Death who, like Michelangelo, found themselves "thinking no grave thought which did not have Death engraved on it," we are all able to think about death not at all if we so choose, despite the Holocaust, the wars of the past generation, despite the violence that greets us everywhere. James D. Watson and Sir Francis Crick do not contemplate a skull on their desks as they investigate the genetic code, and although recent existentialism played a part in recovering the subject of death for intellectual discussion, it has little practical significance in the organization of life. Everyone is quite familiar with the fear of death, and with its intricate permutations in conscious and unconscious mind, everyone knows about hostility and death wishes, not only in others but in oneself; but to what end?

Death is the most individual event in our lives, the most unique, its importance equaled only by the uniqueness of birth. Although euthanasia itself offers no solution to anything at all, the euthanasia movement may help to rouse a culture too long given over to a denial of the very reality of death, and, especially in view of the new medical technologies, may illuminate a subject that most urgently needs our thought and concern.

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Berrigan's Diatribe

Robert Alter

SURELY one of the most shocking documents of American response to the latest Middle East war is Daniel Berrigan's October 19, 1973 speech to the Association of Arab University Graduates. (The full text appears in *American Report*, October 29, 1973.) It is not that there is anything startlingly new about the views of Israel which Father Berrigan articulates—one has heard them often enough issuing from Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, Moscow, and from the spokesman of the Palestine Liberation Organization. What is shocking is that such views should be taken up by a man whom many Americans had come to regard as the exemplary hero—if you will, martyr—of conscience and political struggle in this country, our paragon of courageous and idealistic activism. It is encouraging to note that not only Jews have been dismayed by the Berrigan address. Several clergymen prominent in the peace movement have spoken out against it, and the Rev. Donald S. Harrington, who last month was to have presented Berrigan with the Gandhi Peace Award on behalf of an organization called Promoting Enduring Peace, withdrew from the proceedings, denouncing the prospective recipient in the plainest terms: "Father Berrigan has ceased to be a witness and an influence for peace, and has become the opposite" (New York *Times*, December 22, 1973). Subsequently, the directors of the organization announced that they were reconsidering the award and Berrigan, in turn, rejected the prize.

It would be surprising, of course, if anyone so involved as Berrigan in the 60's political climate of the Left with its stereotypical formulas about global politics should be particularly sympathetic toward Israel. Berrigan, however, is not content, like many of his New Left colleagues, merely to castigate Israel's more vulnerable policies and to affirm his identification with the suffering Palestinian people. Impelled by a peculiar animus, he takes pains to weave out of malicious invention and crude distortion an entirely mythical image of a sinister Israel that will be a worthy object of his invective. It is a question worth pondering why this supposed man of conscience should have shown such eagerness to pronounce the big lie—and to pronounce it, moreover, with frequent protestations that his chief concern is to be a zealous guardian and a brave protagonist of the truth.

Berrigan begins his address, on a proper note of rhetorical humility, by announcing that he is "a non-expert in every field of human expertise," including the one he is about to explore. The disclaimer, however, can hardly justify the outrages on factuality which he then proceeds to perpetrate. One may be understandably disenchanted with professional experts, but that does not entitle, say, a lecturer on Lapland to be unaware of the fact that Lapland has a very cold climate; yet that is the order of Berrigan's ignorance, whether willful or innocent, of the history of Zionism, the development of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the nature of Israeli society, even, one suspects, of Middle Eastern geography. Berrigan's twisting of facts is so crude that it hardly deserves point-by-point refutation. What I will do instead is simply to review the main points he makes about Israel—to cite them is to expose them—with some reflections on the rhetoric in which they are couched and what it may imply. For no one should imagine that the Berrigan document is an impetuous if misguided outburst made in the heat of war. On the contrary, its studied use of anaphora and metaphor, its careful orchestration of biblical echoes, its manipulation of invidious comparisons and emotionally-weighted word-choices, suggest that it is above all else a cunningly contrived rhetorical instrument in which every gesture is the result of patient calculation.

The Jews, Father Berrigan informs us, are "the classic refugee people," and everything he says about them is implicit with a powerful regret that they have not elected to continue their noble vocation as refugees but instead have presumed to meddle in the Gentile sphere of history. This people of ex-refugees "is now creating huge numbers of refugees." The slipperiness of the "now" here is typical of Berrigan's rhetorical slyness. If it means 1973, the whole statement is a barefaced lie; if one edges it into something more general like "the last twenty-five years," it recedes from a lie to a distorted and gravely misleading simplification. The Arab nations are, quite plainly, "a people invaded"—whether one uses 1948, 1967, or 1973, this, by contrast, is the sort of lie that is exactly antithetical to the truth. Israel itself is a

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"*de facto* state," hence worthy of no more than *de facto* recognition, an assertion supported solely by its own rhetorical context, while we are left wondering why Israel, established by a vote of the UN General Assembly, should be a *de facto* state, though the *de jure* status, for example, of Jordan, created through a fiat of British imperialism, is left unquestioned.

As Berrigan moves into the main part of his argument, it becomes clear that his refusal to accord Israel full legitimacy of national existence is based on what he conceives as moral rather than strictly legal grounds. Israel, he affirms again and again, is a "settler state," like South Africa and the United States. (Unless he is talking about the frontier era, I find it hard to see how that term applies to the United States, but in any case South Africa would appear to be the analogy he has most steadily in mind.) "We had known," Father Berrigan tells us with a fine homiletic flourish, "criminal Christian communities," and though he is a little vague about their identity, the emphasis on community—which is, after all, a collective entity of men, women, and children —suggests that he is thinking again of South Africa, and of Nazi Germany, more than he is of the United States or, for example, of Spain during the Inquisition. In our own time, however, Zionism has created a new thing in history: "a criminal Jewish community."

This radical Jesuit's bill of complaints makes it clear that he intends the criminal label in all seriousness, not as a mere figure of speech. The wisdom of Israel has become "an Orwellian nightmare of double-talk, racism, fifth-rate sociological jargon, aimed at proving its racial superiority to the people it has crushed." One hardly needs add that no specific documents of this alleged flood of racist pronouncements are offered in evidence. Israel, Berrigan would have us believe, is a state that exists through a systematic policy of terrorism, violence, and murder directed against its own dissidents. He knows in his bones that if he were a Jew living in Israel, the state would suppress him, for he can confidently assert of Israel's peacemakers that "Many of them are in prison, or hounded from the scene, living in exile. They are equivalent to Palestinians; no voice, no vote; non-persons." I don't know what the particular source may be for this dramatic fantasy, but it is obvious that the rhetorician who spun it has never been in Israel, never read the Israeli press, knows nothing of the actual figures and parties that constitute political life in Israel, where I think it is safe to say that more freedom has been accorded to dissent than in any other society under continuous critical stress.

The Berrigan document offers other, equally vivid vignettes of Israeli life, or what his Arab listeners on October 19th must have rejoiced to accept as such. Thus, to illustrate the militaristic ethos that he imagines has become the heart of Israel, he tells us that "Her absurd generals, her military junk, are paraded on national holidays before the narcotized public"—and again he goes on to invoke Orwell in order to provide the aptest image of the Zionist state. Now, one would not want to require such an avowed non-expert to have a mastery of arcane sources, but presumably he has had access at least to the New York *Times*, which since Israel Independence Day of 1969 has prominently featured photographs of the children's parade that the "narcotized" Israelis, with the sense of an appropriate symbol for the kind of nation they wanted to be, decided to substitute for the display of troops and weapons. The decision to hold a military parade on the twenty-fifth anniversary only—for the sake of tourism!—was vehemently criticized within Israel, the opponents of the parade including even Moshe Dayan; but in any case what Father Berrigan is looking for here is a rhetorical handle, a symbolic image to fit the symmetries of a myth, not a statement that will have the least responsibility to verifiable historical fact.

LEST it seem that I have been exaggerating the virulence of Berrigan's attack on Israel by citing brief statements out of context or by my own interpretation of their tenor, I would like to conclude this summary of his October 19 speech by quoting continuously three of the central passages of his argument. There is scarcely an assertion in them that cannot be challenged on the basis of solidly documented facts, but after the first sentence, I will resist the temptation to intervene because I think any reader with a minimal knowledge of recent Middle Eastern history can readily see how gross fabrication has been piled upon gross fabrication in the service of a transparent propaganda.

> The Jews arose from the Holocaust, a cause of universal joy [a joy not conspicuously evidenced in the policies of the nominally Christian nations from 1945 to 1948 toward the establishment of a Jewish state]; but the Jews arose like warriors, armed to the teeth [that is, with antiquated rifles, improvised armor, and a few rattletrap planes, against the modern weaponry of five invading Arab armies clearly intending their annihilation]. They took possession of a land, they exiled and destroyed old Arab communities, they (a minority) made outsiders of those who were, in fact, the majority of citizens. Then, they flexed their muscles; like the goyim, the idolators, the "inhabitants of this earth," like Babylon and Egypt and Assyria; like those kingdoms which Israel's own prophets summoned to judgment, Israel entered the imperial adventure. She took up the imperial weapons, she spread abroad the imperial deceptions.

I am not sure whether the imperial adventure referred to is Israel's extensive program of technical and economic aid to the new African states,

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or Israel's preemptive thrust in June 1967 into the staging-grounds of the surrounding armies that had massed to attack and destroy the Jewish state. Be that as it may, Berrigan sees in Israel a confirmation of Frantz Fanon's idea that "the slave became master, and created slaves"; and having thus concluded what he is pleased to think of as a resumé of Israel's history, he proceeds to offer a description of Israeli society as it has evolved. Israeli intellectuals have often wrestled with the question of what some of them call "the price of Zionism"; Father Berrigan for his part knows what it is in the most unequivocal terms:

> And let us not hesitate to state the price in Israeli coinage. Something like this; not only a dismal fate for foreign and indigenous victims, but the failure to create new forms of political and social life for her own citizens. The coinage of Israel is stamped with the imperialist faces whose favor she has courted; the creation of an elite of millionaires, generals, and entrepreneurs. And the price is being paid by Israel's Oriental Jews, the poor, the excluded, the prisoners. Do we seek analogies for this "sublime adventure of return"? They are not hard to come by. But they do not exist, alas, in the dreams of Zionist rhetoricians; they exist rather in the real world, where Zionist violence and repression joins [*sic*] the violence and repression of the great (and little) powers; a common method, a common dead end.

As the last sentence here suggests, one of the reasons why Berrigan's hatred of Israel is so undiluted is that the Jewish state provides him—at least as he chooses to imagine it—with an intensely focused image in miniature of the corporate America he hates. That confusion of images is conspicuous in this climactic diatribe, and with it, at the beginning of the passage, an element of theological outrage that will bear further consideration:

> Israel, that millennial dream, belonged not only to Jews, but to all of mankind—it belonged to me. But the dream has become a nightmare. Israel has not abolished poverty and misery; rather, she manufactures human waste, the byproducts of her entrepreneurs, her military-industrial complex. Israel has not written justice into law; she has turned the law of nature to a mockery, creating ghettoes, disenfranchised peoples, exiles, hopeless minorities, cheap labor forces, Palestinian migrant workers. Israel has not freed the captives; she has expanded the prison system, perfected her espionage, exported on the world market that expensive blood-ridden commodity, the savage triumph of the technologized West: violence and the tools of violence.

It is hard to think of a more dismaying instance in recent years of a figure looked up to as a moral guide who has so totally betrayed his intellectual trust. Words create a climate of thought; words can kill; and the words Father Berrigan has permitted himself to speak, in extravagant defiance of the most elemental facts of the issue, are the sort that could help endanger the survival of two-and-a-half million human beings. It is clear that he knows nothing whatever of Israeli laws or of civil liberties within Israel; of the Israeli economy, the way the distribution of incomes within it is controlled, the role of the proletariat in the economy and in political life; of the kibbutz, the moshav, and other forms of social experiment in Israel, or of Israel's programs of social welfare; of the real economic and living conditions of Arab workers (by no means migrant) in Israel; and, most fundamentally, of the iron necessity of self-defense that has held the Jewish state in its grip for twenty-six years, which could not for a moment be ignored if the nation was to exist at all.

With all this burden of ignorance, Berrigan does not flinch for an instant—indeed, he has since continued to defend his remarks of last October—at grossly misrepresenting Israel in the most extreme terms of vilification—violence, repression, torture, terrorism, murder, slavery, racism, militarism, imperialism—and as an impartial man of peace, he is happy to propose that Israel unilaterally withdraw to the 1967 borders, allowing hostile tanks and missiles to be positioned in what are virtually the suburbs of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, while all the Arab refugees are to return to their pre-1948 homes in a great eschatological wave. The *Wall Street Journal,* in an editorial on Berrigan occasioned by the controversy over the Gandhi Peace Award (December 21, 1973), has formulated the shameful irresponsibility of Berrigan's political views on the Middle East with dry succinctness: "His apparent inability to understand why Israel sometimes resembles a garrison state does not say much for his perception of world realities. Nor does his refusal to address himself to the question of what would happen to an Israel that found a 'biblical justification' for unilaterally beating its swords into plowshares."

There is little more to be said about the substance of Berrigan's argument, such as it is. What may still trouble one about this whole verbal onslaught is its motives. Arthur Hertzberg, in an effective rejoinder to Berrigan (*American Report,* November 12, 1973), has provided, I think, at least part of the answer. "I am a Jew," Berrigan announces in his address in a characteristic rhetorical gesture, and he repeatedly affirms that the spiritual heritage of the Jews is his heritage, the dream of Israel (whatever he may think that means) his dream. Having put up his shingle as a symbolic Jew, Berrigan, as Hertzberg observes, "has no patience with the Jewish community, and judges it to be horribly sinful for living with some semblance of normalcy in the world." Berrigan, I should say, introduces his attack against Israel by first excoriating the American Jewish

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community, which he represents as having no political concerns except Israel, and he particularly stigmatizes the leadership of the American Jewish community, which he imagines to have almost unanimously adopted what he calls "the Nixon ethos." This is, of course, still another extravagant lie, since two-thirds of the Jewish vote went to McGovern in the 1972 elections, and many of the most prominent figures of American Jewry strongly opposed Nixon; but this is a lie Berrigan desperately needs. A real Jewish community is an encumbrance or an embarrassment for a Christian of such aspiring spirituality, and, as Hertzberg notes, "He wishes it would go away and leave to him the role of the true Jew." This frame of mind, which has antecedents going all the way back to the Gospel according to St. John, has a familiar label, as Hertzberg the historian is keenly aware—theological anti-Semitism.

Let me briefly amplify that conclusion. Berrigan is a political messianist, and there is no more dangerous way of relating to politics. Anything that does not correspond to messianic reality can be denounced as an abomination in the eyes of man and God, and all practical steps to its abolition can be justified. If this way of thinking can be applied to political reality in America, it can be applied tenfold to Israel; for the people of Israel, as the carnal source of the messianic vision, can be seen most scandalously as the betrayer of the vision. To speak typologically, as Christians traditionally have done, Israel in the light of its waywardness is to be imagined as Esau, the false son who thoughtlessly casts off the inheritance of the Father, and not as Jacob, the Christlike true son who remains steadfast to his Father's behests. Such exegetical notions invite a direct translation into concrete historical terms: other nations may have varying degrees of inequity in their social systems, and may be criticized for it; but if anything less than the realized messianic ideal is perceptible in Israel, it has abandoned its great heritage, the language of Isaiah being invoked to underscore the theological scandal, and the outraged spirit may now proceed to denounce Israel as a criminal community, outcast of humankind and cursed of the Lord.

This terminology and this mode of thinking are by no means unique to Berrigan among Christian spokesmen. To cite one highly visible example, a whole vociferous clique of Protestant and Catholic Old Testament scholars in this country have since October 6 scrambled to the platforms of the various local news media with attacks on Israel couched sanctimoniously in the same biblical terms, inveighing against the Jewish state as the wayward son who is no longer "True Israel." Thus, W. H. Brownlee (Claremont College) made public on October 16, 1973, a plea against American arms shipments to Israel in which he justified the Arab attack on Yom Kippur with a well-known text from Isaiah, "Your new moons and your appointed festivals My soul hates." George E. Mendenhall (University of Michigan) concluded a letter to the editor of the Ann Arbor *News* with a phrase from Hosea (quoted in Hebrew) that makes explicit what is implicit in Berrigan: "*Yisrael lo ami,* Israel is not my people." And the examples, alas, could be multiplied. In June 1967, many of these same Christian scholars rushed to the letters pages of American newspapers in defense of the Arab cause—members of the Yale Divinity School, for example, were conspicuous in the New York *Times*—but the theological anti-Semitism was by comparison muted. It was as though they were still looking over one shoulder wondering whether the moratorium on public anti-Semitism after the Holocaust was really over. Now, however, all doubts about that have vanished as the image of a militarily powerful Israel has canceled out the last vestiges of bad conscience for the Holocaust. Reverting to one of the classic points of departure of Christian thought, a certain kind of American Christian now feels no compunction whatever in again denouncing the Jews as the pariah people, pariahs usurping the land from which God justly expelled them.

In the case of Berrigan, the theological animus is so strong that his rhetorical habit—a somewhat antiquated one—of referring to the state of Israel as "she" blends perfectly with a pseudo-prophetic vision of the Jewish state as an allegorized Daughter of Zion who, in betraying her true Husband, has metamorphosed into an apocalyptic Whore of Babylon, courting the favor of imperialist faces, as Berrigan puts it with more attention to metaphor than to idiomatic correctness. It would be a mistake, however, not to note also what is distinctively Catholic, even Jesuitical, in this whole hate-filled harangue, and that has been done with great penetration by Michael Novak in a devastating exposé of Berrigan (*Commonweal,* December 21, 1973). Concerned as a committed Catholic intellectual that the zeal of priests who became active in Left politics may in the end arrive at the same point as the fanaticism of a Father Feeney or a Father Coughlin, Novak observes: "The fascination of the Catholic Left with authority, with huge sun-blocking bureaucratic forces, with evils in administrative structure, with signs of doom, is all-too-Catholic, all-too-clerical. . . . And to find the Left mesmerized by armaments, by espionage, by prisons; by spies, by power elites, by industrial complexes, by millionaires (as if the world had begun only yesterday), and making no distinctions whatsoever between regimes, cultures, histories, concrete situations, is to feel again what one felt a dozen years ago in curial circles in Rome: an iron-tight, complacent, impenetrable, simple 'truth.'"

There is, nevertheless, something that goes beyond theology, finally beyond the opposition

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between Christian and Jew, in Berrigan's orgy of falsification, in his very commitment to a complacent, simple "truth." The obvious question poses itself of whether there is some psychological or political connection between Berrigan's anti-war activism and his current denunciation of Israel. If one admires without qualification Berrigan the burner of draft records, perhaps there is simply some inexplicable disjuncture between his actions then and now. This, for example, is the view emphatically spelled out by the Rev. David R. Hunter, Deputy General Secretary of the National Council of Churches, in a letter to *American Report* (November 26, 1973): "Dan Berrigan, whose courage and insight I have admired for years, has suddenly gone mad in this one aspect of his life and has given way to stereotyping which violates the hard cruel fact of truth." The thesis of sudden madness is an interesting one, and the presence of anti-Semitism deep in the spiritual imagination of an otherwise enlightened man might well give support for such a thesis. Nevertheless, it seems to me more plausible to see a direct continuity of character between Berrigan the peace activist and Berrigan the anti-Zionist demagogue.

There are few stances trickier to maintain with some sort of moral integrity than civil disobedience. Circumstances within a given polity may well come to such a pass, as Thoreau first argued to Americans, that the only path a man of conscience can take is willfully to violate the law. But especially in a constitutional democracy, where there are open options of legal redress, however painfully slow and imperfect, a person who deliberately breaks the law in the name of conscience must have a very strong sense that he knows what is right and what is necessary, so he may decide on his own that he cannot wait, that the means he adopts are justified. The forthright conscience of civil disobedience may not be altogether separable from a certain disdainful sense of moral superiority. It takes courage to be a martyr, but, let us be frank, it is also soul-warming to be confirmed in one's rightness by public persecution at the hands of the Others, the wrong ones. We should not forget that an important moment of the whole experience of martyrdom—that is, two years and three months in prison for violating federal law—for Berrigan was *The Catonsville Nine,* a didactic play he wrote about his trial which is artistically vitiated by its dominant note of self-gratulation.

THAT same note rings clear and strong in his address to the Association of Arab University Graduates. The profession of strict impartiality he offers at the beginning, and the little wrist-slap he administers to the Arabs near the end for their occasional excesses, are in part a rhetorical ploy to appear impeccably fair, in part the expression of a real need to feel superior to both sides. In the climate of prevalent political opinion in America, of course, it is much more inviting for a dissident spirit to savor its superiority vis-à-vis the Jews than vis-à-vis Arabs. On the level of rhetorical strategy, there is no more comfortably-lined vehicle for spiritual superiority than Christian humility, and Berrigan rides it for all it is worth, confessing his limitations, his association through Catholicism with the historical victimizers of the Jews, even as he reminds us repeatedly of his own role as a rebel against authority who has courageously borne witness for the truth, and as he proceeds to libel in the most damaging fashion the living Jewish people in Israel and in America. His argument with both sides, he tells us at the end, "is made in a spirit of love and deep concern." One should fervently pray that the people of Israel always be preserved from such love and concern, for it could be, quite literally, the death of us.

HAVING made a vocation out of performing spectacular acts of political righteousness, Berrigan would seem prepared to balk at nothing now in the quest for new causes in which he can express the adversary energies of his old cause, and tie old and new with the same worn ideological thread. The point is not that Israel need in any way be exempt from vigorous and probing criticism, whether from Gentile or Jew, but it is clear that Berrigan is not interested in criticism, or in the gathering of complex data necessary to make the carefully qualified judgments that constitute responsible criticism. What Berrigan is really interested in is denunciation, and that warm tingle of self-gratulation which denunciation carries with it; and for this purpose, mendacious stereotypes will serve much better than recalcitrant facts. Thus in his version Israel is not a nation with imperfections, that has made a variety of policy-decisions, some of them questionable, in the most trying circumstances imaginable; rather it must be thought of as an Orwellian nightmare of state terror, militarism, imperialism, and all the rest.

"Be not overrighteous," Ecclesiastes warned long ago, to which the Rabbis (*B'midbar Rabbah,* 21:6) added, "so that no man come to dispense with the Law." It is a warning that all commentators on the Middle East might bear in mind during this tense period when Israel urgently needs, from its supposed friends as well as from its enemies, the simple human recognition of its basic legitimacy as a nation, so that there will be some ground for a workable peace.

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Observations

The Presidency & Professor Schlesinger

Michael Novak

"THIS BOOK," Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. tells us in the single clear statement of his theme in *The Imperial Presidency*,* "deals essentially with the shift in the *constitutional* balance—with, that is, the appropriation by the Presidency, and particularly by the contemporary Presidency, of powers reserved by the Constitution and by long historical practice to Congress." Conservatives like James Burnham have long held that Congress is being overrun, outflanked, and overwhelmed by activist Presidents in the service of culturally imperialistic constituencies at home. Of this—the immense growth of the executive branch brought about since 1932 and especially since 1960 by the active intervention of Presidents in domestic affairs—Professor Schlesinger says very little. He focuses almost entirely on foreign affairs:

> . . . the imperial Presidency received its decisive impetus, I believe, from foreign policy; above all, from the capture by the Presidency of the most vital of national decisions, the decision to go to war. . . . By the early 1970's the American President had become on issues of war and peace the most absolute monarch (with the possible exception of Mao Tse-tung of China) among the great powers of the world.

The Right worries about the Imperial President at home; the Left about the Imperial President abroad.

For the first twelve pages, Schlesinger tells us "what the Founding Fathers intended" in the Presidency, and in the next twenty-one pages, "where they disagreed." This brief section valuably recreates the hesitance and uncertainties of practical men laboring to create a great new office more restrained than monarchy. But it is not until chapter 3, "The Rise of Presidential War," that Schlesinger gets down to his true theme. Already in 1834, Justice Story was saying of President Jackson: "Though we live under the form of a republic we are in fact under the absolute rule of a single man." Schlesinger is at his best, here and throughout his book, when he tries to describe the *unwritten* checks upon the Presidents and Congresses and Courts, those habits of conferring with one another, deferring in time of crisis to flexibility and unity, refusing to insist upon prerogatives so absolutely that rigidity sets in, respecting public opinion and precedent and traditional civilities. Harsh and mean conflicts there have been in American history; passions almost murderous and outbursts of fury and frustration. Schlesinger takes unusual care to point out those appeals, and large submissions, to public judgment that seem almost always to have mitigated our most grievous constitutional crises. From Washington to Jefferson to Jackson to Polk to Lincoln, Presidents sometimes seized powers that were either too trivial to be watched over by legislatures or too immediate, urgent, and serious to be submitted to congressional consent. Yet in every case, some countermeasure on the part of Congress was generated or some appeal beyond the sole judgment of the President was launched.

Schlesinger next describes the period of growing congressional control, from the time of Lincoln until World War II. The failure to impeach President Johnson in 1868 prevented the reduction of the Presidency to total subservience. But year by year, Congress got a tighter grip upon the nation. Bryce wrote in 1888 that impeachment is "the heaviest piece of artillery in the congressional arsenal, but because it is so heavy it is unfit for ordinary use. It is like a hundred-ton gun which needs complex machinery to set it into position, an enormous charge of power to fire it, and a large mark to aim at." McKinley, Taft, Theodore Roosevelt, and Wilson demonstrated that strong Presidents could find ways to act in foreign affairs both through and around the Congress. But by 1937 Congressman Louis Ludlow of Indiana failed in the House by only 21 votes to write into law a "Peace Amendment" that would have required a national referendum before a declaration of war could take effect.

From 1919 until 1939 Congress used its control over foreign policy, neutrality policy in particular, to keep the United States ineffectual abroad. Under congressional management, Walter Lippmann judged, "the emasculation of American foreign policy reached its extreme limit—the limit of total

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absurdity and total bankruptcy." The stage was set for the ascendant Presidents.

Beginning in 1942-45, Schlesinger records, Americans began to feel differently about their Presidents. Instantaneous nuclear warfare, international intrigue and espionage, global competition of virtually every sort, and the high ideology of "Cold War" led to speeches, articles, and editorials proclaiming: "More Presidential Power (Not Less)." In simpler days, some held, we could afford cumbersome democratic procedures; nowadays, we must strengthen the swiftness and efficiency of presidential control and learn to "trust" our Presidents.

The American Presidency came to perceive itself as the last, best hope of human progress and liberty. Crusade in Europe, Containment of Communism, Alliance for Progress, New Frontiers, Showdown in Cuba, the Lonely, Embattled "Only President You've Got" —such elements as these projected a new cosmic drama. One man "with his finger on the button of doom" came to occupy a symbolic role that kings, perhaps only gods, had once occupied. The "loneliness" of the office began to be extolled; the President's labors grew to mythological dimensions. The Congress shrank.

Schlesinger quotes Carl Vinson of Georgia, Member of Congress since 1914. The role of Congress had

> come to be that of a sometimes querulous but essentially kindly uncle who complains while furiously puffing on his pipe but who finally, as everyone expects, gives in and hands over the allowance, grants the permission, or raises his hand in blessing, and then returns to his rocking chair for another year of somnolence broken only by an occasional anxious glance down the avenue and a muttered doubt as to whether he had done the right thing.

Truman, Johnson, and Nixon bear the brunt of Schlesinger's criticism. Eisenhower was a team man, passive even, seemingly nondirective. Kennedy escapes serious criticism. His handling of the Cuban missile crisis "beautifully fulfilled both the ideal of the strong President and the prophecy of split-second presidential judgment in a nuclear age." Then, in a Nixonian tactic he uses frequently, Schlesinger feigns the acceptance of responsibility without really admitting fault:

> The very brilliance of Kennedy's performance appeared to vindicate the idea that the President must take unto himself the final decisions of war and peace. The missile crisis, I believe, was superbly handled, and could not have been handled so well in any other way. But one of its legacies was the imperial conception of the Presidency that brought the republic so low in Vietnam.

The least satisfactory of Schlesinger's chapters ought to have been the best: "The Revolutionary President: Washington." The book was rushed to publication; its motivating force should here be nakedly supplied. Schlesinger makes two chief accusations against Nixon: that Nixon was "revolutionary" in his conception of the Presidency, nearly bringing off a sort of *coup d'état*; and that Nixon tried to establish a "plebiscitary Presidency" modelled on Charles de Gaulle's Fourth Republic.

Three texts yield the basic allegations:

> As one examined the impressive range of Nixon's initiatives—from his appropriation of the war-making power to his interpretation of the appointing power, from his unilateral determination of social priorities to his unilateral abolition of statutory programs, from his attack on legislative privilege to his enlargement of executive privilege, from his theory of impoundment to his theory of the pocket veto, from his calculated disparagement of the cabinet and his calculated discrediting of the press to his carefully organized concentration of federal management in the White House—from all this a larger design ineluctably emerged. It was hard to know whether Nixon, whose style was banality, understood consciously where he was heading. He was not a man given to political philosophizing. But he was heading toward a new balance of constitutional powers, an audacious and imaginative reconstruction of the American Constitution. He did indeed contemplate, as he said in his 1971 State of the Union message, a New American Revolution. But the essence of this revolution was not, as he said at the time, power to the people. The essence was power to the Presidency.

Then comes the second accusation:

> What Nixon was moving toward was . . . not a parliamentary regime but a plebiscitary Presidency. . . . Certainly after his re-election he began what can be profitably seen as an attempt to establish a quasi-Gaullist regime in the United States. Instead of conciliating the defeated minority, he was cold and unforgiving. Instead of placating Congress, he confronted it with executive *faits accomplis* taken without explanation. The mandate became the source of wider power than any President had ever claimed before. Whether a conscious or unconscious revolutionary, Nixon was carrying the imperial Presidency toward its ultimate form in the plebiscitary Presidency—with the President accountable only once every four years, shielded in the years between elections from congressional and public harassment, empowered by his mandate to make war or to make peace, to spend or to impound, to give out information or to hold it back, superseding congressional legislation by executive order, all in the name of a majority whose choice must prevail till it made another choice four years later—unless it wished to embark on the drastic and improbable course of impeachment.

The third text taxes Nixon further:

> Richard M. Nixon, for all his conventionality of utterance and mind, was a genuine revolutionary. Who can say why? No doubt it was partly out of inner need: he had to create for himself a Presidency he could handle psychologically. Partly it may have been out of honest ignorance of American traditions: few Presidents seem to have had such limited acquaintance with the history of the republic. It was partly, one must hope, out of a considered judgment that the old separation of powers had outlived its time: nothing else could

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confer dignity on what constitutional historians will otherwise regard as a piratical administration. Whatever the explanation, the theory of the Presidency he embodied and propagated meant that the President of the United States, on his own personal and secret finding of emergency, had the right to nullify the Constitution and the law. No President had ever made such a claim before.

What are we to make of these accusations? Plainly, Richard Nixon gathered unto himself all the prerogatives employed by other Presidents in the past. John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson had shared in wiretaps on Martin Luther King and others. Impoundment, executive privilege, tampering with elections, illicit military ventures, counterespionage episodes within the United States, and other kinds of activity of which Richard Nixon stands accused are not in the least unknown to recent history. What then was special about the Nixon Presidency? According to Schlesinger, that it was "imperial," that it was "plebiscitary," and that it was "revolutionary." A cool look at the Nixon administration reveals that Schlesinger uses all three of these terms in a misleading way.

THE word "imperial," to begin with, need not mean non-constitutional and, in association with high office, need not be pejorative: Winston Churchill was an imperial prime minister. American Presidents of the future, however observant of the Constitution, will necessarily be executives of a worldwide economic and military power.

Secondly, the word "imperial" conjures up an image of the "militarization" of American life. Yet our army is inferior in manpower to the army of Russia and the army of China. It is falling short of its quotas for volunteers. It does not attract a preponderance of our best and brightest citizens. It has few articulate defenders among the molders of public opinion, the leaders of Congress, or major candidates for the Presidency. Can one think of any great power in history with a weaker military spirit?

If our Presidents are "imperial," moreover, it is in good measure because our intellectual leaders have not helped to dispel illusions. Few such leaders call for large-scale national discipline, national service, national flexibility. The nation has made an extravagant commitment to elaborate military hardware in order to contrive a cheap way to balance Russian and Chinese divisions. To pay the salaries and to maintain the facilities for several million men under arms is beyond our seriousness. It is not our *military* spirit but our *consumer* spirit that has led to technological terror. We lack Spartan discipline; on their way to combat, our soldiers board helicopters from golf courses, officers' clubs, and dazzling department-store PX's, with stereos and TV sets under their arms. Our civilian life has not been nearly so militarized as our military has been consumerized.

Our intellectual elites have contributed little to the nation's willingness to accept intelligent and honest mobilization. In the Korean "conflict" as well as in Vietnam, our Presidents were duplicitous because the national psyche had not been readied for military discipline. Americans do not want to accept the economic burdens of militarization. War cannot be called war. Presidents cannot call up "war fever" to unite the population. They cannot promise a protracted, costly, low-level struggle of endurance. They could not keep men in Vietnam for terms of three or five years, so as not to lose hard-won lessons of experience with every batch of new recruits. Our society is not sufficiently military—and, therefore, not sufficiently political—to grant our Presidents flexibility. Our Presidents must be devious because we are.

There is a further "imperial" dimension to the modern Presidency which Schlesinger does not address. We have not yet found a way to separate the office of *symbolizing the life of the nation* from the office of *exercising executive power*. The confounding of these two offices was, in the beginning, a major source of presidential power. The Congress was diffuse, ornery, obstructive; the Presidency needed every possible symbolic lever to enforce coherence and direction. But since 1945 the advent of television has magnified the symbolic power of the Presidency a hundred times. Television is an intensely person-centered medium. It focuses on the individual, on his personality, on his manner, on his tacit as well as on his spoken views. Depending on newspapers, we depend on the President's printed words. Watching him on television, we not only deal with words: we watch his darting eyes, see him perspire or watch his fingers tremble, notice that his smile is not synchronized with his sentiments. Television heightens by many degrees the impact of the President's personality upon the nation, upon its moods, its judgments, its restlessness. Here, in this psychic forum, there is no constitutional balance. The Congress does not reach us so. The Courts do not reach us so. Only the President has acquired this new technological access to the citizen's soul.

Of *this* kind of presidential "imperialism," Schlesinger says very little; it does not seem to be the swelling of presidential power that truly concerns him, so much as into whose hands such power falls. The triviality of the reforms of the Presidency that Schlesinger finally proposes at the end of his book builds up this impression irresistibly.

SCHLESINGER is equally misleading on the "plebiscitary" character of the Nixon Presidency. In 1960, John F. Kennedy barely won election; his uncertainty of his symbolic power among the people kept him under severe external check. In 1968, Richard Nixon barely won election and he, too, fell under severe external check. After the poor economic performance of 1970 and the increasingly unpopular prolongation of the war in 1971, prospects for Nixon's re-election did not seem certain. In January 1972, Senator Edmund S. Muskie was riding higher in the polls than President Nixon, although Muskie had not even been nominated yet or given the full attention of a long political campaign. With the nomination of George McGovern, the major political check on the Nixon administration was eliminated.

In 1972, Richard Nixon did not

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take his campaign to the American people. He did not even campaign *as* Richard Nixon. He asked people not that they should vote for *him*, but that they should "Re-elect the President." To call this election strategy a move toward a "plebiscitary Presidency"—Schlesinger characteristically hedges by calling it an "unconscious" move—is both to misread the plain facts and to insult the American people. Nixon could not afford to play Charles de Gaulle in public because he did not have the respect, love, or legendary quality that Charles de Gaulle had—not the egotism, not the *panache*. Nixon's very name was a political liability. His face, his manner, his style, his past, his economic policies, were minuses. Nixon, anticipating in 1971 a very close race, won in 1972 without campaigning. The mandate was not *for* Nixon; it was *against* his opponent.*

WHAT moved the Nixon men, moreover, was not a "revolutionary" design on the Constitution, conscious or unconscious. What moved them was a political design. Quite consciously, Nixon set out to alter the fundamental balance of power not in the American Constitution but in American *politics*. He was convinced that in the rapidly growing and increasingly rootless populations of the South and West he had the votes and the money to do what the Civil War had not succeeded in doing: transfer preeminence of power and symbolic reality from the Puritan culture of the North to the evangelical culture of the South. He was not trying to carve out a merely personal success, nor to alter the constitutional balance. He was trying to build a dynasty, a "new majority," which could—like the New Deal coalition which was its obverse model—last some forty years. This was the real meaning of his "Southern strategy," of his cozening of Connally, of his "White Houses" in Southern California and Florida, of his Supreme Court appointments (defeated in the act but symbolically the more powerful in the region where defeat represents reality itself), and of his struggle with the television networks.

The struggle with the networks was particularly important. Nixon understood that television functions today as the main information system for the largest proportion of citizens. Whoever shapes the sense of reality, the narrative line, and the symbolic context of the day's news goes a very long way toward shaping political reality. For political power is, in essence, power over symbols—power over the construction of reality itself. Since World War II, television has more and more come to control that power and the main lines of network news reflect the Northeastern style, values—and politics. What was finally most threatening about the Nixon Presidency was its ambition to transfer ideological control of the nation's instruments of communication from one ethos to another. Then there would indeed be a concentration of presidential power.

In short, where Schlesinger speaks of a shift in constitutional power, Nixon had in mind a shift in political power. Where Schlesinger holds up the civil religion of the Puritan Northeast as the guardian of the nation's traditions, Nixon holds up the civil religion of the evangelical frontier. Schlesinger cites Reinhold Niebuhr; Nixon cites Billy Graham. Schlesinger cites the national press; Nixon extols the regional and local press. Schlesinger turns his eyes toward "public figures in Washington" and toward the elite universities; Nixon looks to Miami, Houston, Tulsa, San Diego.

It is *this* revolution that Nixon was trying to accomplish. In its service, he became a tough, bold, forthright, adversary President, exactly the kind of President that Schlesinger himself has always celebrated—so much so, indeed, that one can easily imagine Nixon's ideas about the Presidency acquiring nourishment and reinforcement from Schlesinger's earlier writings. From *The Age of Jackson* (1954) through *The Vital Center* (1949 and 1962) Schlesinger has given no little support to men of "toughness" who ride roughshod over the obstacles in their way. He has thrilled to "the danger of power." His vital center "believes in attack," rejoices in "conflict," generates "passionate intensity," depends upon—the phrase is important to him—"the large resolute breed of men capable of the climactic effort." He has commended "the Jacksonian attitude," which "presumes a perpetual tension in society, a doubtful equilibrium, constantly breeding strife and struggle." He has praised "an earnest, toughminded pragmatic attempt to wrestle with new problems as they come, without being enslaved by a theory of the past, or by a theory of the future." And as he himself long ago predicted:

> So long as democracy continues, the government will periodically change hands; and every accretion to the power of the state must be accounted as a weapon of a future conservatism as well as of a present liberalism. It is not too much to anticipate that the fortunes of interventionism may duplicate the fortunes of free enterprise, and what began as a faith for liberals end up as a philosophy for conservatives.

Thus Nixon has been the single serious challenge to the political and cultural power of the liberal elites. Shrewder than Taft, or Goldwater, or Reagan, Nixon was careful not to be an "extremist." He came out of the very eye of the "vital center"; he hit Schlesinger where he lives. Some might call Nixon the embodiment of banality and conventionality, but they knew that for the first time since Andrew Jackson, a President had arisen who genuinely threatened both the economic and symbolic power of the Eastern elite. Schlesinger writes:

> . . . the White House plainly saw as the real Enemies . . . the

* Alexander M. Bickel, who has used the phrases "plebiscitary" and "Gaullist" for some time, means by them something slightly different from the meaning Schlesinger employs (see, for example, Mr. Bickel's article, "Watergate & the Legal Order," in last month's issue of COMMENTARY). But, in any case, the collapse of the *external* (political) checks on the Presidency in 1972-73 was not due so much, it appears, to Nixonian design as to the grand political failures of his opposition. The collapse of the *internal* checks was implicit in the resentment and lack of magnanimity in the Nixon men from the beginning, although some observers—Theodore White and John Osborne among them—thought for a time that Nixon was "growing with the job."

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Eastern "establishment" with its attendant politicians, lawyers, journalists, television commentators, professors, and preachers. Nixon had long perceived this crowd as a self-appointed elite who did not know or understand or represent the real America, who had opposed him all his life and who were now using their domination of the media of communications to destroy his Presidency.

The *old* Eastern establishment has, of course, lost its power to a new one, centered in Washington politics and in communications. Schlesinger himself described the shift in a remarkable passage in *The Bitter Heritage:*

> It has become recently fashionable to denounce the arrogance of the American Establishment. But one sometimes wonders whether the trouble with the American Establishment has been so much its arrogance as its cowardice—in other words, its fear of acting as an Establishment should. The point of an Establishment, I take it, is to provide support for the established values and institutions of society. This has been the triumph of the original Establishment in Great Britain. It is impossible to imagine a McCarthy terrorizing British public life: the Establishment would never permit it. But the so-called American Establishment crumbled up before McCarthy. . . . let us avoid the illusion that the American Establishment will be much braver the next time round. The nation will have to look to stouter and more principled figures if it is to contain another epidemic of political panic. One place to look, I think, will be in Washington itself.

Schlesinger in 1967 named our best hopes: Secretary MacNamara, Senator Fulbright, Senators Robert and Edward Kennedy, the Supreme Court, "public figures and the press," and "the increased size and weight of the academic community." Here, then, is Schlesinger's basic constituency. His own hidden agenda is to provide the ideological transition from the high culture of the old Northeast to the political activism of the recent Left—including, where necessary, a touch of the radical Left.

SCHLESINGER is fascinated by an exhortation from Walt Whitman's later writings. He cites this passage in no fewer than three of his books and uses it at the very conclusion of *The Imperial Presidency*. Whitman looks around at the cities crowded with new immigrants. He sees masses "with hearts of rags and souls of chalk." (How many of our grandparents milled in those crowds beneath his gaze?) He ponders "the shallowness and miserable selfism of these crowds of men, with all their minds so blank of high humanity and aspiration." And he raises "the terrible query . . . Is not Democracy of human rights humbug after all?" With Whitman's answer, Schlesinger closes his latest book:

> There is no week nor hour when tyranny may not enter upon this country, if the people lose their supreme confidence in themselves —and lose their roughness and spirit of defiance—Tyranny may always enter—there is no charm, no bar against it—the only bar against it is a large resolute breed of men.

The grand body of workingmen, mechanics, clerks, and operatives who live in their many diverse kinds of families and neighborhoods across this vast and beautiful land do not have hearts of rags and souls of chalk. They do not wait for some "resolute breed" from among "the best and brightest" to lead them to morality. Neither Nixon's men nor Schlesinger's men hold the key to the American future.

Still, the marching banners of the Eastern elite are already flapping in the wind: LEADERSHIP! MORALITY! Compared to Nixon's tattered leadership, those flags are bound to stir the heart. The hallways are abuzz with preparations for a mighty comeback. That, finally, is the agenda, not really hidden, of Schlesinger's useful book.

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

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Books in Review

History into Literature

A CROWN OF FEATHERS. By ISAAC BASHEVIS SINGER. *Farrar, Straus & Giroux. 342 pp. $8.95.*

A SHTETL AND OTHER YIDDISH NOVELLAS. Edited, with Introductions and Notes, by RUTH R. WISSE. *Behrman House. 364 pp. $12.50.*

Reviewed by JOHANNA KAPLAN

IN THE mind of the English-speaking reader, Isaac Bashevis Singer stands almost alone, the single representative of Yiddish writing; as a result of this uniqueness he has both benefited and suffered from the peculiarly awed and mystified response that might well be accorded a literary Martian. Although he has lived in this country since 1935, and many of the stories in his latest collection, *A Crown of Feathers,* take place in the U.S., it would be a genuine mistake either to compare him with American Jewish writers or to try to place him, however marginally, within their tradition. Reading the stories in this book that deal with familiar places in New York City, you think: he writes like a foreigner—and of course, he is one. It is not a mistake, though, nor does it in any way diminish the extraordinary range and vitality of his work, to connect him with that tradition to which he clearly belongs—Yiddish literature, or more accurately, Jewish writers writing in Yiddish. That this distinction, seemingly an academic one, is rarely raised as an issue, offers an important clue toward understanding the problem faced by Yiddish writers and, to some degree, their audience; that it has been raised at all is to the credit of Ruth R. Wisse, in her new book, *A Shtetl and Other Yiddish Novellas.* Mrs. Wisse, the author of *The Schlemiel as Modern Hero,* a critical study of modern Jewish fiction, has in the present volume anthologized five previously untranslated Yiddish novellas. She has also provided the reader with a thorough, thoughtful historical and critical overview in her introduction and notes.

The primary problem of Yiddish literature has generally been considered to be its inaccessibility: that is, so much of it has gone untranslated and hence unread. Although this is presently true—with Singer the notable exception—there was a time, Mrs. Wisse points out, that time in which the novellas in her anthology were written, just before World War I, when Yiddish was the language of large numbers of people, the language of "more Jews than had ever spoken a single Jewish language at any one time." It would seem, then, that Yiddish would have been the natural choice for any Jewish writer, offering as much possibility for expression and literary achievement as his talents would allow—as natural a choice, for example, as writing in Italian would be for an Italian writer. Of course, this was not ever so, partly because, as the early Zionists said, the Jews were a people with a history but no geography, but more significantly, because those writers who chose to write in Yiddish felt imbued with a special mission to their people, an extra-literary obligation the nature of which varied according to the writer and to the particular time in which he lived. Essentially they perceived their task to be an educational one: to awaken, to enlighten, to sweep away the self-imposed darkness of backwater *shtetl* life. Many Yiddish writers who began their careers in fury, writing harsh satires and undisguised harangues, ended as displaced, heartbroken romantics, even sentimentalists, not because of the mellowing toll of old age, but because that world which they, in love-hate, had excoriated and tried to shake up had been shaken into dissolution before their eyes—by economic crises, by pogroms, by emigration.

THE Yiddish writer's real subject has always been the struggles of the individual and of the community to come to terms with modern life. At first, these writers saw modernism itself as a solution, indeed an imperative. *"Tzebrech die Keytn!"*—Break the Chains!, the Bundists sang; only much later were the conflicts and losses such chain-breaking entailed called into question. In almost all of the novellas anthologized by Mrs. Wisse, the sense of constriction, of the bleakness of lives, is so intense and overwhelming that it is hard for characters to break out sufficiently to be differentiated. This does not make for vibrant, sturdy imaginative literature, and only insofar as these novellas succeed in transcending some of their authors' aims do they succeed as works of fiction. In I. M. Weissenberg's *A Shtetl,* what emerges as most memorable are the unusual, keenly lyrical descriptions of rural life, the countryside, weather, and nature; yet this novella is the most determinedly, even brutally, socialist "consciousness-raising" in the anthology. The characters exist as class or caste representatives and the ensuing conflict—inevitably—is class conflict. In Mendele Mocher Sforim's *Of Bygone Days,* an elegiac memoir written at the end of his career, the characters represent specific *shtetl* types and exist in order to present an exhaustive, definitive picture of the *shtetl* as it had once been and already no longer was. This is an atypical work for Mendele because of its descriptive softness, but in narrative style, pacing, and content it is in keeping with his belief that literature must instruct and explain.

David Bergelson's *At the Depot* is a very different sort of story. Though Bergelson also sets out to be programmatically "ideological," his work does not suffer from it. Bergelson's intensely personal vi-

JOHANNA KAPLAN's *articles and stories have appeared frequently in* COMMENTARY. *She is currently at work on a novel.*

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sion makes him appear to have more in common with Chekhov than with other Yiddish writers. A terrible melancholy yearning hangs over the story, the place (a stagnant provincial railroad depot), and the characters. Money-making and capitalistic greed are the evils, but even those who partake of them to apparent undeserving good fortune are no less victims of the frustration, lethargy, and thwarted undefinable desires that haunt all of Bergelson's world. His story "In a Backwoods Town" in the classic anthology, *A Treasury of Yiddish Stories,* by Irving Howe and Eliezer Greenberg, expresses a similar vision perhaps even more acutely, suggesting that Bergelson's was a rare, strong talent; what he might have been capable of had he not later turned to the production of "acceptable" Soviet literature—and been liquidated by Stalin—can only be conjectured at.

S. Ansky, best known for his play *The Dybbuk,* is here represented by the novella *Behind a Mask.* It directly confronts the clash between the young men of the Haskalah and their benighted, intolerant elders, but Ansky does not make a simplistic division between good guys and bad guys. He sees the tragedies and ambiguities on both sides; there are no winners. Stylistically this is an odd, imbalanced work; it takes too long to get moving, and, especially in the beginning, it too has problems with character differentiation. Still, its depressing oddness is part of its strength and its frightening, unexpected conclusion lends a weird, angry, and passionate quality to the whole work.

David Opatashu's *Romance of a Horse Thief* is in subject matter and style reminiscent of part of Isaac Babel. In some ways, it is the most attractive story in this anthology. The prose is strong, spirited, and lively like the characters, and though this novella succeeds in pointing out the corrosive power of class inequality as it existed in the *shtetl* and the limitations and hardships of *shtetl* life in general, it does not suffer from a sense of constriction and it is never boring. It is, however, open to the same charge that can be made against this particular strain in Babel's

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work: that he succeeds in making Jewish characters appealing by portraying the ones whose lives are most "un-Jewish"—atypical, exotic Jews, Jews of the underworld.

JEWS AS figures of exotica bring us back to Isaac Bashevis Singer, or rather to the way in which his work is most commonly read and often most highly regarded. His Jewish underworld is not the subculture of thieves, but the underworld of ghosts and demons, and those readers and critics who may find real-life, familiar flesh-and-blood East European Jews embarrassing, distasteful, or parochially devoid of imaginative possibility can feel the same relieving, therapeutic enthusiasm in mystical, esoteric Jewish ghosts as they can in tough *macho* Jewish gangsters.

Singer's work has never given any reason to suggest that he himself is uncomfortable with or embarrassed by Jewish smells or Jewish appearances: in fact, the extraordinary variety of precisely and vibrantly described Jewish physical types remains, in his work, more haunting and powerful than those ghosts he sometimes seems rather summarily to summon. Even more than other Yiddish writers before him, Singer has had to grapple with the problems of traditional Jewish values as they come into conflict with the modern world, and his creation of, his seeming dependence on, an underworld of demons, a belief rooted in the terror-ridden superstitions of East European Jewish life (described in Mendele's *Of Bygone Days*), appear to be more an expression of this dilemma than a resolution of it. When it works—when it serves an organic function in the story, in the creation and expression of the characters' lives—it works brilliantly. Notable examples are the novella *Satan in Goray*, the short story "A Black Wedding" in the collection *The Spinoza of Market Street*, and "A Crown of Feathers," the title story in this latest collection. But as Singer tells us in the Author's Note to this collection, describing the people he is writing about: "They lived in the midst of almost all the social movements of our time. Their illusions were the illusions of mankind." He is at his best, then, in those of his works, primarily his novels, where the characters and ideas that whirled around them are explored and developed. Those books are stunning, brilliant creations, and with them in mind, no claims made for him are too large. In this collection of twenty-four stories, "A Crown of Feathers," "The Magazine," and "On the Wagon" seem the most successful; almost all the others, though they have elements of vitality, interest, and appeal, somehow have the quality of drop-cookies—a flick off the spoon and they're gone.

In thinking about the novellas in Ruth Wisse's anthology and Singer's work as a whole, it is hard not to come to the conclusion that the real, perhaps subterranean protagonist in all Yiddish literature is Jewish history itself. If history for James Joyce was the nightmare from which he could not escape, Jewish history can too often seem like a horror movie—but in this one it makes no difference where you come in.

Abolitionism

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. By MICHAEL MELTSNER. *Random House. 338 pp. $8.95.*

Reviewed by JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR.

WE ARE a litigious people, and we relish legal argument. We have, moreover, a Constitution which, as construed by the Supreme Court, may compel or prohibit political decisions which in other countries are entirely in the hands of politicians. In the blunt words of Charles Evans Hughes, "We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is." Thus, the country swarms with lawyers; new law schools appear like mushrooms after rain, turning still more lawyers loose upon the citizenry; and the profession is full of ferment and argument, both decorous and raucous, about its proper role in the national polity.

JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR. *is Richard Ely Professor of Law at Yale University Law School.*

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
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Traditionally, of course, that role has been to represent clients, to go as far as the Canons of Ethics permit (and sometimes a little farther) to make the law fit the interests of those clients—whether by persuading a jury that the client was somewhere else when the bank was robbed, or by persuading the Internal Revenue Service or the courts that an intricate corporate maneuver produced no taxable gain. Clients who could offer great offices or great fees got the Francis Bacons and Daniel Websters, and the poor and powerless got whom they could, which was frequently nobody. Hence the ancient cry of revolutionaries, "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers." (Sometimes, of course, the lawyers *are* the revolutionaries and set about killing everybody else. Robespierre, Barère, and Danton were lawyers—to say nothing of Hans Frank and Fidel Castro. In fairness it should be noted that when medical men turn politician, the results may be quite as cataclysmic—e.g., Marat, "Papa Doc" Duvalier, and Salvador Allende.)

Not many contemporary American lawyers, especially the younger ones, are content to see themselves simply as mouthpieces of the highest bidders. Something more, they agree, is required of those with legal skill. Hardly any member of the bar quarreled with the Supreme Court's decision that a poor man faced with imprisonment (or, *a fortiori*, death) must be furnished defense counsel. Almost as few oppose the growing efforts to see that the poor and near-poor get legal advice and representation in their civil problems—divorce, consumer fraud, landlord and tenant, and all the rest. But the argument grows hot when it comes to the right and duty of lawyers, as lawyers, to push their own ideologies in court, to cause or resist changes in the law simply because *they* think them good or bad—sometimes without giving undue weight to the best interests or the desires of the client whose predicament gives the lawyer access to the courts in the first place. Should a lawyer insist that a statute he dislikes is unconstitutional, when he has a better chance of selling the court a construction of that statute which will solve his client's problem? Should he do so when by ordinary criteria the statute is probably constitutional, but he thinks he can find judges who share his ideology and will twist the Constitution a bit to achieve a result which he and they (but not most other people, or most other lawyers) think just? In short, do the political rights and duties of the gentlemen of the long robe go beyond the privilege of all of us to vote, to try to persuade other citizens to vote the same way, and possibly to run for office?

Cruel and Unusual: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, presents the problem in particularly clearcut form, although it never really focuses on it. Professor Meltsner's book is a scholarly, honest, accurate, readable account of the long effort of a group of dedicated and highly competent lawyers, motivated by earnest moral conviction and what Professor Meltsner frankly calls "professional pride," headed by Professor Anthony Amsterdam, to persuade the Supreme Court that capital punishment is "cruel and unusual" and therefore in violation of the Eighth Amendment. That effort achieved a large measure of success in *Furman* v. *Georgia*, decided by the Supreme Court in 1972, but not enough to satisfy Professors Amsterdam and Meltsner and their fellow abolitionists. Only two of the Justices, Brennan and Marshall, were willing to hold it cruel and unusual in *all* circumstances. Three (Douglas, Stewart, and White) thought it unconstitutional as practiced, because in fact juries and judges imposed the death penalty infrequently, unpredictably, and capriciously, and inflicted it much oftener upon blacks than whites. This was, in my view, a valid ground for holding death sentences unconstitutional in the cases before the Court. Four Justices (Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist) dissented. Thus, the possibility remains that execution will be held constitutional if it is made mandatory for certain offenses, or if legislatures can devise rational and predictable standards for selecting those murderers who are to be permanently eliminated from society. The object of Pro-

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fessors Meltsner, Amsterdam, *et al.* is now to exclude that possibility by persuading the Court to hold that even a mandatory death sentence inflicted without discrimination upon everyone who commits a particular offense, or one which is based upon a rational distinction between one felon and another, is "cruel and unusual," no matter what the people and their elected representatives may think about the matter.

GRANTED the sincerity and even the possible rightness of their belief that capital punishment is immoral, is this a proper objective for very gifted, learned, and ethical lawyers? Certainly they will be asking the Court to read into the Eighth Amendment a meaning which those who drafted and enacted it never contemplated. No historian or lawyer can assert that the men of 1791 thought it cruel, much less unusual, to hang a criminal for murder, rape, treason, or half a dozen other offenses. Hangings occurred frequently, with the hearty approval of the community and most of its leaders, and not rarely with the agreement of the convict himself. (Perhaps it could be argued that the death penalty is crueler in an age of disbelief than it was when many murderers went to the gallows fortified by huge doses of spiritual consolation administered by the clergy and fully convinced, as their last speeches attested, that repentance and expiation would shortly transport them into realms of bliss and even entitle them to special welcome and status when they got there.) What the framers intended to outlaw was torture, long employed in the countries which followed the Roman law, but never accepted by the common law, and punishments which, while within the letter of the law, were harsher than its spirit allowed. The origin of that provision of the English Bill of Rights of 1689 which is the direct ancestor of the Eighth Amendment lay in the case of Titus Oates. Oates, the inventor of the Popish Plot and an extraordinarily wicked man even by the standards of the present century, had by false swearing sent many innocent Catholics to bloody

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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death. When the Catholic James II came to the throne, Oates was convicted of perjury—but perjury was at that time only a misdemeanor, for which death was not authorized. Since the judges could not hang him, they sentenced him to be whipped from Aldgate to Newgate and then from Newgate to Tyburn—a total estimated at more than three thousand lashes. The sentence was intended to kill him and would have killed any other man. I cannot do better than quote Macaulay:

> Murder by false testimony is . . . the most aggravated species of murder; and Oates had been guilty of many such murders. Nevertheless the punishment which was inflicted upon him cannot be justified. . . . [The judges] were undoubtedly competent to inflict whipping; nor had the law assigned a limit to the number of stripes. But the spirit of the law clearly was that no misdemeanor should be punished more severely than the most atrocious felonies. The worst felon could only be hanged. The judges, as they believed, sentenced Oates to be scourged to death. That the law was defective is not a sufficient excuse: for defective laws should be altered by the legislature, and not strained by the tribunals; and least of all should the law be strained for the purpose of inflicting torture and destroying life. . . . Happily the progress of this great evil was speedily stopped by the Revolution, and by that article of the Bill of Rights which condemns all cruel and unusual punishments.

It is therefore clear that there is no historical basis for a contention that the draftsmen of the Constitution intended to abolish capital punishment. This ended the argument for Justice Black, as many years before it had ended it for Justice Holmes. But most lawyers do not share Justice Black's belief that the precise intent of the draftsmen is always conclusive. Changing public attitudes may give to broad words a content different from that which they had when they were originally put in the Constitution. Few people still contend that *Brown* v. *Board of Education* was wrongly decided because the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not mean to end racial segregation in the schools: by 1954 most Americans outside the Deep South (and many even in those states) unquestionably believed that segregation by law denied "the equal protection of the laws." The men of 1689 and 1791 might have agreed that if in 1972 flogging or branding had become cruel and unusual, as ordinary men understood those words, they were barred by the Bill of Rights. But this argument is not available to those who want to abolish the death penalty, for their battle has been fought and lost in many legislatures, whose members' opinions fairly reflected those of their constituents. In 1972 capital punishment was permitted by the laws of the United States, the District of Columbia, and forty-one states, including some that had abolished and then restored it. Its opponents, as Professor Meltsner very honestly concedes, took to the courts because they could not persuade the voters. Only Justice Marshall (one of the two who thought the death penalty was cruel and unusual in all circumstances) attempted to deal with this objection, and he did it (as well as it could be done) by saying that public opinion was not what the people themselves thought, but what enlightened persons, such as Justices of the Supreme Court, thought: "The question with which we must deal is not whether a substantial proportion of American citizens would today, if polled, opine that capital punishment is barbarously cruel, but whether they would find it to be so in the light of all information presently available."

It may be that death sentences are always cruel and that they are never effective in preventing crime. The proposition seems less clear to me than it does to Justice Marshall and Professor Meltsner. I am inclined to think that death may be in some cases a better method than imprisonment for disposing of terrorists (a class of murderers not mentioned in *Cruel and Unusual*), who will kill again if they get the chance and whose presence in prison is simply an invitation to their friends to hijack airplanes and kidnap hostages to extort their release. In their case, "Stone dead

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hath no fellow." But even if the abolitionists are right in all their arguments, I have grave reservations about the proposition that in a constitutional democracy the law *is* what a self-elected elite, however humane and wise, thinks it *ought* to be. Carried to its logical conclusion, this would mean that any time five teetotalling lawyers land on the Supreme Court, Prohibition can be reinflicted on us. (Fortunately, the number of lawyers who hate alcohol is too small to make such an event statistically probable.)

It may also be that a lawyer has a right and even a duty to urge in a client's behalf arguments which he knows to be unsound but which he believes may find a sympathetic ear on the bench. But when one of their death-row clients decided that he preferred death to life imprisonment and sought to withdraw his appeal, the reaction of the abolitionist lawyers was an attempt to persuade the court that "he was suffering from serious mental illness and therefore incapable of exercising normal judgment as to what was in his best interest." In fact, the quoted extracts from a very literate article in which the client explained his position do not sound in the least insane. In this case at least, it seems pretty clear that the lawyers were more concerned with the furtherance of their own cause than with that of their ostensible client.

Thus I come, somewhat to my own surprise, to the conclusion that the role played by even the most addlepated members of the radical bar* is less questionable than the role played by Professor Meltsner, *et al.*, in the abolition of capital punishment. The radicals—William Kunstler is probably the best-known specimen of the breed—add very little to the dignity of the profession. One may question the competence of many of them. (Kunstler recently achieved what he probably regarded as a triumph for the Movement in the case of Karleton Armstrong, who bombed the Army Research Center in Madison, Wisconsin, killing a graduate student who was working in the

* See, for example, *The People's Lawyers*, by Marlise James, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 338 pp., $8.95.

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building. Kunstler persuaded the judge to listen to several days of anti-war propaganda, which was faithfully reported by the New York *Times* and presumably other newspapers. But what he achieved for his client was a sentence of 23 years in the state penitentiary.) No doubt they sometimes secure the acquittal of people who belong in jail. That, however, is the not excessive price we pay for due process of law. There is not much danger that they will ever persuade the courts to accept the most pernicious of their doctrines, that "political" murder, kidnapping, arson, or bank robbery is innocent and commendable. At their worst, the American legal system can stand them, as a healthy man can stand a case of acne. At their best, they furnish, at least with great zeal, legal services which poor and unpopular people want and to which they are entitled. But what the learned and highminded opponents of capital punishment are trying to do is to introduce into the democratic process of law reform an elitist doctrine which seems to me quite inconsistent with democracy and which might be used, given an elitist majority of the Supreme Court (a supposition which is unfortunately far from inconceivable), to bring about changes much less desirable than the abolition of the death penalty.

The Past Refinished

PENTIMENTO: A BOOK OF PORTRAITS. By LILLIAN HELLMAN. *Little, Brown. 297 pp. $7.95.*

Reviewed by EDWARD GROSSMAN

LILLIAN HELLMAN'S second volume of autobiographical pieces has its ups and downs, but on the whole it is really bad—there's no getting around that. The interesting part is why one wants to try.

From the beginning, instead of being slight and charming, the writing is irritating, for several reasons, one of them a strange portentousness that is so heavy at times that it almost passes for pretentiousness. Take the title, *Pentimento*. It is an Oxford Unabridged word that signifies the phenomenon of a previous image coming through a second layer of paint on an old canvas, revealing (as Hellman suggests up front) that the artist had "repented" of his first idea and redone it. The point is that the "portraits" that make up the book are supposed to be assessments of dead people in the writer's life compared with what she remembers of her ideas and emotions about them when they were alive and she was younger. Among these people are a pair of colorful relatives remembered from childhood, a childhood friend who followed her political star to Europe and was assassinated by the Nazis, some famous theatrical and political heavyweights of several eras ago, and a crazy corporation lawyer who was Hellman's suitor in middle age.

THIS sounds as if it were more of the same sort of thing that Hellman did in her first, very popular autobiographical book, *An Unfinished Woman,* where portions of old diary entries are interspersed with durable stories and reminiscence to make an impressionistic revelation. But the announced intention in *Pentimento* is not carried out with any consistency; instead there are stories and character sketches strung out along no special scheme. Possibly the real intention was to fill in some of the gaps of *An Unfinished Woman;* however, the effect is to emphasize the virtues of the first book by invidious comparison, and draw belated attention to its vices, for what is irritating in *Pentimento* was already discernible through the virtues of *An Unfinished Woman.* Both books—the earlier not hopelessly—labor under the requirements of adhering to a code that might once have been fine, but has since become archaic with age,

EDWARD GROSSMAN *is a frequent contributor to* COMMENTARY, Harper's, Atlantic, *and* Saturday Review/World. *He is currently at work on a book about the Yom Kippur War.*

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abuse, and custom, but which forever insists on being expressed first and last in language.

In the new book, Hellman is recalling a talk she had as a teenager with one of her aunts in New Orleans:

> "Don't worry," Jenny said as she rose, "about me, worry about yourself and why you like very thin people who have money."
>
> I asked her what she meant, and she said that someday she would tell me if I didn't find out for myself. (I did find out, and when I told her she laughed and said I was thirty years old, but better late than never.)

Pentimento is loaded with mysterious, truncated exchanges like this. Obviously they are meant to convey something very important —maybe even something sadly ominous. Yet on the face of it there is absolutely nothing significant, for instance, about very thin rich people, one way or the other, or about liking or disliking them, and if there is something hidden, Hellman never gets around to explaining what it might be her aunt knew and she grew up sufficiently to comprehend. This is baffling at best, because the book has no lack of characters who move in and out of it who are rich. It is made more than baffling—positively irritating —by the manner in which it is mostly delivered:

> I said I wouldn't and he said he thought I should and I asked him why and he said I was hiding things and he didn't like me when I did that. After we had batted that around for a long time, he said. . . .

The style that bases itself on a series of *and's* and relies on a low monotone of declarative sentences to convey meanings by indirection harks back to a time when Hemingway and Hammett, among others, made it seem fresh, new, and appropriate, cumulatively full of force. It was supposed to be manly, insure against nonsense and sentimental fakery. In fact it did not, of course, not only in Hemingway's imitators but in Hemingway himself and his work, as Hellman herself recalled with some vividness in several memoirs about the 30's in *An Unfinished Woman*. To write according to the tough code was all too easy and self-limiting. More and more the complicated things plain prose was supposed to suggest were simply not there. Eventually it would take a near-miracle of throwback reminiscence (Hemingway's *A Moveable Feast*) just to make this prose style readable again—and *Pentimento,* though it is assuredly too much to demand, is no miracle. Spreading out and aging, the prose and the code became dangerously mannered, and the mannerisms were contagious, and hard to shake off. Sometimes they hung on for a lifetime. In *Pentimento* Hellman uses a certain odd verbal construction habitually: "I thought, I think now, that it is a funny play. . . ." In another place: "I could now, I did a few years ago, walk to that restaurant." Dashiell Hammett used the same construction almost fifty years ago in a private-eye story: "His mother had, and has, highly developed. . . ."

The style invades speech, and this is where it is deadliest. The essential charm of *An Unfinished Woman* was that one could hear the stories in it spoken in a throaty voice by a woman taking relish telling stories on herself on the patio of a summer house to an appreciative audience in the know, composed of more than one generation, who might have heard some of the stories more than once already. Some of the stories were very good, rising to the level of the higher gossip, an enjoyable and useful form, and even the ones that were not so good were redeemed in part by the fact that they were about famous people, or divulged glimpses of the semi-genteel New Orleans world of wills and syphilis that was transmuted in the hostess's famous plays. Possibly Hellman used up the cream of her stories in the first book. But possibly it is just the code coming on stronger than ever, tender and regretful, allusive to less than it seems, more sentimental than elegant, parading its classiness. One does show emotion now, on cue, so that the dialogue and action quoted from life are impossible to hear coming out of anything but an actor's mouth, to see accomplished by anything but an actor's limbs on stage, in a

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

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play written by a playwright with a tin ear:

> She said, "No, you don't understand. People are either teachers or students. You are a student."
>
> "Am I a good one?"
>
> "When you find what you want, you will be very good."
>
> I reached out and touched her hand. "I love you, Julia." She stared at me and took my hand to her face.

WHY is it that in spite of this, one's main urge, the one that wins barely, is not to attack the book or leave off reading it, but to try and separate two inseparable things? The generally egregious *style* aside, much of the *content* has its own vulnerable interest—again, as higher gossip. Hellman can sketch in famous figures, half mythic by now, with a few strokes of expressive language. Tallulah Bankhead:

> . . . in the first months of the play, [she] gave a fine performance, had a well-deserved triumph. It was sad to watch it all decline into high-jinks on the stage and in life. Long before her death, beginning with my play, I think, she threw the talent around to amuse the campy boys who came each opening night to watch her vindicate their view of women.

Samuel Goldwyn:

> He was, as were many of the bright, rough, tough lot that first saw the potential of the motion picture camera, a man of great power. Often the power would rise to an inexplicable pitch of panic anger when he was crossed or disappointed, and could then decline within minutes to the whispered, pained moral talk of a loony clergyman whimpering that God had betrayed him.

FDR:

> The bold, handsome head had so much intelligence and confidence that the wheelchair in which he sat seemed not a handicap but an interesting way to move about.

There is a clue here as to why one wants to find a way around the book's impassable flaws, and why college students generations removed from Hellman like to take her "creative writing" courses. She was a witness to distant yet not absurdly ancient political and artistic history, and she has survived to tell about it in person and through personalities, which is always the easiest way to take your history. For younger people her brave memories of Spain in the Civil War, Russia in the Second World War, provide an unexamined sense of continuity to present-day concerns. Having been a rebellious, anguished teen-ager helps. Being blacklisted during the years of Senator Joseph McCarthy adds a special cachet. The long, loving liaison with Hammett in Hollywood and New York is timelessly romantic, even for contemporary girls liberated from any need of glamor. And the stories, which are what it keeps coming back to, are not boring; a number in *Pentimento* are well worth telling better than they are told. If Hellman sometimes lapses into regret, she never preaches, never compares the present to its disadvantage with the past. Consequently she may be allowed a liberty she knows most people her age ought to forgo:

> This puzzled my aunts, who like all sensitive older people were convinced that youth had no interest in what it sprang from and so were careful not to bore the young with their own fancies or regrets. (I am now at the same age myself and the interest of students in my past has bewildered me and taken me too long to understand.)

This quality and this ability are rare enough so that when they show themselves, even imperfectly, they tend to be praised out of all proportion, taken for wisdom. In looking at what they produce on paper, however, there should be no overriding reason to fuzz the focus kindly.

Life and Death

STAY OF EXECUTION: A SORT OF MEMOIR. By STEWART ALSOP. *Lippincott. 306 pp. $8.95.*

Reviewed by JANE LARKIN CRAIN

STEWART ALSOP is the author of a number of books on contemporary American politics and has

JANE LARKIN CRAIN *contributed "TV Vérité" to our December 1973 issue.*

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been a columnist for *Newsweek* since 1968. His highly successful career in journalism dates back to 1946, when, in collaboration with his brother, Joseph Alsop, he began writing political columns for the now defunct New York *Herald-Tribune* syndicate. In July 1971, after returning from a three-week vacation at his country home in Maryland, Alsop was diagnosed as having an incurable, almost inevitably fatal, form of leukemia. His latest book, *Stay of Execution*, is primarily a chronicle of the strange course his medical history has taken since the time of the original diagnosis. It is also the occasion for autobiographical reflection on many other matters as well; he describes the book as being essentially a description of an "attempt to come to terms with death," and this has seemed to prompt an accounting of what has been accomplished so far in the way of his coming to terms with life.

Well-born, well-bred, well-connected, Alsop is a man whose experiences have a kind of novelistic quality about them—his is a world outfitted with country weekends spent in the company of the rich, the powerful, the aristocratic; his war experiences included being summoned from rifle practice to have tea with his mother's cousin, Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt; a detailed account of his medical situation was carried, in memorandum form, by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to leukemia specialists in Russia, on one of the Secretary's follow-up visits to the Nixon-Brezhnev talks. Himself the father of six children, Alsop is a man with a highly civilized sense of tradition and family. Admittedly uncomfortable with demonstrations and professions of his most intimate feelings, he nonetheless devotes a great part of *Stay of Execution* to fond, proud anecdotes of his ancestors, his mother, father, brothers, sister, and, most movingly, his wife and children.

As they emerge in this book, the characterizing qualities of Mr. Alsop's life are prosperity, success, order, security. Against this background, his disease intrudes in a particularly ugly and insidious way —a cancer moving in on, under-

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mining, and eventually coming to dominate what was once a charmed and privileged way of life. Alsop's doctors have now changed the diagnosis from acute myeloblastic leukemia, a blood cancer for which the treatment of chemotherapy sounds, at least to the layman, almost as deadly as the disease itself, to a "milder" form, smoldering or subacute leukemia. He was told originally that he had perhaps two years at most to live; now no one can predict how much time he has left. Hence, perhaps somewhat ironically, the title of the book. As he implies, the "normal" life his doctors tell him he can now lead—permeated with frequent and gruesome tests, blood transfusions, chills, exhaustion, the constant threat of infections that might prove fatal—bears little resemblance to that life he had more or less tacitly valued.

As Alsop describes the "progress" of his disease over the past few years, one comes to think of his blood and bone marrow as a kind of battleground, with forces of good and evil engaged in a violent struggle for control. This is an image suggested by the author himself, who, despite his fluent command of the private and esoteric language of medicine, seems much more at home with the universal language of metaphor. The passages about medical matters in *Stay of Execution* are really the most compelling; they resemble detective stories or thrillers, and one keeps hoping that the hero will at some climactic moment rush forward and vanquish the villain once and for all. There was, for example, a time when it did look as if Mr. Alsop's blood cells had returned, for reasons no one could fathom, to normal; the reader shares his own sense of euphoria and suspense here, and also the subsequent, sharp disappointment when the percentage of "abnormal" cells begins again, inexorably, to rise.

If there is a kind of "hero" in *Stay of Execution* (besides its author) it is modern medicine itself, embodied not only in Alsop's doctor, but also in the seemingly magical technology now at the disposal of medical science. Alsop has received all his treatment at the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, Maryland. Although at one point the callousness of a particular physician prompts some truculent observations about "the place [being], after all, a government bureaucracy, and not at all immune to Parkinson's law and the other abuses to which all bureaucracies are heir," Alsop would probably also be willing to admit that NIH is more properly cited as representative of one of the few triumphs of modern American society about which no one would wish to cavil. His descriptions of the brilliant, almost miraculous, research and treatment going on at NIH (whose services, by the way, are dispensed free of charge) provide the most heartening news in the book.

Alsop notes in his Preface that *Stay of Execution* is narrated by a number of different persons —a man first told that he has incurable cancer, a man released from NIH feeling "pretty rotten" but still able to work, a man almost "sick to death," a man who for a brief period thought he had had a complete remission, and the man he is presently, suffering from an uncharted form of leukemia whose next move no one can anticipate.

It is probably the cruel and inevitably obsessing unpredictability of his present situation, coupled, of course, with his actual physical debility, that accounts for the strain of disillusion and depression that eventually comes to haunt *Stay of Execution,* and that contributes to the presence in it of some distastefully casual commentary on the condition of society as a whole. At times Alsop seems almost to be forcing himself to adopt a welcoming attitude toward death, citing as justification for this personal posture the shattering revelations of the Watergate imbroglio, the disappearance from power of the "Wasp establishment," and with it the loss of all grace, style, and taste, the ascendance of "sleaziness, small-mindedness," and vulgarity. Tolling the death knell on "American greatness" has become a favorite national pastime, but we are entitled to expect, to require, a greater degree of thoughtfulness from Alsop, who does, after all, still have the responsibility inherent in his own eminence to speak the truth (if he speaks at all) on matters of public moment, despite whatever tendency to morbidity his sickness has induced.

Beyond these occasional lapses into maudlin, and unconvincing, postures of disenchantment, there lies a more serious problem. Alsop seems to have set himself a task in the writing of this book which he himself regards as alien to the essential inclinations of both his talent and his sensibility. He remarks that his brother, Joseph Alsop, had cautioned him to make the book an *"important"* one, but confesses that even the fear of his own imminent death has produced no profound revelations on the subject, going so far as to say that since he became ill he has "discovered nothing very important to say" about anything. He is not given to ruminations on philosophical abstractions, nor is he at home with public or even private soul-searching, and yet the avowed purpose of *Stay of Execution* is to seize the opportunity to do both.

Toward the very end of the book, Alsop is ready to say simply that "A dying man needs to die, as a sleepy man needs to sleep, and there comes a time when it is wrong, as well as useless, to resist." Nothing, however, in what he has revealed of that fine rush of endeavor and accomplishment that has characterized his experience of life prepares us to accept this; the words seem, rather, those of a desperately ill, battered, and beleaguered man, who conceives of himself as being "terribly dependent, like a vampire, on the blood of others," confronting a prospect that simply cannot be effectively rationalized: progressive depletion, old age, and death by slow stages. The fear of dying has presented itself to Stewart Alsop in the form of a monstrous coercion, depriving him of the liberty to do as he likes and as he does best. No one, needless to say, would begrudge him whatever modes of assuagement he can devise. But his readers, admirers, and even mere sympathizers, may be permitted that response of terror and loathing that it is perhaps safer for him not to experience. The life rendered in *Stay*

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of Execution is a remarkably full and valuable one; for this reason, reading Alsop's account can in itself provide the impulse to dramatic affirmation, and one can only hope that some equally substantial consolation was accomplished in the writing of it.

Blacklist

A JOURNAL OF THE PLAGUE YEARS. By STEFAN KANFER. *Atheneum. 306 pp. $7.95.*

Reviewed by PAUL WARSHOW

IN 1947, with World War II over and the cold war begun, the House Committee on Un-American Activities began investigations into what a former member, the anti-Semitic John Rankin, had called "one of the most dangerous plots ever instigated for the overthrow of the government" in "the greatest hotbed of subversive activities in the United States." The Committee's investigation into Hollywood still stands, a generation later, as perhaps the supreme paradigm—at once comical and terrifying—of American Yahooism and right-wing hysteria.

Among those witnesses to appear before the Committee, there were few liberals and no anti-Stalinist radicals (a breed which, hard enough to find anywhere during this period, seems to have been virtually extinct in Hollywood). Except for a couple of producers, like Jack Warner and Louis B. Mayer, the witnesses fell primarily into two groups. On the one hand were the long-time avowed right-wingers (Robert Taylor, Adolph Menjou, Ronald Reagan, the directors Sam Wood and Leo McCarey, etc.), all leaders or members of organizations designed to drive Communism out of Hollywood. On the other hand were the Communists and fellow-travelers, ex-Communists and former fellow-travelers. And this second group was divided into what became two warring camps: the "friendly" witnesses and the "unfriendly" ones. The friendly witnesses (who included Elia Kazan, Clifford Odets, and Lee J. Cobb) cooperated with the Committee. They answered the Committee's questions. They admitted and discussed their past membership in the Communist party or their connections with Communist front organizations, and they gave the names of fellow party-members or of others connected with those organizations. There is no way to measure the amount of personal damage done by these witnesses (in many instances they gave names already known to the Committee), but they undoubtedly helped destroy or arrest many careers and hurt many lives.

The unfriendly witnesses refused to cooperate. Several from the original Nineteen finally did not have to appear, but those who did, known as the Hollywood Ten (they included the screenwriters Albert Maltz, Dalton Trumbo, Ring Lardner, Jr., and John Howard Lawson), took the First Amendment, would not discuss their own or anyone else's histories, and disputed the Committee's right to question them. They were cited for contempt, fined, and sentenced to one year in jail (two of them received six-month sentences). As Albert Maltz has recently stated, the Ten took the stand they did in order to bring the question of the Committee's constitutionality before the Supreme Court and because they expected to win the case and abolish the Committee. Had they expected to lose and go to jail, says Maltz, they would never have adopted those tactics. (In fact the Supreme Court declined to review the case after the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the Ten's convictions.)

The studios were already in trouble from declining postwar attendance and rising costs. Now they were under siege from the Committee, a virulent right-wing press, anti-Communist organizations within Hollywood, and aroused sections of the public. A movement by Hollywood liberals publicly to combat the Red hunt was abortive. Within a month the studio heads capitulated: they an-

PAUL WARSHOW *is a young film critic who lives in San Francisco.*


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Jacques Lipchitz was the last survivor of the grand avant-garde of modern art, the last link with the heroic cubist period of the School of Paris. A friend of Picasso, Braque, Modigliani, and Le Corbusier, his death in May of this year at the age of 82 brought to a close the era in which they effectively revised the twentieth-century image.

Yet if Jacques Lipchitz was one of the first to apply the principles of cubist form to sculpture—and if, as he said of himself, he was "always a cubist"—it is in another sense that he finally commanded international attention. Cubism had always been an art of heroic form rather than of heroic themes. Lipchitz, turning his attention to the grand subjects of mythology and the Bible, forged a style that could accommodate such material. In some ways he ceased to be a modern artist. Working within an emotional climate that recalled the great efforts of Michelangelo and Rodin, he created monumental works that transcended our own time. In so doing he set aside his youthful experiments in favor of an art that would be capable of sustaining his own mature passion and eloquence.

The central figure of Jacques Lipchitz' mythology was Prometheus—who stole fire from the gods and brought it to mankind. Zeus punished Prometheus by chaining him to Mt. Caucasus, where a vulture fed upon his liver until Heracles—with the consent of Zeus—interceded and set him free. For Lipchitz, Prometheus symbolized the triumph of light over darkness, of education over ignorance, of the effective struggle for liberation in the face of arbitrary punishment and hardship. His interest in the figure apparently traces to 1931; but, with the Hitlerian threat of 1933, Prometheus took on new significance for him. By 1936, the Prometheus he created for the Paris World's Fair was not only chainless but had triumphed over the vulture.

It is this triumphant vision of Prometheus—with the Menorah held high—that Lipchitz chose in his last year to express Israel's determined battle for survival and freedom.

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Commentary

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a sterling silver salver issued in commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the State of Israel

THE STRUGGLE was created by Jacques Lipchitz especially for the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the State of Israel. The Israel Museum, which commissioned the work, houses an incomparable collection of the sculptor's maquettes. Jacques Lipchitz, aged 82 when a Museum representative proposed the project to him in June 1972, promptly offered the original art and his royalties to the Museum.

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nounced they would fire the Ten (among whom were some of their most cherished writers) without compensation and would hire no more Communists. The unfriendly witnesses and those with similar reputations were blacklisted until the early 60's. Some began selling their work on the black market, under pseudonyms, for a fraction of their previous fees. Some found work abroad, mainly in England—there too usually working pseudonymously. Some actors managed to find work on the stage in New York. Many simply remained out of work, and many never returned to their previous professions even after the blacklist had dissolved. But the blacklist grew until it affected everyone whose name had been given a bad aura in the hearings and in the press: it extended beyond the unfriendly witnesses to include not only former Communists but liberals and civil libertarians who had criticized the Committee or the blacklist, and others. In at least two cases a man was blacklisted solely because, like Cinna the Poet in *Julius Caesar,* he was mistaken for someone with the same name.

So innocent people were harmed? To speak of the guilty and the innocent here is an impertinence. Not one of these persons deserved one bit of what was done to him—and that includes the friendly witnesses who abased themselves and were cut off from their former friends and associates. Despite their stupidities and excesses, the Committee's investigations into government had some measure of reason behind them and some justification as a help to national security, and they probably did the country some good along with the harm they did. The Committee's investigations into Hollywood had no such justification and did nothing but great harm. The charge that screenwriters were poisoning the American people with Communist propaganda was a joke—unless one accepted the criterion (as indeed did many Hollywood right-wingers and members of the Committee) that it was Communist propaganda to show anything unfavorable about American life. Otherwise, those making the charge could come up with nothing more than three or four pro-Russian movies (e.g., *Mission to Moscow, Song of Russia),* made, in some cases with the President's encouragement, when the Russians were our allies, and four or five lines of dialogue whose possible pink connotation was ludicrously nullified by their context.

That the public needed to be protected from the work of certain actors was an even bigger joke (though no story emerging from this period is more wonderful than the one about Lionel Stander whistling the "Internationale" in a scene where he has to wait for an elevator). Yes, some of these people —both knowingly and unknowingly —had helped or were helping to bring money into the Communist party. But it was a hysterical leap from this fact to the conclusion that a suspected or proven Communist must be deprived of work because paying him a salary was paying for a conspiracy to overthrow the government.

This is not to say that Communism did not affect Hollywood films in this period. Of course it did. One of the most powerful political and intellectual currents in this country, particularly among writers and artists, it could not have failed to. But although the Communist party line at any given moment may have been a model of simplicity, the effect of Communism on Hollywood films—when combined and diluted by other forces, especially the main consideration that goes into the production of Hollywood films (the desire to entertain and win a large audience)—was subtle and complex. (In this it was analogous to the effect of Communism on American life in general.) Only a mentality which saw thought and culture in simplistic partisan terms, and as phenomena to be controlled and legislated, could see this effect as a matter of simple propaganda. And the effect of Communism on films, like the impulses which gave birth to Communism, was both good and bad: it brought both truth and lies. Nor were the lies emanating from Stalinism necessarily more pernicious than the more traditional Hollywood lies, nor were they necessarily incompatible with them. On the contrary: in many cases they were virtually indistinguishable from them.

IN HIS chronicle of the blacklist, *A Journal of the Plague Years,* Stefan Kanfer—an associate editor and former film critic for *Time* magazine—covers extensively the part of the story related to the hearings. He brings in an abundance of material, some from obscure published sources and some, based on interviews, which has never appeared in print before. And simply to remind people of what happened is useful. We seem, in fact, to be in the midst of a public recollection of these events: witness not only this book, but also Eric Bentley's documentary play *Are You Now or Have You Ever Been?* and the film *The Way We Were* (whose treatment of the events is superficial, inaccurate, and confusing). But this part of the story is already documented at least fairly well in far better books than Kanfer's, such as Walter Goodman's *The Committee* and Eric Bentley's *Thirty Years of Treason* (which consists of transcripts from the hearings, very well-selected and well-edited, with other relevant material and with commentary by Bentley); and it has been all along, however dimly, a part of the public consciousness.

The most valuable service Kanfer's book performs is calling our attention to, and informing us about, a crucial aspect of these times that is not well known: the activities of what Kanfer calls the "secular blacklisters," men like Vincent Hartnett and Lawrence Johnson, who operated through organizations like American Business Consultants and Aware, Inc., and publications like the volume *Red Channels* and the periodical *Counterattack.* The Committee's main province was the movie industry; that of the secular blacklisters was television and radio. However shameful, the Committee's hearings were at least carried out by elected officials and in public, where it was possible to see them for what they were. The secular blacklisters were self-appointed vigilantes who operated insidiously behind the scenes. They would sniff out "subversives" and denounce them; they would

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encourage letter-writing campaigns against them and would pressure sponsors and producers to drop them. At the same time they turned their organizations into almost the only channels through which a black- or gray-listed performer could successfully rehabilitate himself. Their standards were severe. Mere proof of innocence was seldom enough. Confession and a public avowal of patriotism in *Counterattack* or a similar organ were often required. These moral cretins wielded ruthlessly their enormous illegitimate power throughout the first half of the 50's and damaged or ruined hundreds of careers and lives.

Kanfer is very good at selecting telling incidents and quotations. At the height of the television blacklist, a CBS executive remarks: "The trouble with people who've never joined anything and therefore are 'safe' for us to use is that they usually aren't very good writers or actors or producers or, hell, human beings." A witness writes to one of the Ten (a superlative instance of Sartrean *mauvaise foi*): "I have come to recognize that I was not formed in the heroic mold. Unfortunately, my father and mother bred a moral weakling. I'm truly sorry, but because I am what I am I'm going to work and get paid for my cowardice."

Unfortunately the book is seldom much more than a stringing-together of quotations and anecdotes. There are some acute observations, and some honest, forceful indignation, but there is little analysis and no shaping idea or form other than chronology. At the same time, many remarks are characterized by a brutal reduction of psychological and political nuances and complexities. Moreover, the book is extremely slovenly in both factual accuracy and style. In a list of the original unfriendly Nineteen, three are given the wrong profession (e.g., "producer" for "scenarist," etc.). In the first sentence of a two-sentence quotation from an essay by Robert Warshow, there are three mistakes in wording. Such errors in matters I know make me mistrust Kanfer in matters I don't know about. Worse than this, most of the book is written in a vulgar, cluttered, *Time*-derived style—replete with hyperbole, epithets, cumbersome metaphors, fuzzy diction, and obscure words—whose tone of nagging sarcasm serves Kanfer as a substitute for an idea. This style, as Peter Biskind has remarked, seems to have its own autonomy: it goes along on its own, often at odds with the material, blurring and distorting it. The sarcasm colors everyone and everything indiscriminately. Although the book is ostensibly meant as a gesture of commiseration with the victims of the blacklist, in its treatment of them it is often like those Hollywood movies (e.g., *The Detective*) which, under the guise of tolerance for some oppressed group, miss no opportunity to mock and caricature it. Sometimes the style is simply out of control. Kanfer describes the late Stanley Prager, a comedian, as "a born survivor, a round cork of a man who would

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bob to the top of an ocean or a sewer." Who would ever imagine that Kanfer means to praise Prager? But apparently he does. In the introduction, he expresses his gratitude to Prager, one of the few who survived professionally *without* giving names, for relating his experiences "openly, without rancor or regret. His life was a model of grace under pressure."

To SOMEONE reading the history of this period, and reading the excerpts of the testimonies in *Thirty Years of Treason,* perhaps the most striking and saddening thing is that almost no one comes off well morally and intellectually. If there are acts of considerable moral courage (such as the Ten's defiance of the Committee) and if there are witnesses who give extremely informative and even cogent narratives of the past (this is true of a number of friendly witnesses), there is almost no individual who comes anywhere near being a model of both intellectual candor and moral courage. Why is this?

Well, for one thing, these people —among them men and women of considerable talent, intelligence, and good will—were not intellectuals nor really political people, and of course we will be disappointed if we expect them to have behaved as if they were: they were actors, directors, and screenwriters whose political thought and activities were a virtuous sideline. (It's worth remarking that the two people whose postures before the Committee probably came closest to being exemplary—Lillian Hellman and Arthur Miller—were playwrights with only a tangential relationship to Hollywood.) This is one reason (others were the Popular Front and the war) why the line between fellow-travelers and liberals who wanted things to go well with the Russians was so hard to draw. Often there was no such line; these people's politics were not thought-out or well-defined. And it was precisely because they lacked the intellectual's creed of free inquiry that the orthodox Communists among them managed to remain so as long as they did—in some cases not recognizing or acknowledging the truth about Stalin until Khrushchev made it acceptable to do so. Conversely the party, by its policies of secrecy and its rigid ideological prescriptions, made truth and candor virtually impossible for these as for all its members. The Communists among the Nineteen had admirable reasons for refusing to be candid with the Committee; but as a rule they were not candid anywhere else either, for reasons that were not admirable.

The contention that the hearings and (in some cases) the blacklist were in the national interest was of course implicit—and in many cases quite explicit—in the testimonies of the friendly witnesses. But there is a significant difference between the two groups of friendly witnesses—the right-wingers and the ex-Communists—in the spirit in which this contention was made. In the mouths of right-wingers like Adolph Menjou and Leo McCarey this contention, however idiotic, was evidently sincere. In the mouths of the ex-Communists, despite their legitimate grievances against the party, this contention was hypocritical, a complete rationalization: these men's testimonies were completely self-serving, motivated solely by fear and a desire to go on working.

Yet here, too, remembering that they were not intellectuals or really political people helps us understand the lamentable posture of both groups, not only the stupidity and callousness of the one but the moral, intellectual, and political emptiness of the other. An intellectual's function is to tell the truth, and he can still perform his function as long as he can write or speak. In a sense, he can perform his function even by being silenced, even by dying for what he believes. But the function of these men was to work in movies, and if they couldn't do that they had no function. And when it comes to men like Elia Kazan and especially Robert Rossen, who at their best were among the few genuine artists in Hollywood, along with repugnance for their behavior one can feel a certain sympathy. They may have felt they needed to make a lot of money, but one can also believe they really needed to direct movies—in a way that Dalton Trumbo, who seems to have worked in films *only* to make money, and whose work shows it, did not need to write them. And in movies like Rossen's *The Hustler* and Kazan's *On the Waterfront* (a sophisticated rationalization for informing but also a very good movie) their work is its own justification.

BUT finally most of the blame must go to the Committee, the blacklisters, and the hysteria which gave birth to them. For they created a climate in which the cost of virtues like honor and candor was exorbitant or in which it was practically impossible to practice such virtues. It was impossible to be honest before the Committee without being an informer and causing others to be blacklisted. It was practically impossible to refuse to be an informer without, at the very least, being blacklisted and perhaps going to jail. It was (after 1951) virtually impossible to refuse to be an informer without being silent about one's own past (by the ruling that "disclosure of a fact waives the privilege as to details"—see Lillian Hellman's testimony). In this sense, in Hollywood at least, to have ever been a Communist was truly to be damned: you were damned if you did inform and damned if you didn't. Eventually it was virtually impossible, within the Hollywood community, publicly to attack the legitimacy of the Committee or its methods, to defend the Ten, or to speak out against the blacklist without being blacklisted oneself. Is it any wonder, then, that although this period gives us some truthful words and some saintly acts, no real saints emerge?

Losses like these are not made up in a generation. The losses of this period are our losses too.

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

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

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

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